Novaya Gaz., No. 35, 20-26.09.99

Excerpts and Commentary

• "...in the critical ability to reason and not just swallow information, but also to digest it."
• "— And how do you evaluate the authorities' calls for total vigilance?"
• Vladlen MAKSIMOV: "...[if they] go, then the losses will be more large-scale. And that means—one must not give in to fear today especially. As cliché as it sounds."

By Blowing Up Houses, Bandits Blow Up the State

Speech by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in the State Duma on September 14
(From the transcript published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta)

We were supposed to talk about the situation in Dagestan. But I think you will agree: now, after the new terrorist attacks in Moscow, the issue is much broader. We are talking about the state security of the country.

It is obvious to us—both in Dagestan and in Moscow—that we are dealing not with amateur militants, but with well-trained international saboteurs. Their goal is to demoralize the authorities, to shake the foundations of the state...

Today, the safety of the population in Russia's large cities is becoming a major problem. Moscow is in first place among them. It must be admitted that the problem of the safety of Muscovites arose long before the explosion on Manezhnaya Square. But we still do not know the names of the organizers of the terrorist attacks in the Moscow metro and the prevented attacks near the buildings of federal security agencies. To a large extent, the blame lies with regional and local authorities.

But we cannot blame everything only on their negligence and indecision. Federal leaders are personally responsible for order not only in their own departments, but also in the territorial structures subordinate to them. Today, it is required to effectively restore the unconditional direct subordination of regional units of security agencies to their federal centers.

By blowing up the houses of our fellow citizens, the bandits are blowing up the state. They are undermining authority—not presidential, not city, not Duma authority. But authority in the country as such.

Honorable deputies!

It is time to frankly admit: the contagion of terrorism has long since crossed the administrative borders of krais and oblasts. It has become a national problem for Russia. Therefore, we will act step by step.

Action Plan

1. Task number 1. Protection of the population from bandits. Their identification, suppression, and bringing to justice. Organization of necessary measures to ensure the personal safety of citizens.
2. Task number 2. Finding and preventing hotspots of conflict. Elimination of the terrorist training bases themselves, depriving them of financial sources and personnel replenishment both from within Russia and from abroad.
3. Task number 3. Treating the "virus of war" in the North Caucasus by applying a whole range of measures to stabilize the socio-economic and political situation in the region.

Another source of problems is that the true scale of the threat was not correctly and timely assessed. In my view, the Ministry of Nationalities and other relevant agencies did not show proper persistence and consistency in this direction.

And finally, a special place in solving North Caucasian problems is given to the settlement of the situation in Chechnya.

Conclusion on page 3

RUSSIANS DO NOT BELIEVE IN RUSSIA

How the regions view the Moscow bombings

According to data from the Agency for Regional Political Research:

• 85 percent of Russians know about the bombings in Moscow, with the highest awareness among residents of the North Caucasus—likely because they have already grown accustomed to expecting "retribution" even without any reason.
• Those in complete ignorance (12 percent) live mainly in villages.

Blame Allocation in the Terrorist Attack

Note: The distribution of blame is described as being "very similar to a childhood fear embodied in a mythical image."

Perception of Security Control

• 43 percent of respondents are sure that the security ministries do not control the situation in Dagestan.
  • This opinion is held more often by residents of the north and northwest of Russia, and, for some reason, by supporters of Zhirinovsky and Lebed.
  • Ural residents and the NDR (Our Home is Russia) electorate are more optimistic (34 percent), believing the situation is under control.
  • Pensioners and the unemployed find it more difficult than others to answer this question.

Belief in Militant Support

• 67 percent of Russians are convinced that groups exist within Russia that support and finance the militants in every way.
• 21 percent of citizens are stumped by this question; they no longer know what to think.
• Only 12 percent resolutely reject such suggestions.

Information Department

[Sidebar]

• Yuri Luzhkov's declaration of a hunt for "persons of Caucasian nationality" led to Islamic centers increasingly becoming targets of attacks and turning to law enforcement for help.
• A German newspaper reported that for law enforcement, the hunt for terrorists and the tightening of the passport regime are primarily a new excuse to make some illegal money on the side.
• In an interview with the Associated Press, Islamic militant commander Khattab promised to plant bombs all over Russia. This conversation took place in Chechnya, between the two apartment building bombings in Moscow.
  • Khattab, considered the organizer of a series of terrorist acts in Russia, stated then: "From now on we will fight not only against Russian planes and tanks. From now on, Russians will have bombs everywhere. Let Russia prepare for explosions in its cities."
• However, on Tuesday, the day after the explosion on Kashirskoye Highway, he told the Interfax agency the exact opposite. According to him, he has nothing to do with the four explosions in Russia. "We do not want to be likened to those who kill sleeping peaceful people with bombs and shells," he stated.
• Shamil Basaev also completely denies his involvement in the bombings.

World in a Week, No. 2, 4-11.9.99

Moscow is Shaken by Explosions

The headline, "Trud," responds to the emergency on Guryanova Street. The newspaper quotes the prefect of the South-Western District, Vladimir Zotov:

"Now we are trying to do everything to resettle the survivors and find apartments for them. At the moment, 68 apartments have been found in Maryino alone. Although, truth be told, people will have to be resettled all over Moscow."

Analysis from "Izvestia"

In the article "Explosion," "Izvestia" states:

"The sharp aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus was bound to be followed by a surge of terror. The explosion in Buynaksk was the first warning bell, to which the federal special services (the entire machine of the executive branch, including Russia's overloaded and bloated intelligence community, the government apparatus, and analytical structures) should have responded with adequate preventive measures. The executive branch should have strengthened the security scheme for the common man—the ordinary worker who lies down on the sofa in front of the TV in the evening and in no way expects an explosion with a power of several hundred kilograms of TNT.

And such preventive measures are not a utopia. The circle of potential terrorists is narrow; they are known to counterintelligence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is technically feasible to track their movement in real time. In addition, there are landmark events. For example, the bombing of Shamil Basaev's native village of Vedeno was an obvious prerequisite for a terrorist attack. And Basaev indeed publicly threatened to take revenge for the air raid on Vedeno. No one, it seems, took his words seriously.

Until the mid-70s, the whole world fought terrorism with the only method available then—AFTER an explosion or assassination attempt, the search for terrorists began based on the clues they left behind. The Israelis were the first to come to their senses—they began to fight terrorists BEFORE they committed their planned crimes. This is a technically difficult task, requiring special skill and sometimes considerable courage from counterintelligence officers. This tactic was adopted by almost all developed countries of the world experiencing problems with terrorism. Sometimes enlightenment also came to the Russian special services. Have you heard anything about Salman Raduyev in the last six months? He is incapacitated, and thanks for this should be given to that anonymous sniper who hit him in the head with an explosive bullet."

"Izvestia" provides preliminary data on "losses":
* Deaths: 20 people
* Wounded: 152
* Hospitalized: 73

Residential Building Blown Up: Investigating the Cause

"Vechernyaya Moskva" reports on the tragedy, attempting to understand the causes:

"Gas doesn't explode like that," said firefighters and rescuers, "windows would have blown out and the floors between apartments would have been damaged. But for the house to just fold up?.." And teenagers walking nearby saw some kind of glowing object fly through the sky with a whistle toward the house that later exploded."

FSB explosives experts share with "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" that:

"Only professional demolitionists could have achieved such a destructive effect."

In the article "Mystery of the Night Explosion," their assumption was made public: the power of the explosion was at least 200 kilograms of TNT.

Media Reactions and Warnings

• "Moskovskaya Pravda" headlined its article as "Concrete Trap":
  > "...The tragedy strongly resembles the terrorist attacks in Kaspiysk and Buynaksk. The words of Khattab come to mind: 'Moscow will choke in blood.' The explosion in the shopping center on Manezh Square, for which the Dagestan Liberation Army claimed responsibility, seemed the limit of audacity and cruelty, but in light of recent events it becomes clear: Manezh was the beginning, Guryanova Street is the continuation, the end is not soon. It is not our task to frighten anyone, but the situation is heating up."

• "Parlamentskaya Gazeta" asks: "The second explosion has thundered. Are we waiting for a third?" and warns Muscovites:
  > "It seems that we all need to look around carefully, look at the conditions in which we exist. And first of all—at basements, attics, entrances... The doors are wide open, leave any junk, even a bomb, no one will pay attention."

• "Ekho Moskvy" radio station distributed the words of Yuri Luzhkov:
  > "The explosion in a residential building in Moscow can with the highest probability be called sabotage, a terrorist attack. It can be said that hexogen exploded—an explosive substance that is twice as powerful as TNT, which is used only for combat purposes."

Law Enforcement Follow-up

The radio station further reports that law enforcement agencies have:
* Identified a circle of persons possibly involved in the explosion of the residential building in Pechatniki.
* Drawn up composite sketches based on eyewitness testimony.

Mir za nedelyu [World in a Week]

No. 3, 11-18.09.99

EXPLOSION WITH HOME DELIVERY

"Novye Izvestia" Reports

"Novye Izvestia" reports that on Tuesday evening, the capital's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, discussed a prevented terrorist attack on Borisovskie Prudy Street during a program on TV Center called 'Face to Face'.

The mayor listed items found on the first floor of the house that escaped destruction:
* Sugar
* Saltpeter
* Aluminum powder
* Plastic explosive
* Electric detonators

However, the report notes an unexpected conclusion: all these materials were illegally brought by terrorists from Chechnya.

The publication challenges Yuri Luzhkov, stating that even with the tightened regime, materials to blow up a house can be legally purchased in Moscow without police intervention. Journalists from 'Novye Izvestia' demonstrated how one can "assemble" explosives in Moscow with sufficient money and a classifieds newspaper.

FSB and MUR Sources

'Segodnya' reports that sources within the FSB and MUR (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department) claim to know the origin and method of the explosives.
* Several addresses have been identified where terrorists brought explosives disguised as granulated sugar.
* At least six bombs have already been defused.

The Kashirka Incident

The success of the security forces began hours after the explosion on Kashirka.
* A "Gazelle" driver reported being hired by a man matching the terrorist's sketch weeks before the explosion.
* Together, they collected "bags of sugar" from a warehouse in the basement of a house on Krasnodarskaya Street.
* The materials were transported to Guryanova Street, Kashirskoe Highway, and Borisovskie Prudy.

Operatives found:
* 6 explosive devices in the basement of the house on Borisovskie Prudy Street, with timers set for September 16 and September 20.
* 2.5 tons of various explosives capable of destroying the 10-entrance house and burying at least 1,200 people.
* An additional 4.5 tons of explosives were found in the basement of a house on Krasnodarskaya Street hours later.

The bags bore the marking "Erkenshakhar Sugar", the stamp of the only sugar factory in Karachay-Cherkessia (village of Erkenshakhar, Adyge-Khablsky district). The bags were stuffed with hexogen. It was determined that the explosives arrived in Moscow at least last autumn, as the sugar factory's production had been suspended since November.

Task force members also found the driver's associates. In 24 hours, over 100 people were interviewed (about 10 detained), including those who received assignments from the same dispatcher who advertised in the newspaper "Iz Ruk v Ruki" [From Hand to Hand]. Drivers stated that some picked up the "sugar" from a Mercedes trailer parked near the 51st km of the MKAD [Moscow Ring Road].

'Ekho Moskvy' Updates

'Ekho Moskvy' reports that the search continues:
* On Thursday, residents were evacuated from several houses, but explosives were found in garages in Kapotnya.
* Kirill Mizulin, head of MUR, reported the discovery of about 3.5 tons of explosive substances.
* Another batch was found in Proektiruemy Proezd, in an industrial zone, inside a box rented by a person wanted under a fake passport with the surname Laipanov.

Additionally, the re-registration of visitors in the capital continues, with about 20,000 unregistered people found.

Civic Response and City Reaction

• 'Trud' notes that the explosions on Manezhnaya Square and Pechatniki, along with the tragedy on Kashirskoe Highway, have shaken the city, leading Moscow to rise in defense.
• 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' reports that in the Chertanovo microdistrict, volunteer detachments have begun forming to protect public order. Lists are being compiled in ZHEKs (housing offices) for men who will guard their homes, and volunteers are granted the right to detain suspicious persons.
• 'Vremya MN' indicates that residents are daily requesting repairs for entrance doors, code equipment, intercom installation, or organizing security guards.

Continued on page 2.

42 TV SEPTEMBER 16

Trud-7, 16.9.99
TELE-ACCENT

At dawn on Monday, the television programs of the two most popular Russian channels—"Good Morning" (ORT) and "Good Morning, Russia" (RTR)—as they began their broadcasts, were ashamed of their radiant names. The morning was not good. Another explosion shook the capital. Television reporters, to their credit, established a dialogue with viewers from the scene of the tragedy in the shortest possible time.

PEOPLE AND NON-PEOPLE

Despite the bad weather, the crowd of onlookers, and the police precautions that kept people away from the ruins, journalists managed to create a sense of presence at the scene for the audience. We heard eyewitness accounts, comments from officials, and saw the tears of relatives and loved ones of those who lived in the house on Kashirskoye Highway.

The rescuers worked even better. On their actions depended whether the few who remained alive under the rubble would receive help in time. It so happened that on this morning, the same Tsentrospas brigade of the Ministry of Emergency Situations was on duty that had worked at the site of the residential building explosion in Pechatniki last week. The guys did not spare themselves.

S. Alekseev's program "Emergency Call," placed on the morning air of ORT outside the schedule, turned out to be very timely. Dedicated to the guys from the capital's Tsentrospas, it told the story of the tragic death of one of them—the high-altitude climber Maxim. Three weeks ago, he was descending from a roof to open a metal door on the eleventh floor that had accidentally slammed shut, leaving a two-year-old child alone inside.

Maxim and his colleagues had video cameras. They filmed a lot both at work and at home. Therefore, the authors of the program had a lot of material dedicated to the deceased at their disposal. We see him in action, observe him at rest, and communicate with his relatives and friends. We see his body sprawled on the ground near the ill-fated house. I imagine it was unbearably painful for his comrades from the squad to make these recordings, but the camera in their hands did not tremble. They worked for us, the viewers, so that we would know the price of rescue.

The rescuers' filming turned out to be so professional, and the dramaturgy of the episodes making up the whole so consistent and complete, that at some point it began to seem as if we were watching a feature film rather than a documentary. But then you notice how careful the rescuer-cameramen are in telling the terrible, bloody details of what is happening. How restrained they are in showing bodies mangled by death and suffering.

The broadcast of the program—at the point where the story of the hero reached its tragic climax—was interrupted by an emergency news bulletin. On the screen, we saw Maxim's colleagues—MChS personnel and their minister, S. Shoigu. Having seen many terrible things "by virtue of his office," he seemed shaken by what had happened. About the organizers and perpetrators of the terrorist attack, he said succinctly: "These are non-humans!"

And again I noticed how the theme of the victims of terror was presented on the screen. The camera tactfully, from a distance, without emphasizing shocking details, told about the dead. Terrible details (corpses mutilated beyond recognition, body fragments) were heard only in the verbal sequence, giving way in the "picture" to figurative solutions. A carpet runner, which as a result of the explosion ended up thrown onto the branches of a tall tree, became a kind of screen metaphor for the destructive blast.

I speak in such detail about seemingly external circumstances for a reason. Soul-chilling bloody details affect millions of viewers not only depressingly, not only by evoking compassion. They often give rise to a blind thirst for revenge. On the streets, I have already heard more than once these days decisive proposals to turn repressions against Chechens living in Moscow. TV, fortunately, broadcasts these opinions very cautiously. However, in the program "Together" on the day of the explosion, information was heard from one regional center where a "witch hunt" had already begun.

Representatives of the authorities these days are carefully formulating their accusations. They do not forget to repeat that crime has no nationality. They dismiss religious motives. TV strictly adheres to such a position. But until recently, this unwritten rule of mass broadcasting was crudely violated. In one of the issues of "Segodnya" (Today), journalist V. Grunsky, with harsh commentary, showed terrible footage from Chechnya. Before the television camera, a militant shot through the palm of a hostage. In another frame, a man in a red shirt, who found himself in the hands of Chechens, pleaded for help. He said that a large ransom was required, otherwise he would not live. And a moment later, a militant with a huge axe cut off his head in one stroke. I confess, it is scary for me even to recount this—let alone watch it. Nevertheless, such a civilized television company, which knows the rules of the game perfectly, as NTV, showed this "extreme" scene.

Last Saturday, in the program "Fourth Estate," dedicated to our media, there was an attempt to react to the sensational television story. The host asked the opinion of a British journalist from the BBC Moscow bureau. He was unequivocal: "Under no circumstances would such footage be shown on TV in our country." But O. Dobrodeev, general director of NTV, remained unperturbed: "Sometimes such things must be shown."

No clear explanations: when exactly, under what circumstances, for what purposes? The questions remained hanging in the air.

Anri VARTANOV.

Don't Be Afraid to Become "Snitches"

Trud-7, 16.9.99

The tragic results of recent times force us to seek answers to questions that until very recently seemed misplaced. Why have such bloody terrorist attacks become possible in Russia? Who failed to keep watch? What should be done now? Sergey Goncharov, President of the Association of Veterans of the "Alpha" anti-terrorist units and former deputy commander of the legendary "Alpha," is certain that in former times, terrorists' chances of success were minimal.

• Q: Can we speak now about the existence of a system for fighting terrorism in Russia?
  • A: We can speak of it, but this system is still very fragmented, and the conditions of its work are far from ideal.
• Q: What do you mean?
  • A: For example, the collapse of the administrative-legal regime in the country and the weakening of visa and border controls have created serious complications in the work of the special services. After all, the primary bread of counterintelligence is timely information, the possibility of at least minimal reasonable observation of migration flows, and tracking. The KGB was very strong in its agent apparatus. Now, I doubt that we have any agents at all in Chechnya, for instance.
• Q: If we speak specifically about Chechen terrorism, what measures should be considered today?
  • A: To start with, we must decide what Chechnya is—a subject of the Federation or a foreign state that has unleashed aggression. Everything will depend on that.
• Q: Special units whose main task is the fight against terrorism have existed in Russia for years. How would you characterize the level of training, for example, of modern "Alpha" personnel?
  • A: I think that this level has not dropped. And the guys have gained colossal experience. They are well-armed, and their physical training is appropriate.
• Q: Many today are increasingly asking: if we have such good anti-terrorist special units, why don't they, as is customary throughout the world, eliminate the terrorist leaders? After all, Basaev and Khattab appear on screens daily...
  • A: Such decisions cannot be made by ordinary officers. The state leaders must first decide on this. And no such strong-willed decisions have been forthcoming.
• Q: What advice could you give people regarding the prevention of terrorism?
  • A: The most elementary. The main thing they must understand for themselves is that no matter what measures the special services or city leaders take, the preservation of personal life largely depends on the citizens themselves. In such difficult times, they need to organize themselves, look around more carefully, and contact police officers more often. Throughout the world, contact with law enforcement agencies is considered a civic duty. But here, it is always called "snitching."

Aleksandr DANILKIN

Terrorism: Cossacks and Robbers

Kommersant-Vlast, No. 35, 7.9.99

The explosion at the "Okhotny Ryad" shopping complex on Manezhnaya Square, as monstrous as it may sound, was not unexpected. No, of course, no one (except, perhaps, the organizers of the terrorist attack themselves) expected it to blow up specifically at Manezhnaya and specifically on the eve of September 1. But the people were internally prepared for something to explode somewhere.

IGOR FEDOROV

The symptoms of the coming explosion were all too obvious.

1. Election Campaign: The election campaign began, and it has already become a tradition for us—elections are necessarily accompanied by high-profile terrorist attacks. The current composition of the State Duma was elected, one might say, under explosions. And when they started electing the president, things started booming in full: buses, trolleybuses, the metro.
2. Caucasus War: Another war began in the Caucasus, involving recognized terrorists Shamil Basaev and Khattab. When these figures take the warpath, expect sabotage and terrorist attacks. For the full picture, only Salman Raduyev is missing. However, it's nauseating enough without him.
3. FSB Warning: Back in early August, literally in the first days of the fighting in Dagestan, the FSB warned: according to information it had, militants intended to "sow horror and terror" in major Russian cities in the near future.

So all that remained was to wait for when and where the inevitable explosion would occur. And following the explosion, the first versions were immediately born: the Chechen and the Chekist.

These two versions have invariably accompanied all terrorist attacks in Russia since 1994.

• "Chekist trace" supporters claim the explosion was organized by the FSB with the goal of introducing a state of emergency in the country and canceling the elections, in which the authorities are doomed to defeat.
• Those who follow the "Chechen trace" are convinced the terrorist attack is the work of Chechen (Dagestani) militants. Being unable to withstand the Russian army in open combat, terrorists carry out explosions with the aim of confusing and morally breaking the population of Russia.

Self-proclaimed "revolutionary writers" who get underfoot are irritably brushed aside. The point is not at all how close one or the other is to the truth. The point is different: people are inclined to believe both. And this means that in the public consciousness, the opposing Russian special services and Chechen militants are perceived almost identically—as a threat.

The reason for such a perception is probably that both have become alien, all-powerful, and mysterious to the population. Both are, to put it mildly, not entirely sincere in their communication with the people.

• Militant leaders object to accusations of terrorist attacks by saying: "Why would we organize terrorist attacks against peaceful residents of Russian cities who oppose the war and thus are objectively our allies?"
• However, in Budyonnovsk, Basaev seized not barracks or a city administration building, but a maternity hospital.
• The special services declare: "Our task is to protect the safety and lives of citizens." But, preparing for the storming of Pervomayskoye, the first thing they did was announce that the militants had shot the hostages. But the hostages were still alive.

Yes, of course, war has its own rules. And what is considered a lie in normal life is called enemy disinformation in war conditions. It's just that in the conditions of an information war, it is most often the public consciousness that becomes deceived.

The Cossacks and robbers fighting each other have merged in the mind of the frightened and confused man in the street into a single image of a "Cossack-robber." Elusive, ubiquitous, and merciless terrorists walk through the country, leaving behind bloody Chekist-Chechen... [text cut off]

Kommersant Vlast No. 35[336] - September 7, 1999

TERRORISM: The Chekist Trace

The 1994 Moscow Sabotage Wave

In 1994, when the military operation in Chechnya began, a wave of transport sabotage swept through Moscow. The incidents included:
* November: A powerful bomb exploded on a railway bridge over the Yauza.
* December: An explosion occurred between the Kozhukhovo and Kanatchikovo stations of the Moscow District Railway.
* December 27: A route 33 bus exploded near the southern entrance to the VVC.

Law enforcement agencies immediately attributed all these explosions to Chechens retaliating.

However, these strikes were strange—there were no casualties, unless one counts the concussed bus driver and the saboteur who blew himself up while planting the bomb on the Yauza bridge.

The "Lanako" Connection

MUR (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department) operatives discovered that behind these crimes was the "Lanako" oil trading firm, which had ties to the Moscow UFSB. The Chekists not only provided documents for FAPSI employee and firm co-founder Maxim Lazovsky but also protected him.

• One of his bodyguards, Alexei Yumashkin, recently received the rank of lieutenant colonel.
• MUR operatives suspected Lazovsky of many serious crimes.
• They detained him and intended to charge him with banditry, but were unable to do so.

Conveniently for Lazovsky and the counterintelligence officers protecting him, Vladimir Tskhai, head of the 12th department of MUR who coordinated the "Lanako" investigation, died suddenly of an unknown illness. The case subsequently fell apart into separate episodes.

Lazovsky ultimately received two years, but for drug possession, and is already free.

The Bus Explosion Case

The episode involving the bus explosion also reached court. Lazovsky's former driver, Vladimir Akimov, who was arrested by MUR officers in 1996 for selling a revolver, unexpectedly gave testimony in this case.

Akimov claimed that he blew up the bus with retired colonel Vladimir Vorobyov, who also worked at "Lanako" and was concurrently an undercover UFSB agent. They allegedly did this at the request of a Chechen "authority", supposedly because Vorobyov paid Akimov back for a monetary debt.

• Akimov later recanted his testimony.
• The Moscow City Court acquitted Akimov (who received three years for the pistol).
• The court found Vorobyov guilty, sentencing him to five years, which the Supreme Court later reduced to three years.
• Vorobyov was scheduled for release at the end of August.

Summary of 1994 Sabotage

At the end of 1994, a wave of transport sabotage swept through Moscow. It was noted that there were no casualties among the population, which seemed strange.

Vladikavkaz Explosion (March 19, 1999)

A powerful explosion that occurred on March 19, 1999, at the Central Market of Vladikavkaz, claimed 64 lives. The organizers have not yet been identified.

There are two conflicting versions regarding the perpetrators:
1. One version suggests the terrorist attack was organized by Chechen field commander Arbi Barayev (who was seen in the city with two henchmen on the day of the explosion).
2. Another version claims the crime was committed by militants of Khattab or Ruslan Khaikharoev.

Kommersant VLAST No. 35[336] - September 7, 1999

TERRORISM: The Chechen Trace

It is simply impossible to count the number of explosions thundering across the country. Even more numerous are the various explosive devices found in a wide variety of places that did not have time to explode. If a successful or unsuccessful explosion does not look like an outright criminal one, the authorities immediately talk about terror.

True, rarely has anyone taken responsibility for the terrorist attacks (with the exception of Salman Raduev, who at one time attributed all explosions to himself, and Komsomol extremists who blew up monuments to tsars), but it was taken for granted that it was the Chechens.

Law enforcement agencies managed to solve only three high-profile terrorist attacks, the perpetrators of which actually carried out the orders of Chechen field commanders Ruslan Khaikharoev and Salman Raduev. Teenagers worked for the former, women for the latter. The goal of the actions, as stated in the instructions seized from the militants, was:
* "to sow panic"
* "show the inability of the Russian authorities to control the situation"
* "increase tension in the region."

Historical Incidents

1977 Moscow Attack

• The first terrorist attack occurred in 1977 in Moscow.
• A bomb exploded in the Moscow metro.
• The explosives were hidden in a cast-iron roasting pan.
• Counterintelligence veterans found the organizers using a surviving piece of glass from a "Nairi" alarm clock as a timer mechanism, as fingerprints remained on the glass.
• The terrorists managed to detonate another bomb (on Nikolskaya Street) and planted a third, but the Chekists neutralized it.
  • Photo Note: The head of the press center of the UFSB for Moscow and the Moscow Region, Sergei Bogdanov, demonstrates a model of the explosive device in the roasting pan.

June 1996 Sabotage in Nalchik

• Khaikharoev ordered 17-year-old Akhmed Vorokov and his 16-year-old brother Ismagil to carry out sabotage in Nalchik.
• They planted a homemade bomb equivalent to 4 kg of TNT in a regular "Ikarus" bus on the Minvody—Nalchik—Vladikavkaz route.
• Additionally, the brothers mined:
  • The railway station of the city of Prokhladny (Kabardino-Balkaria).
  • A carriage of a local electric train.
• The bombs at the station and in the train did not go off, but six people died and 26 were injured in the bus explosion.
• The brothers were caught a few days later.
  • February 1997: Ismagil was sentenced to seven and a half years, and Akhmed to seven years in prison.

April 1997 Pyatigorsk Attack

• Raduev's subordinates, Chechen women Fatima Taimaskhanova and Aset Dadasheva, blew up the station in Pyatigorsk.
• Two people died and 22 were injured.
• Raduev promised the terrorists $50,000 each, but when they were caught by FSB officers a few days later, he did not give their relatives a penny.
• February of that year, a Stavropol court sentenced:
  • Taimaskhanova to 19 years.
  • Dadasheva to 16 years.
• Both were sent to serve their sentences in Vologda. (Note: There is a very strong Chechen diaspora there (15,000 people out of 400,000 residents), and the female saboteurs will not be in need while in the zone.)

Recent Developments

If a successful or unsuccessful explosion does not look like an outright criminal one, the authorities immediately talk about Chechen terror. True, rarely does any Chechen take responsibility for terrorist attacks.

• Two months ago, two more fighters from Raduev's group—Rustam Mezhiev and Ramazan Kozroev—went to the camps.
• By decision of the Supreme Court of North Ossetia, they received 15 years each for sabotage in the Prigorodny district of the republic.
• As part of a terrorist group commanded by an Ingush criminal "authority" and part-time officer of Raduev's army, Khasan Khadziev, Mezhiev and Kozroev mined roads near the village of Tarskoye.
• They were also supposed to take hostages from a nearby military unit, but Khadziev's detachment ran into the police and the military and was destroyed.
• Only Mezhiev and Kozroev escaped.
  • Mezhiev is serving his sentence in a camp near Saratov.
  • Kozroev is serving his sentence near Vladikavkaz.

Precedent: The First Terrorist?

The absolutely closed nature of not only the investigation but also the trial makes one doubt that this case is the first success in the fight against terrorism in the capital.

"MN" has addressed the strange circumstances of this story twice (No. 24 for 1997 and No. 42 for 1998).

Background of the Incident

• On December 27, 1994, at the very beginning of the Chechen war, an empty bus was blown up with an ammonite stick at the final stop of Route No. 33 near VDNKh.
• The driver escaped with a slight scare; no one else was hurt.
• The main suspect, Vladimir V., was arrested only in August 1996, shortly after the explosions of two trolleybuses in Moscow.

The Suspect and Evidence

By that time, V. was a retired lieutenant colonel engaged in small business, who had previously taught (he is a Candidate of Technical Sciences) at the academy.

• In 1997, the newspaper "Moskovsky Komsomolets" reported on the imminent solving of the "terrorist attack" (apparently at the suggestion of the investigation).
• As evidence of V.'s guilt, the article reported that he:
  • "...while a student at a military school, made a firecracker for fun and tried to throw it out of the dormitory window..."

V. was identified as an accomplice in the bus bombing by his business acquaintance Akimov.

• Akimov had previously been arrested in a completely different case and gave a "voluntary confession" while in custody.
• Akimov was being sent for a psychiatric evaluation and repeatedly changed his testimony.
• Akimov reported that the bus was blown up on the orders of a certain Chechen; however, the "customer" of the terrorist attack never appeared before the court.

In general, due to the closed nature of the trial, it remains unknown whether any more weightier evidence of the terrorist's guilt was presented to the court.

The Verdict and Proceedings

A sentence was passed:

• The judge, whose surname the Moscow City Court office refused to give, sentenced V. to three years of imprisonment.
• This sentence was notable because the article of the code establishing responsibility for terrorism specifies a term of 5 to 10 years as a sanction.
• However, the terrorist had already been in pretrial detention for exactly three years by that point, so he was released from the courtroom.
• Vladimir V.'s sister stated that her brother is in a serious psychological state and does not want to meet with any journalists.

Official Statements

• Nina Barkova, the state prosecutor in this trial (a representative of the Moscow City Prosecutor's Office), requested exactly three years of imprisonment, citing that V. had no prior convictions, has children, and is characterized positively in his service. She refused to name other details of the case, citing secrecy.
• Viktor Lyutikov, another employee of the Moscow prosecutor's office, stated in a conversation with an "MN" correspondent:
  > "It is strange that judges and prosecutors hide the details of this case. However, by law, they are not obliged to tell the public all the circumstances of a trial in which a sentence has already been passed. As for the extremely short term for terrorism, I was the state prosecutor in the case of a mentally ill couple who threatened to blow up the 'Tsentralnaya' hotel. Terrorism was evident, but I requested only one year of imprisonment for the man."

Conclusion

Due to the numerous oddities and the secrecy of this case, the ability to evaluate the professionalism of both the investigation and its operational support is limited. For the same reasons, it is difficult to judge the prospects for solving and investigating the new terrorist acts just committed in Moscow, which have already led to far more tragic consequences.

Dmitry BALBUROV,
Leonid NIKITINSKY

MOSCOW NEWS No. 35, 1999

In August, the Moscow City Court delivered a verdict on an act of terror committed in December 1994.

[Photo caption:] A trolleybus blown up in 1996. Now it seems like a prank...

HELLISH MIX

Trud-7, 16.09.99

Inventor's Account: The Mystery of the 'Second Substance'

After hearing that terrorists who blew up houses in Pechatniki and on Kashirskoye Highway in Moscow used hexogen, I contacted E.G. Ledin, the inventor featured in the article "The Mystery of the 'Second Substance'" published in Trud on May 12, 1998. I asked if hexogen was the basis of the explosive he invented with V.P. Bogdanov even before the war, noting it was twice as powerful as TNT.

Evgeny Grigoryevich confirmed:

"Exactly that. For a long time, everything concerning the composition of 'A-9-2' — the 'second substance' — was secret, right down to the fact that it contained hexogen."

When asked, "What kind of hellish mix is this?" Ledin explained:

"More than a hundred years ago, a German named Henning obtained a chemical compound under this name, and in 1898 he patented it. For a long time it was of purely theoretical interest, because they did not know how to apply this powder. Only decades later, in countries that do not have their own oil from which TNT is made, for example, in Italy, hexogen began to be added to weaker explosives, but they did not get the effect."

Development and Spread

• Experiments continued in the Soviet Union.
• In 1938, two employees of the Leningrad Technical Laboratory of the Navy—a master and an engineer-sailor (Ledin had just graduated from the Technological Institute and was called up as a private)—managed to select the recipe and manufacturing method for hexogen charges that exploded after the shell pierced armor.
• For many years, no army in the world possessed this, until foreign intelligence agents obtained the secret.
• The formidable weapon spread globally, used in:
  • Shells
  • Bombs
  • Torpedoes
  • Mines
  • Rockets
• Unfortunately, it ended up in the hands of terrorists.

On the Leakage of Explosives

Evgeny Grigoryevich refuted media claims regarding the source of hexogen explosives reaching the Chechens from England or Arab states:

"In Russia, even after a significant part of ammunition production went to Ukraine and other sovereign republics, enough of it is produced, including for sale abroad. And it's not army warehouse warrant officers who trade it: the military is supplied with ready-made ammunition. The most likely possibility of a leak is during inter-plant transport of explosives to filling enterprises. An echelon with a secret cargo—but not secret to criminals—stops somewhere, and it is possible, though risky, to unnoticedly drop off a hundred kilograms. That is where the leak channel must be closed first and foremost."

The veteran also dismissed other media reports, such as the claim that hexane (an ordinary dye solvent) was found near the blast site on Kashirka, emphasizing that hexogen is a far more dangerous combustible component.

Source: Yuri Popov, Novaya Gazeta, No. 13, April 1999**

NITRO-EXPLOSION ON THE RUSSIAN MARKET

After years of journalistic investigation, I am convinced that the old Soviet principle persists in our country: it is not so important to own something, it is much more profitable to control something.

A prime example is how a group of individuals took over an entire industry—the production and sale of explosives.

The Rise of Control

1. Late Eighties: The state concern "Nitro-Vzryv" was created based on one of the main directorates (glavks) of the Ministry of Defense Industry, which managed explosives production for the national economy. The officials leading the glavk smoothly took charge of the state concern.
2. February 10, 1992: By Government Decree of the Russian Federation No. 267-r, the concern was granted the exclusive right to export and import explosives.
3. September 9, 1992: Government Decree of the Russian Federation No. 687 (signed by acting Prime Minister Gaidar) endowed the concern with all functions of control over the production and sale of explosives throughout the country.
4. Transition to JSC: The concern soon ceased to exist, replaced by the open joint-stock company (OAO) "Nitro-Vzryv." The state held no stake in this JSC. Despite this, the JSC retained all the aforementioned functions, effectively acting as a federal government body.
5. Confirmation of Monopoly: Two years later, Viktor Chernomyrdin, with Decree No. 732, reaffirmed "Nitro-Vzryv's" exclusive right to export and import.

The Mechanism of Control

From that point on, official documents showed the JSC as the entity authorized to issue licenses for explosive exports. To export, one needed to contact both the State Committee for Defense Industries and JSC "Nitro-Vzryv." Customs required a "Notice of Attachment to JSC 'Nitro-Vzryv'," a notice previously required by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for transporting and storing explosives. Furthermore, all entities were obliged to report explosive consumption to both Goskomstat and JSC "Nitro-Vzryv."

This resulted in an ordinary commercial structure profiting from explosives production and sales gaining complete control over its competitors—a strange model of free market relations where the possibility of influencing entire industries ended up in private hands. Since mining, transport, and hydraulic engineering construction depend on explosives, this control is immense.

Crucially, JSC "Nitro-Vzryv" gained the opportunity to participate in the control over the production and use of explosives, simply by buying shares. This is highly convenient for terrorists.

Attempts at Reversal

• Last year, the Kirienko government prepared a draft decree to return all control functions to the state, but the August 17 crisis forced Kirienko into resignation, leaving the decree as a draft.
• In January of this year, several shareholders of JSC "Nitro-Vzryv" petitioned First Deputy Prime Minister Maslyukov, strongly requesting "not to allow the destruction of the current system of control over the circulation of explosive materials and to give appropriate orders."
• Maslyukov responded by sending a resolution to the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, and other bodies, asking them to "consider, take measures to further strengthen the system of state control over the circulation of industrial explosive materials."

The author concludes that those claiming Russian authorities do not support private enterprise are mistaken; they are, in fact, ready to give everything to it.

MK, 14.9.99

AND SAVE. MORE

WHO IS WRITING THE HELLISH SCENARIO?

Analysis of both explosions—on Kashirka and on Guryanova Street—showed that they are almost completely identical.

• Explosive Composition: A TNT-RDX mixture (preliminary expert conclusion).
• Explosion Power: Approximately the same in TNT equivalent—200–300 kilograms.
• Tactic: Planting explosives long before the terrorist act.

According to Russian special services personnel, this is characteristic exclusively of secret services not accustomed to saving money.

There is no doubt that the two explosions were prepared by the same group of people. Both stores ("Furniture" on Kashirka and a construction store on Guryanova Street) were rented by the same person—according to documents, Mukhit Nazirovich Laipanov, born in 1964. By the way, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo stated yesterday that this person died in a car accident back in February, and another person is using his documents.

Mechanics of the Explosion on Kashirskoye Highway

The mechanics of the explosion on Kashirskoye Highway also support the version of special services involvement. It followed the scenario of so-called "sparing" (paradoxical as it sounds) terrorist attacks—only one building was affected. Only professionals, of whom there are only 50–60 in Russia, can so accurately calculate the required charge power when blowing up single-entrance buildings. The fact is that the load-bearing structures in single-entrance buildings are located in a small area, and for the complete destruction of the building, they must be blown up simultaneously.

WHO IS WRITING THE HELLISH SCENARIO?

Who organized this monstrous crime? Along with the Chechen hypothesis, another one is now coming to the fore.

Security officials do not rule out that both explosions were ordered by one of the Russian financial-political groups and aimed at the complete destabilization of the situation in the country. The perpetrators hired by these people simply tried to disguise themselves as Chechens.

• Initial Assumption: The perpetrators could be former employees of Russian special services or employees of foreign secret agencies.
• Current Assessment: The possibility of using foreigners for these actions has been practically rejected. The point is that RDX mixtures were used only in the USSR. They are very "capricious" (they can explode on their own), and a professional, if not trained to work with RDX, would never risk using this particular explosive substance.

Will there be a third terrorist attack?

In Saturday's issue, "MK" already reported on a recording provided by a German radio station to the FSB, stating that three residential buildings would be blown up in Moscow.

• Initially, counterintelligence officers ignored this warning.
• Now, the Chekists have decided to check all capital stores that changed owners and closed several months ago.
• In addition, a version has already been voiced about sabotage groups of Chechen commander Khattab, allegedly preparing as many as 10 (!) such terrorist attacks in Moscow.

All these signals could turn out to be either the truth or disinformation. And for ordinary Muscovites, alas, only one thing remains—to wait for the third explosion.

Information Service.

Explosives found at unfinished cottages

Today 21.9.1999

A large amount of explosives was discovered yesterday afternoon in Moscow at a construction site of a cottage town on Tamanskaya Street. Around 15:40, the construction foreman, a former sapper, found a suspicious bundle with wires on the construction site, and a dog handler with a dog called to the scene confirmed the presence of explosives.

In the bundle, FSB bomb technicians found 1 kg of ammonal, wires, and an electric detonator. According to experts, the explosive device was not armed and was unlikely to explode.

DENIS BRATSKY

Novaya Gazeta, 1999, No. 34

Why waste gray matter on dark deeds?

After the terrorist acts shook the capital, we contacted professionals in conducting investigations in this field and demolition specialists who recently worked for the FSB but are now, alas, retired. However, the latter allows them to feel more free. We asked them to assess the situation and, through us, pose questions to those "generals" and "presidents" who are currently dealing with the mess that was recently brewed.

Investigator's Assessment

• An ordinary sapper could have done such "work." The explosion was not directional; the charge was placed locally.
• The amount of explosives used was equivalent to 300 kg of TNT (that's 6 bags of 50 kg each!), whereas a professional could have managed with fifty. With two 50 kg charges, he could have destroyed the entire building.
• Explosives Type: Judging by reports, the terrorists also have problems with explosives; they use hexamine (hexogen), most likely melted out of aerial bombs, torpedoes, or artillery shells (the dark gray substance can be prepared at home, but the smell will be like sewage and neighbors will immediately suspect something is wrong).
• Detonation: It detonates from a Bickford fuse, though a pistol shot is also sufficient.
• Alternative: Terrorists could also have used ordinary ammonite (a substance used in mines and notable for being moisture-resistant), but apparently the miners did not share with the terrorists. The military did...

Operational Officer's Assessment

• For several terrorist attacks, the bandits need several tons of such a substance. Getting it at a factory in Moscow or nearby is not easy.
• Transportation Method: A rhetorical question arises: how to transport it? Most likely, it was transported by plane—less risk. Transporting it by land takes a very long time, is dangerous, and expensive. It's better to risk three to four hours than several days.
• Explosive Strength: It is clear that the terrorists do not have powerful explosives, such as plastic bombs, or they are saving them for other purposes. The relatively weak explosion on Manezhnaya Square is proof of that. It would have been impossible to carry several hundred kilograms there unnoticed.

Specialist in Sabotage Operations' Assessment

• Explosive Identification: It is not clear exactly which explosive was used; hexogen, judging by reports, was detected by a faint residue.
• Obtaining Technology: The possible technology for "obtaining" it is like during World War II. Partisans, when short on explosives, heated shells with steam and melted out this very hexogen. (By the way, this substance can explode even if dropped onto a metal surface from a height of one meter).
• Market Availability: It is unlikely that the terrorists used such technologies. In Moscow, the Moscow region, and the rest of Russia, the black market for explosives is quite large. Explosives disappear almost by the wagonload. They could have bought it from a factory or a military unit.
• Transportation Logistics:
  • Most likely, they didn't buy it. (Extra witnesses are not needed by anyone.)
  • The explosives were transported. If trucks with militants can pass through several serious checkpoints unhindered, then transporting several tons of explosive material disguised in some truck with sugar is quite realistic.
  • Officially, warehouses under the buildings were rented for sugar storage...
  • Thus, any amount of explosives could have been placed under the building. Trading sugar in bags is very fashionable now. They didn't carry the explosives on their shoulders. They brought it by car, with a surplus of power, without raising any suspicion at all.
  • Moreover, it is possible that they brought it quite a long time ago, probably several months ago.
• Conclusion: All the talk about a foreign car that drove away from the building at high speed before the explosion is some kind of nonsense...

Analysis of Terrorist Tactics and Societal Response

Terrorist Objectives and Methods

The text outlines several potential motivations and methods employed by terrorists, contrasting amateur actions with professional planning.

Potential Terrorist Actions

• Amateur Actions: Involve simply "pressing the button."
• Professional Planning: Suggests that professionals may have planned the explosions and planted the explosives.

Terrorist Goals (As Analyzed)

Terrorists pursue specific goals, which can be categorized as:

1. Destabilization and Panic:
   • Targeting life-support facilities to create panic, often without causing human casualties.
   • Example: Using six hundred grams of explosives to leave an average Moscow district without light, water, and heating, which would cause a greater stir than the current situation.
2. Economic Damage:
   • Targeting major enterprises, factories, and infrastructure centers.
3. Symbolic Statement:
   • Targeting significant symbols of statehood, such as:
     • A business center (as seen in the USA).
     • An administrative building.
     • A monument.
   • Ideally, they take responsibility immediately or even before the explosion.

The Ultimate Goal

The overarching goal of these "operations" is identified as:
* Mass human casualties, but not for the sake of blood, but for the sake of demoralization and embitterment of the people.
* The hope is that a few more such cases will lead to spontaneous unrest, potentially resulting in lynchings, primarily against Caucasians, providing a pretext for a state of emergency.

Media Influence and Mass Hysteria

The text criticizes the role of the mass media in exacerbating the situation:

• The media actively contributes by showing mutilated corpses and crying and screaming people.
• The focus is on sensational facts and effective footage, rather than analyzing the situation or understanding the reasons behind the events.
• This process is described as how mass hysteria is whipped up, which was also successfully planned.
• This training makes society loyal to any, even the most unjustified and absurd, actions by the authorities.

Questions for Authorities (Professional Perspective)

Professionals raise several critical questions regarding the response and investigation procedures:

Procedural Lapses

• Immediate Search Protocol: According to a long-standing order from the Minister of Internal Affairs, immediately after an attack, the district police officer, along with the fire supervision inspector and a representative of the sanitary-epidemiological station, should conduct raids in adjacent territories to search for explosive storage facilities.
• Authority Discrepancy: While the district officer requires a prosecutor's warrant to check premises, a fire inspector can inspect any warehouse or utility room at any time without bureaucracy. The question posed is: Why did such checks only start now?

Investigative Failures

• Intelligence Network: A narrow group is willing to commit such "actions." With a developed agent network among district inspectors (as used by special services), identifying main suspects would not have been difficult.
• System Collapse: The informant network on criminal issues was destroyed along with the network of those who "snitched" for political reasons. The text questions the current call for citizens to watch each other if the informant system has been destroyed.

Note on Detonator: The fuse (detonator) is noted to be similar in size to a pen cap, and the mechanism could be as small as an entire ballpoint pen. The timing could have been set a week ago (if chemical delay was used) or a few hours prior. The text contrasts the possibility of professionals planning the attacks versus amateurs simply "pressing the button."*

Analysis of Security Response and Investigation Procedures

Critical Concerns Regarding Emergency Measures

• Impulsive Calls: There is a concern that impulsive calls will only result in panic.
• President's Reaction: The President's reaction is deemed strange. Specifically, the order for the mayor to check all basements within 24 hours is questioned as unrealistic, given the nature of the capital's basements (containing numerous, frequently changing warehouses).
• Basement Security: Many empty basements and attics are reportedly unlocked, and hanging locks is considered useless given the presence of homeless individuals who have been accommodated through the President's efforts.

Concerns Regarding Institutional Management

• FSB Reforms: The President has reformed the FSB several times in a short period. The effectiveness of these reforms is questioned, suggesting that employees under constant threat of downsizing are incapable of professional improvement.
• Public Reporting: The delay in widely distributing the call for citizens to anonymously report suspicious cargo, along with the promise of a monetary reward for finding explosives, is questioned. The homeless individuals in basements could potentially be valuable allies.
• Market Trader Scrutiny: The zealous shaking down of market traders, simulating activity, raises questions about the police leadership's assumptions—whether militants bribe fellow traders or if the police suspect Khattab and Basaev of mental retardation.

Critique of Emergency Response Strategy

• Prevention vs. Reaction: A rhetorical question is posed: why is the path of taking emergency measures always followed, avoiding prevention by all means?
• Resource Allocation: Instead of creating numerous special police units, the author suggests strengthening the service of existing precinct police officers, noting that in Moscow, the average ratio is 10,000 residents per precinct officer.
• Legal Basis: The Minister of Defense's statement that troops will patrol the streets is noted as lacking a legal basis.

The Central Issue: Investigation Division

• Case Division: The main question concerns why the terrorist attack case was divided between two agencies (MVD and FSB) for too long. The author stresses that in international practice, one missed hour in such investigations can cost a hundred lives.
• Procedural Delay: The FSB only seemed to decide to attach the first case to the second after the second explosion.
• Command Structure: The creation of a joint headquarters under the command of the Minister of Internal Affairs is criticized for its lack of logic.
• Proposed Solution: The author argues for a single group, free from other matters, led by an individual (such as a Colonel, no higher) outside hierarchical intrigue, endowed with maximum powers. These specialists, despite downsizing, remain within the FSB. The generals and political figures should be left to their politics.

Author: Roman SHLEYNOV

P.S. FSB Operative Status:
According to reports received directly from the FSB, the operatives handling the terrorist attack case are in a state of slight confusion. They have been burdened with a large volume of work, and the outcome is considered doubtful under the current leadership—organizers of various levels with their broad minds and level of public statements.

World for the Week, No. 5, 25.9-2.10.99

A Blow to the Head with a Sack!

Alexander Portnov
Soviet Russia.
Subscription index 50124

Explosions of residential buildings in Russian cities have shocked the population. Therefore, the whole country breathed a sigh of relief when it learned that the residents of Ryazan miraculously managed to avoid another terrorist attack: a vigilant resident noticed how three unknown persons from a "Zhiguli" with a taped-over license plate were dragging some sacks into the basement of his 12-story building... The media spread the news throughout Russia that a mixture of hexogen explosives and granulated sugar was found in three sacks, detonators with a clockwork mechanism were attached to the sacks, and the explosion was planned for five o'clock in the morning...

MVD workers in Ryazan reacted promptly to the signal of a planned terrorist attack: in 15 minutes, they woke up and drove out into the street on a cold autumn night half-dressed, sleepy, and frightened residents from all the apartments of the 12-story building, including the elderly, the disabled, and infants... One disabled person remained in the apartment to await death, as he was unable to run out...

In Ryazan, the "Interception" plan was activated to catch the "Zhiguli" with the killers and, as usual, to no avail. But the main thing is that thanks to the vigilance of citizens, a terrible tragedy was prevented, and the residents, swallowing Validol and Valerian, dragged themselves back to their apartments. The head of the RF anti-terrorism headquarters, MVD Minister Rushailo, spoke in the media with a joyful report on the success of the MVD—a successfully prevented terrorist attack—and long-suffering Russia breathed a sigh of relief.

And then a series of some absurd and contradictory statements began. The head of the FSB Public Relations Center, A. Zdanovich, reported that there were no explosives in the basement on Novoselov Street, but there were "similar devices with remote control," and a test explosion of a portion of the substance from the sacks, carried out by specialists from Ryazan, did not cause detonation. Nevertheless, "vapors of an explosive substance of the hexogen type" were released. Does this mean there were explosives in the sugar after all?.. According to explosives specialists, the detonation at the testing ground did not occur only because of the small amount of the sample. As Ryazan UVD employees pointed out to journalists, "if all three sacks had been blown up, it most likely would have gone bang. And even more so if the terrorists had managed to bring in all the planned explosives!"

And suddenly... on the evening of the same day, the head of the FSB of the Russian Federation, Colonel General N. Patrushev, made an incredible statement that was at first difficult to believe: it turns out that the sacks and detonators were dragged into the basement of the 12-story building in the center of Ryazan in the dead of an autumn night by FSB EMPLOYEES who arrived in a car with taped-over license plates!!! It was with such original, mysterious, and as close as possible to real actions that the previously unknown new head of the FSB decided to demonstrate to Russians his general's qualities, implying the talent of a commander, combat savvy, resourcefulness, intelligence, and quick-wittedness.

Speaking on TV, Colonel General N. Patrushev, with a jaunty smirk and a steady, calm voice, informed the astonished listeners that in Ryazan, it turns out, there were... "exercises" and a "test" of the preparedness of the population and the MVD for terrorist attacks!!!

Everything seems clear to every Russian about the abilities of the head of the FSB of the Russian Federation, but a natural question arises: what RIGHT DID CITIZEN PATRUSHEV HAVE TO CONDUCT SUCH IMMORAL AND BRUTAL "EXERCISES" IN THE CENTER OF A LARGE RUSSIAN CITY??? Should we now expect that FSB employees will not limit themselves to Ryazan, but, according to Patrushev's instructions, will begin "educational" mining of the Kremlin, Red Square, Manege, Nevsky Prospect, etc.? And all this in order to check whether Yeltsin and his household and "Muscovites and guests of the capital" will behave "correctly" in extreme conditions; whether they will "notice" the FSB employees in time, whether they will react "promptly" to the sacks of explosives, etc. In short, in the process of such "exercises," one can make a mass of most interesting observations for the FSB leadership!

Of course, any normal person understands that such so-called exercises cannot be conducted in cities! By the way, Zdanovich himself in his statement reminded of the responsibility for a knowingly false report of an act of terrorism under Article 207 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation with a prison term of up to three years. But N. Patrushev apparently does not know this.

If a leader who has lost his mind and conscience wanted to know how people usually react to a situation that he so "resourcefully" organized for the residents of Ryazan, then for a start he should have "played it out" at night at his personal dacha near Moscow: it would be very interesting to know if his household, security, and janitor would run into the forest if armed people in masks dragged sacks of "sugar" with ticking alarm clocks and detonators into the underground garage of the general's dacha?..

Russia is in no mood for jokes now. Russians must understand that a mean and dirty game has been started in the country. The explosions in Russian cities suspiciously coincided in time with the start of large-scale military operations; they were very convenient for someone to unleash the bombing of peaceful residents of Chechnya! Tens of thousands of refugees on the borders of Dagestan and Ingushetia are victims of so-called precision strikes on unknown "militant bases"!

One cannot fail to notice the social orientation of the terrorist attacks: it is not luxurious banks that are blown up, not gilded offices where many dozens of chic limousines are parked... For some reason, it is exclusively the overcrowded houses of the poor that collapse, simple people are dying!.. The mysterious "glitch" in Ryazan clearly showed that the FSB's actions, criminal toward the citizens of Russia, were not coordinated with either the MVD leadership or the Prime Minister.

In that case, the story of the "FSB exercises" in Ryazan cannot pass without a trace. It MUST be studied in detail and with prejudice by the Prosecutor General's Office. In any normal country, the head of a security service who has committed such a shameful and anecdotal misdeed MUST RESIGN. But in Yeltsin's "ersatz-philia" [?] this is "not accepted." Unfortunately, for now, Prime Minister V. Putin also seems to "not notice" the absurd actions of his former subordinate. What a pity!

6 MH N 35, 14-20.9.99

Trud-7, 16.9.99

DETAILS

Mukhid Laypanov: terrorist or victim?
Suspected criminal

Mukhid Laypanov, suspected of involvement in the bombings of residential buildings on Guryanova Street and Kashirskoye Highway, is not actually Laypanov. Yesterday afternoon, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo released information: a person with that name died in a traffic accident in the winter of this year. However, upon closer examination, the answer to the question of whether Laypanov is alive or dead appeared to "MN" [Moskovskiye Novosti] to be not so straightforward.

We managed to find out that Mukhid Nazirovich Laypanov, born in 1964, is registered in the Uchkeken district of Karachay-Cherkessia, in the village of Krasny Kurgan, which is quite remote from the capital. "Registered" instead of "deregistered due to death" is not a slip of the tongue: data that this person is currently registered (and therefore quite alive) at the specified address was obtained from the secretariat of the head of the Cherkessk ROVD [District Department of Internal Affairs], A.V. Pushkarsky. The same was said at the republican address bureau. From fellow villagers of the Laypanov family, however, we received completely different information.

• First: Mukhid did indeed die in a car crash in February of this year—he and a friend "collided with a bus near Cherkessk," both are dead.
• Second: Laypanov's grave is in the cemetery of the same Krasny Kurgan.
• Third: according to neighbors, the deceased Mukhid "looks absolutely nothing like" the composite sketch shown on TV.

As we can see, the words of the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are generally confirmed by ordinary citizens of the Russian Federation and de facto refuted by the structures of this ministry "on the ground." In this regard, a number of questions arise.

• Why did the Moscow GUVD [Main Directorate of Internal Affairs] and the capital's FSB directorate not take measures after the explosion on Guryanova Street to find out if there are other houses in Moscow where a certain Laypanov is renting any premises?
• Where did the accident that killed the real Laypanov occur—near Cherkessk or on the territory of the Stavropol Krai, as federal officials claim?
• Finally: how did it happen that a death certificate, without which an official funeral is impossible, was issued for a person who is alive according to the police documents of the region where he was registered?

Many questions could be clarified by Mukhid's father, who lives in the same village of Krasny Kurgan, but his phone, by a strange coincidence, did not answer, although it was not difficult to reach other residents of Krasny Kurgan.

Yuri VASILYEV

WHO IS MUKHIT LAYPANOV?

As soon as the name of the alleged terrorist responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Muscovites was made public, we began our own investigation.

The first call was to the representative office of the Republic of Ichkeria in Moscow. The head of the press service, Kheda Abdulaeva, seemed ready for our questions and answered without hesitation:

• "First of all, Laypanov is not Chechen, but judging by his appearance and surname, he is Karachay."
• "Could he have been a mercenary for Chechen field commanders?"
• "It is unpleasant to me that out of all the versions, the investigation chose only one—the 'Chechen trail.' But in any case, I want to state: the official authorities of Ichkeria have nothing to do with the terrorist attack. There are forty teips [clans] in Chechnya; the elders of none of them know Laypanov, they do not know who is behind the terrorist acts in Moscow."

A St. Petersburg correspondent, at my request, found out that some Chechens saw Laypanov in the cities of Grozny and Shali...

There is no telephone connection with Grozny, but it is possible to contact Shali. I am talking to the deputy head of the administration for economic issues, Akhmed Duguzov.

• "There are no terrorists in our city, and there never were," he assures. "After all, we are the province, and all the military are in Grozny or in the mountains. The residents of our city are not interested in fighting; we are interested in being left alone. And not being bombed."
• "If we knew Laypanov, we would have long ago taken the trouble to find him and cut off his head. Otherwise, some provoke, and others, that is, us, peaceful people, receive blows of retribution on our heads."

A few minutes after this conversation, a certain Salambek calls me and dumps this information:

• "Interested in who Laypanov is? I'll tell you for free. Not to you, but to those who are listening to the conversation. He is a businessman, studied in Moscow, then in London. He collaborated with British intelligence services. He was in Chechnya on their assignment. The goal is to facilitate the access of British companies to Caspian oil. The route: through Chechnya to Dagestan. That is, they have already agreed with the militants, all that remains is to take control of Dagestan, conquer it, unite into a common Islamic state or something else... Any means can be used..."

The connection is cut off; I don't have time to process the (false?) information yet—another call, also from a satellite phone, already a different voice:

• "Laypanov died a long time ago; other people are using his documents..."

Mikhail ZUBOV.

NO ONE WRITES TO THE "COLONELS"

Their fate was decided by Basaev

As we have learned from informed sources, to date, everyone who was willingly or unwillingly involved in the terrorist acts in Moscow and other Russian cities has been identified.

The number of Moscow "accomplices" includes:
* Three drivers of the vehicles in which the explosives were transported.
* A dispatcher for a freight transport company.
* A real estate firm through which the false Laipanov (aka Gochiyayev) processed contracts for non-residential premises.
* The firm from which he bought a cell phone.

In addition, Gochiyayev's wife and cousin, living in Moscow, have been found.

According to FSB data, both main perpetrators of the terrorist attacks—Denis Saitakov and Achimez Gochiyayev—are currently in Chechnya. Russia has issued a demand to the Chechen authorities to extradite them along with other terrorists (recall that these include Basaev, Raduyev, and Khattab).

But, according to some reports, these two are just executors, ordinary "graduates" of Khattab's terrorist school from August of this year. There is still no exact answer to the question of who actually "ordered" the deaths of peaceful people.

It seems that everything the investigation could do by now, it has already done. And now it has slowed its pace according to the traditional laws of deceleration of the Soviet search machine. The terrorists have been identified, they have been charged in absentia, and they have been put on the wanted list. The investigative team can do nothing more—there is simply no one to catch. And public opinion has already calmed down after the first powerful wave of indignation. Now it remains only to hope for chance or some unpredictable circumstances.

We turned to the head of the Public Relations Center of the FSB of the Russian Federation, Alexander Zdanovich, for comments.

— In total, over 20 people were detained in connection with the bombings, — said Alexander Zdanovich. — To date, all of them have been released, except for three accused of the bombing in Buynaksk. The remaining wanted terrorists, according to our data, are on the territory of Chechnya. But the fact that they are beyond the reach of the law does not mean that we are sitting idly by. Joint operational groups, which include employees of the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the prosecutor's office, are working on operational support for the bandits both in Chechnya itself and in neighboring republics. But where exactly the special forces are now and what they are doing, I, naturally, will not say.

(Continued on page 3)

(Conclusion. Beginning on page 1)

— Denis Saitakov, who is among the nine suspects, was trained in a madrasa in Naberezhnye Chelny. Does this mean that throughout Russia there is an almost legal network of institutions preparing a "fifth column" of Wahhabis?

— The head of this school has already publicly distanced himself from Wahhabism. As, indeed, have most representatives of the Muslim clergy throughout Russia. Although theoretically it can be assumed that some religious schools are used for these purposes. Since many of their young teachers were trained in countries where Wahhabism is very developed.

As for Saitakov, he became imbued with the ideas of Islamic extremism in Khattab's sabotage school, where he went without finishing the full course of study at the madrasa. After the sabotage school, Saitakov returned to Naberezhnye Chelny twice and tried to recruit young people there. The first time he managed to send five students from the same madrasa to Chechnya. His second recruitment attempt failed. Moreover, Khattab and Basaev suspected that the FSB was infiltrating its agents through this Saitakov channel.

A scandal arose. As a result, Basaev demonstrated to the whole world "38 FSB colonels," by whose hands the special service allegedly wanted to destroy him. In fact, each such "colonel" did not even pull the weight of a "warrant officer." The scandal ended with some of the "colonels" being liquidated by the Chechens. Saitakov survived and immediately volunteered to organize and carry out a series of terrorist attacks in Moscow and throughout Russia with the help of rehabilitated saboteurs.

— So Saitakov is the organizer of the terrorist attacks?

— I am not the investigator leading this case. I can only say that such a version has a right to exist.

Oleg FOCHKIN, Oleg TATARCHENKOV.

INVESTIGATION

For committing terrorist acts in Moscow:

Saitakov Denis Faritovich
* DOB: 02.10.1978
* Native: Karshi (Uzbekistan)
* Residence: Tatarstan, Naberezhnye Chelny, Gasiatulina St., 5, apt. 308.
* Passport: 17-KB No. 547596, issued 06.09.96 by the Avtozavodsky Department of Internal Affairs of Naberezhnye Chelny.
* Description: Height 165-170 cm, thin build, light brown hair, short.

Gochiyayev Achimez Shagabanovich
* DOB: 28.09.1970
* Native: Karachayevsk.
* Passport: 15 GN No. 691912, issued 16.11.95 by the Karachayevsk Department of Internal Affairs.
* Alias/Alternate ID: May use a passport in the name of Laipanov Mukhit Nazirovich (DOB: 10.04.64, Native: Stavropol Krai).
* Alternate Passport: 15-GN No. 692892, issued 16.11.95 by the Malokarachaevsky Department of Internal Affairs of the KChR.
* Description: Looks 30-35 years old, height 175-178 cm, medium build, black hair with a little gray, hairstyle with a part, a tattoo in the form of a ring on one of the fingers. Constantly wears a ring made of yellow metal with a black stone.

WANTED BY INTERPOL

For committing terrorist acts in Buynaksk and Volgodonsk:

Salikhov Alisultan Sapiulayevich
* DOB: 28.05.1966
* Native: Village of Kudali, Gunibsky district of Dagestan, Avar.
* Passport: 7-BD No. 590705.
* Description: Height 170 cm, stocky build, black hair, short, may wear a beard and mustache, earlobes protruding, a mole on the left side of the upper lip.

Zainutdinov Isa Isayevich
* DOB: 27.12.1938
* Native: Village of Kudali, Gunibsky district, Avar.
* Passport: 2-BD No. 550298.
* Description: Height 182-185 cm, athletic build, black hair, short, with gray, eyes slightly slanted inward and downward, ears protruding, may wear a beard and mustache.

Salikhov Magomed Sapiulayevich
* DOB: 10.03.1964
* Native: Settlement of Yuzhno-Sukhokumsk, Kizlyar district of Dagestan, Avar.
* Passport: 6-BD No. 553549.
* Description: Height 172 cm, stocky build, black hair... [illegible]

Krymshamkhalov Yusuf Ibragimovich
* DOB: 16.11.1966
* Native: Settlement of Erken-Shakhar, Adyge-Khablsky district of Stavropol Krai... [illegible]

Dekkushev Adam Osmanovich
* DOB: 03.02.1962
* Description: Medium build, round face, a medium-sized mole on the right cheek, black hair, medium length, combed to the right, covering the forehead. Wears a short gold chain with small links around his neck.

Batchayev Timur Amurovich
* DOB: 1978
* Native: Village of Uchkeke... [illegible]

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA

SEPTEMBER 23, 1999

PSYCHOSIS

How I Became a "TERRORIST"

A "KP" journalist tried to find the address of relatives of Denis Saitakov, a suspect in the Moscow bombings. And was... arrested in Kazan.

— Haven't you heard the sensation? Today in Kazan, they caught a terrorist. Her last name is Akhmirova, — a friend reported yesterday evening.

"Terrorist" Akhmirova was carrying out an editorial assignment: to search for everything related to the name of Denis Saitakov. For some time he lived in Naberezhnye Chelny; according to some reports, he underwent training in militant camps in Chechnya, and is now on the federal wanted list. Denis's father, plumber Farit Saitakov, lives in Chelny...

Having been turned away by Kazan counter-intelligence officers and detectives — saying, "don't meddle in the secrecy of the investigation" — I head to the address bureau. Fortunately, it is free in Tatarstan. I make a request, wait five, ten, twenty minutes.

— Young lady, come in! — I am invited into the office of the head of the address bureau, where two pairs of inquisitive eyes fixate on me.

— Your application? — they show me my request.

— Mine, — and just in case, I take out my editorial press card. — I need Saitakov senior.

— And who is Saitakov senior?

— The father of Saitakov junior, — I don't lose my composure. — Well, Denis, who is suspected...

— And how do you know Denis?

This question puts me in a dead end. Saitakov's photo is hanging in Moscow and other cities on almost every entrance. Nevertheless, my "awareness" noticeably irritates the local Pinkertons: "You seem to know an awful lot..."

— You'll have to come with us after all, — says a man who introduced himself as a criminal investigation officer. He showed his ID, covering his last name with his palm. — Maybe you are a relative of Saitakov or his girlfriend?

— Why the hell would I have gone to the address bureau then? — that's what I only wanted to ask, but didn't. So as not to completely confuse the investigation.

Later at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I had an even more substantial conversation with another person. He was interested: maybe I still know something they don't? For example, Saitakov's whereabouts? I solemnly promised: as soon as it becomes known to me, I will immediately inform them about it from the pages of "KP". And I advised them to subscribe to their favorite newspaper.

— If you continue to try to find Saitakov senior, you will end up here again...

— And what will happen then?

— Oh, nothing, — the detective catches himself. — We'll just smile at each other again.

Out of the corner of my eye, I saw how the staff rushed from office to office with my application for the search for Saitakov, as if it were a precious object. I suspect the piece of paper will now be filed in the case as a great operational success. Some kind of compensation for an hour and a half of lost time. But from now on, I will not, like millions of Russians, be tormented by the question: is anything at all being done to stop the wave of terror?

Rimma AKHMIROVA. (Our special correspondent). Kazan.

P. S. Please consider this note my explanatory statement regarding the failed editorial assignment.

[Photo caption]: ...and our terrorist Rimma's height is only 153 cm.

[Sidebar]: — And who is Saitakov senior? — The father of Saitakov junior (From the interrogation of the "terrorist".)

GRANDMOTHER'S VERSION

"It was like a bombing..."

RESIDENT of the house Vera Ivanovna (the grandmother did not give her last name): — I went out onto the porch to get some air before bed. And just before the explosion, I heard the roar of a plane. Then — a sound like a whistle. And then it went boom. It seems to me it was a bomb. I saw enough of that during the war. Maybe some military plane accidentally dropped it?

+++
Yesterday, Alexander Borisov, a military specialist from the Air Force General Staff, categorically rejected Vera Ivanovna's version: this cannot be, because it is impossible.

GAS VERSION

Inspection of this house has not been carried out for a long time

ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION investigating the circumstances of the building explosion, such a character and scale of destruction of the building could have resulted from a so-called "volumetric" explosion, which only a gas explosion can lead to. However, an external gas line was connected to this house, there were no gas communications in the basement of the building, and this reduces the probability of a gas explosion to a minimum.

As we managed to find out, Mosgaz has not conducted an inspection of gas equipment in such houses for a long time, but only paid attention to structures equipped with gas water heaters.

Viktoria KUZMINA.

[Handwritten note]: KP, 10, 9, 99

CLINICAL VERSION

Ilyukhin found terrorists in "Otechestvo"

YESTERDAY, the head of the Duma Security Committee, Viktor Ilyukhin, expressed his version of the reasons for the explosion. It more resembles a diagnosis of current political mores: "If the state..."

ANONYMOUS VERSION

"This is a response to the bombings of Chechnya!.."

YESTERDAY at 12:45 in the central office of the informati...

Chechen Political Stance on Terrorism and Extradition

Chechen Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov stated that the republic's law enforcement agencies are prepared to consider the issue of extraditing terrorists responsible for the apartment building bombings in Russia. This move effectively acknowledges the link between the war in the North Caucasus and the recent terrorist attacks.

However, the Chechen authorities have set significant demands in exchange for the saboteurs: the extradition of over two hundred Russian politicians and military leaders accused of "unleashing the genocide of the Chechen people in 1994–1996."

Key individuals named in this demand include:
* Pavel Grachev
* Anatoly Kulikov
* Sergei Stepashin
* Boris Yeltsin

Context and Previous Statements

Ilyas Akhmadov has a history of making extraordinary statements:
* In July of this year, following a military seizure of a Chechen customs post, he threatened preemptive strikes against Russia. This statement was later disavowed by Aslan Maskhadov, who claimed the minister had been misunderstood.

On Sunday, Akhmadov sent letters to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, stating that "official Grozny is ready to consider the issue of extraditing the terrorists who blew up houses in Buynaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk," provided two conditions were met:
1. The Russian side must provide convincing evidence of the involvement of residents of the Chechen Republic in the terrorist acts.
2. Certain other conditions must be met.

Specific Demands and Legal Actions

The primary condition cited is the preliminary extradition to Chechen justice authorities of "war criminals who unleashed the genocide of the Chechen people in 1994–1996."

Recently, the Chechen Prosecutor General's Office transferred a criminal case to the Supreme Sharia Court, charging two hundred Russian politicians and military leaders with mass murder.

Accused individuals include:
* Former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin
* Former Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs: Pavel Grachev and Anatoly Kulikov
* Generals: Deinekin, Babichev, Shamanov, Tikhomirov, Pulikovsky
* Politician: Sergei Shakhrai
* Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation: Boris Yeltsin

These charges were brought in absentia. Lema Tagirov, the plenipotentiary representative of the Chechen Prosecutor General in Russia, promised a correspondent that "They all face the death penalty," adding that punishment would occur "when circumstances change, and strictly according to the law."

Counter-Narratives and Analysis

A high-ranking official from the GUBOP (Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs suggested that Akhmadov's letter was a provocation:
* The GUBOP representative noted that they have data linking Akhmadov to Chechen militant leaders such as Shamil Basayev.
* The letter was deemed an attempt "to intimidate us and stop the bombing of terrorist bases."
* The GUBOP representative pointed out that one of the conditions for assisting Russian law enforcement is the extradition of pilots who bombed militant camps in August–September 1999, suggesting the offer was more of a provocation than genuine help.

Military Activity

Over the past weekend, federal aviation conducted approximately 150 sorties into Chechen territory. Targets included Chechen villages in the Shelkovsky district bordering Dagestan, and villages in the Gudermes, Nozhay-Yurt, and Vedeno districts, where militants are reportedly concentrating.

Conclusion on Negotiations

While Akhmadov's conditions render negotiations on the extradition of saboteurs meaningless, his statement confirms that the Chechen authorities have acknowledged the link between the North Caucasus war and the Russian terrorist attacks—a stance previously denied by both official Grozny (represented by Aslan Maskhadov) and Shamil Basayev.

The article concludes that the Chechen minister is bluffing, as the republic's law enforcement agencies lack the power to arrest the terrorists, given that Aslan Maskhadov's authority is limited to the presidential palace.

LEONID BERRES

Source Notes:
* Kommersant, 21.09.99, p. 1. (Note: In other reports, I. Akhmadov's words sounded different: if it is proven that the culprits are on the territory of Chechnya, she [Chechnya] will hand them over.)

Secondary Report: Moscow Events (Nova Gazeta)

Elections and Local Crime

• "DINAMO" VS. "SPARTAK"
• Moscow police arrested a fan-bomber
• Law enforcement agencies are celebrating. The Wahhabis are almost destroyed. Only the "small stuff" remains—to find the person who organized the explosion in the shopping complex on Manezhnaya. Preferably by City Day.

Detention of Mikhail Naumenko

On Saturday, the NTV morning program "Segodnya" reported that Moscow police prevented a series of explosions planned by members of a Satanist sect.

• On Friday evening on Old Arbat, near the General Staff building, MUR (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department) officers detained 22-year-old Mikhail Naumenko, a student at the Maxim Gorky Literature Institute.
• A revolver and [illegible] were found on Naumenko.
• Naumenko is alleged to be a member of a Satanist sect planning to blow up several bombs in Moscow for City Day.
• During the search, MUR and FSB Directorate for Moscow and the region officers found components for explosives in Naumenko's apartment.

Fan Culture and Motives

The detention caused bewilderment among Naumenko's friends, as he appeared too calm for Satanism. The report distinguishes between two groups within the fan movement:

1. Young and desperate fans (city punks).
2. The old Spartak guard (the cream of the grandstand society), to whom Mikhail belonged.

The "guardsmen" are described as wealthy individuals, including businessmen, government officials, and rock singers.

• Law-abidingness is a key condition for being part of the "guard"; otherwise, they would be restricted from traveling abroad.

The report concludes by noting that the investigation's outcome is uncertain, expressing doubt regarding the "Satanic trail" which has appeared too frequently.

World for the Week No. 1 (August 28 - September 4, 1999)

"TWO WEEKS AGO THEY WERE ALREADY LOOKING FOR A BOMB HERE?!"

Komsomolskaya Pravda responded to the explosion at the "Okhotny Ryad" shopping center, which injured 41 people last Tuesday.

The newspaper published the testimony of Lyudmila Ogroperidze, a salesperson at the "Chasy" (Watches) outlet, which "radically" changed the picture of the crime: two weeks prior, the first call from terrorists rang out there.

"That day, as usual, I arrived 10 minutes before the opening of Okhotny Ryad. But inside at that time, something incomprehensible was happening. Escalators were working, firefighters were running across all floors, some people in civilian clothes, our security. Even a dog flashed by. A rumor about some call regarding a bomb still spread."

Correspondents from "Kommersant" found Dmitry Pimenov, leader of the Union of Revolutionary Writers, suspected of involvement in the terrorist attack on Manezhnaya Square, before the special services did (leaflets were found at the central entrance to the underground structure, stating on behalf of the SRP that "every normal revolutionary terrorist act creates a new living space..."). Pimenov disappointed the "Ъ" correspondents: "I have nothing to do with this explosion." Perhaps, "Kommersant" concludes, the "writer" version was deliberately launched by the special services in the media to disorient the real terrorists or in case quick investigation results were demanded (Pimenov, so to speak, was at hand).

The Director of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General Nikolai Patrushev, in the pages of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta," expressed confidence that the explosion on Manezhnaya was "extremist or hooligan manifestations." At the same time, he voiced for the first time the amount of damage suffered by "Okhotny Ryad" — 500 thousand US dollars.

"Vechernyaya Moskva" reports on another emergency. At the Paveletsky railway station, a police officer noticed a suspicious package. A specially trained dog confirmed the suspicions, and then the signal was passed to explosives specialists from the FSB. The movement of electric trains on the sixth and adjacent tracks was stopped, passengers...

ALEXANDER RASKIN

Technology of Terrorist Attacks

According to FSB data, Chechens continue to send saboteurs to Russia

Law enforcement agencies in various regions of Russia are catching sabotage groups that were preparing explosions of residential buildings. This was stated at yesterday's press conference by the head of the FSB Public Relations Center, Alexander Zdanovich.

However, as Mr. Zdanovich stated, it is important for detectives to find not only the terrorists themselves, but also the sources of their financing.

Key Findings on Financing and Involvement:

• An Egyptian native, El-Laban Said, currently on the international wanted list, was involved in the Moscow terrorist attacks.
• El-Laban Said married a Russian citizen, took Russian citizenship, and organized the "Zam-Zam" company in Moscow, through which he financed bandits.
• Operational data indicates that in early 1999, El-Laban Said personally visited Grozny, where he handed over 200 thousand dollars to Shamil Basayev for the preparation and implementation of terrorist attacks.
• After the explosions in Moscow, he left Russia.

Detentions and Suspect Profiles:

Some of the criminals involved in the sabotage have already been detained.

• UFSB for North Ossetia investigators charged members of a sabotage group:
  • Nikolai Miroshkin (29 years old)
  • Igor Epryntsev (21 years old)
• According to Mr. Zdanovich, both detainees were on the federal wanted list.

Details on Detainees:
* Nikolai Miroshkin: Wanted since November 1997 for robbery. He hid, arrived in Grozny in December 1997, lived there for over a year, and converted to Islam. In March 1999, he underwent military training in a camp of field commander Khattab.
* Igor Epryntsev: Ran away from home and was declared missing in February 1999. In April, he arrived in Urus-Martan and ended up in the camp of field commander Baggautdin. In May, Epryntsev was sent to a sabotage school headed by field commander Abdurakhman.

Plot Details:

• Meeting and Training: According to Mr. Zdanovich, the criminals met in early summer in the Chechen city of Urus-Martan. They served in the "Kavkaz" battalion of the Islamic army after training in camps.
• Mission Assignment: At the end of August, when most of Abu-Said's militants were fighting in Dagestan, the field commander tasked Miroshkin and Epryntsev with going to Vladikavkaz to prepare a terrorist act.
• Target Selection: They lived in the city for three weeks and chose the "Falloy" market as the explosion site, noting that several thousand people visit it daily.
• Execution Attempt: On September 23, the criminals bought a GAZ-53 truck with North Ossetian license plates from a resident of Vladikavkaz and headed to Chechnya. Their plan was to plant about a ton of explosives in the back of the car in Urus-Martan.
• Explosives Source: The explosives were manufactured at a mini-factory located on Chechen territory (operatives noted that some components were also used for the apartment bombings in Moscow).
• Interception: The terrorists planned to return to Vladikavkaz and detonate the timer, leaving the truck near a market pavilion. However, Miroshkin and Epryntsev were detained on the border of North Ossetia and Chechnya, en route to Urus-Martan.

Additional Incident:

Alexander Zdanovich also reported that a few days prior in Pyatigorsk, Chekists detained the leader of another sabotage group, Musavanov.

• Musavanov's Unit: He stated his unit included six professional sapper-demolitionists trained in Khattab's camps.
• Planned Action: In early October, they arrived in Pyatigorsk to organize five explosions.
• Incident: On October 5, during the mining of a house, the bomb spontaneously exploded, killing the sapper. Two other terrorists were injured.
• Current Status: According to Musavanov, the surviving members of the group are now hiding in the Stavropol Territory

FSB Wants to Blame the Moscow Bombings on a Mysterious Organization

Interrogation of Pavel Lyuzakov

At the end of October and beginning of November 1999, FSB investigator Valery Pavlovich Krylov invited the editor-in-chief of the newspaper 'Svobodnoye Slovo', Pavel Lyuzakov, to the FSB pre-trial detention center in Lefortovo. The meeting was with the suspect Alexander Yumashev (at his request), with whom Pavel served a sentence (Art. 146) in the same camp in the 80s.

Investigator Krylov, who was present at the meetings, said to Pavel: "Help find those who blew up the houses."

Pavel asked: "And isn't it your people?"

The investigator replied: "I don't know, maybe it's ours. But you help catch them."

Detentions and Accusations

• Seven members were detained among members of the Committee for the Protection of Political Prisoners.
• The arrests were described as "unprecedented during the operation."
• More than a hundred officers from Lubyanka were detained and interrogated.
• The detained individuals included representatives of left-wing forces who were well-acquainted with each other and had known criminal pasts.

Notable Cases

• Larisa Shchipova, a member of the committee, was accused of an attempt on the current governor of Krasnodar, 'Batka Kondratenko'.
• Andrei Sokolov was accused of blowing up a gravestone in Vagankovskoye cemetery.
• Interrogated individuals included former members of the 'Revolutionary Military Council', who were involved in blowing up the monument to Nicholas II and mining the monument to Peter I.

Organizational Names

• Larisa Shchipova mentioned the group's past connection to 'Narodovolchestvo' (People's Will).
• The organization that united them is named the Committee for the Protection of Political Prisoners.
• However, a different abbreviation appears in the criminal case: the New Revolutionary Alternative (NRA).

Expert Opinions on the NRA

Valery Nikolsky, a representative of the Helsinki Group in Moscow and a member of the human rights organization 'Glas Naroda' (Voice of the People), asserted:

"I, as an independent expert, assert, that no NRA actually exists. This name exists only in the annals of the FSB; they invented it themselves. The only evidence of the existence of this semi-mythical organization that the FSB found is the name 'IRA' carved on a bench by workers from a nearby construction site at the dacha of Larisa Shchipova's parents. Apparently, this is their main piece of evidence..."

Valery Gefter, a representative of the human rights organization 'Memorial', stated that the detained left-wing radicals were made scapegoats:

"Past transgressions are now a reason to constantly keep them under surveillance and be able to shut them down at any moment... Marginals are not supported by our society; it is believed they get what they deserve. And this plays into the FSB's hands."

Official Statements and Analysis

• Dmitry Andreev, who is leading the NRA case, could not comment, citing "official secret."
• The Moscow FSB Directorate press service stated that they "did not detain anyone, everyone is alive and well, these people were simply invited for a talk."

Valery Nikolsky further argued:

"We do not deny the past 'merits' of these guys, but the current case — the New Revolutionary Alternative — is fabricated by the FSB from beginning to end... Those who kept Moscow in suspense all autumn — remember the explosions in the Manege, at the FSB reception on Kuznetsky Most — have still not been found. And the FSB is actively forming the image of a certain organization on which everything could be blamed. This is necessary for the FSB and Putin's security-oriented government to create the appearance of activity in cleaning society of destabilizing elements. And they 'hook' people who are already exposed."

Conclusion

The text suggests that young left-wing radicals are the best candidates for scapegoats, as anarcho-communism is unpopular, allowing the bombings to be dealt with while the communist opposition is shown in a negative light.

Polina IVANUSHKINA (Author)

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA!

SEPTEMBER 10, 1999

The Most Incredible Version: Is the Killer's Wife to Blame?

Ten days ago, immediately after the explosion on Manezhnaya Square, a man called the editorial office:

— I have exclusive information on the terrorist attack.

There were always many such calls after an emergency, and we were skeptical. Nevertheless, we agreed to meet.

— How will I recognize you?
— I'll be in a light-colored suit, with keys in my hands, — the caller cut off laconically.

At the Okhotny Ryad metro station, in the center of the hall, he was there: a thin man with a mustache in a light suit, a bunch of keys jingling in his hands.

— You're late.
— Checking if I'm being followed.

We headed for the exit. Vladimir (as he introduced himself) looked around. We sat at a table in a cafe. He had two-day stubble on his cheeks, a crazy spark in his eyes. He was nervous.

Vladimir's Version of the Manezhnaya Terrorist Attack

We present Vladimir's version of the Manezhnaya terrorist attack in summary:

• In 1996, a certain Alexander Z. was detained on suspicion of two contract killings.
• In 1999, a trial took place where he was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years.
• Alexander's wife, Natalya, was left with two children.
• Since January, Vladimir started living with her.
• A couple of months later, Alexander sent a 'malyava' [prison note] through Natasha for his friends.
• The note contained the coordinates of his accomplice named Rudenko, also a killer, who disappeared with 15 thousand dollars; he and Z. had received them as payment for the murders.
• Z.'s comrades began to beat the share out of the accomplice piece by piece. But at one fine moment, the debtor disappeared.
• Then, coming to his wife, Z.'s buddies said: "If you don't want this knife to cut your throat next time, tell your husband to pay up."
• But the husband went to RUBOP [Regional Directorate for Combating Organized Crime].
• As a result, they detained... Natasha, Alexander's wife, on suspicion of organizing a robbery.
• They put her in a SIZO [pre-trial detention center].
• Vladimir lived in her apartment all this time.
• Periodically, phone calls came, and voices with a Caucasian accent asked for Natasha. Vladimir replied that she was in prison.
• The Caucasians indignantly advised him: "You, man, cannot help a woman. Act, or we will arrange such fireworks as Moscow has never seen!"
• Finally, on August 30, Vladimir received a message on his pager. The text—verbatim: "If Natashka is not released tomorrow, there will be fireworks. Sincerely, friends." The message arrived at 10:00.
• Vladimir stated: "I am in private legal practice, so I receive even tougher messages. But here my intuition kicked in; I immediately realized it was serious. I went to the police, to the MVD. They didn't believe me: 'Do you think this is serious?..' I replied: 'Believe it or not, but I'm getting out of here.' I spent the entire next day outside of Moscow—providing myself with an alibi. Upon returning, I learned about the explosion on Manezhnaya. I was summoned to the MVD and interrogated. But I could not tell them anything new."
• After that, the Caucasians called again: "You did nothing. If Natalya is not released, the explosions will be repeated every day... no, every week."

Alas, we did not believe the strange story—there were too many stretches. And we told Vladimir this directly. Having heard our doubts, he smirked:

"Watch, when you do believe, it will be too late."

We didn't believe—and now we punish ourselves for it—and on Wednesday evening, when Vladimir came to the 'Komsomolka' editorial office: "The next explosion was promised in seven days. The deadline expires tonight..."

At midnight, the house in Pechatniki exploded...

Having learned of this, we tracked down Vladimir yesterday. We sat and talked in a cafe across from the editorial office. At that moment, across his...

[Photo caption]: Vladimir in a cafe near the editorial office. We still don't know whether to believe his revelations...

[Handwritten note]: KP, 10.9.99

Article for Publication in "Novaya Gazeta"

This document is a printout of an article prepared for publication in "Novaya Gazeta".

Incident Background

The article details an event that occurred on Monday, September 13th, the day of mourning for victims of the explosions in Buynaksk, on Manezhnaya and Guryanova streets, and the explosion on Kashirka.

The core of the report concerns information provided to Vyacheslav Izmailov by one of the terrorists.

The Informant's Contact

• The terrorist approached Izmailov at the editorial office to report planned terrorist attacks in St. Petersburg and Rostov.
• This contact occurred before the explosion on Guryanova Street.
• The informant promised to call, and he did so after the explosion.

Initial Reception of Information

• The information received, despite being sensational, was initially met with skepticism.
• Izmailov was not believed at the time.
• Even the special services were hesitant, leading "Novaya Gazeta" to publish the information, as they felt it was necessary to inform their readers.
• The informant subsequently disappeared.

The Anonymous Note

The article raises the question of the informant's identity and why he specifically approached Vyacheslav Yakovlevich, leaving a note despite extreme fear:

"Comrade Major. Your acquaintance Alexander K. is writing to you. On August 24, a group of terrorists consisting of 10 people (leader Turpal Kharakharoev) left Chechnya. The explosions in Moscow are their doing. Ten explosions are being prepared. I fear the FSB. I trust you."

Subsequent Meetings and Details

• Izmailov first heard of Alexander four years prior. He knew Alexander served as a warrant officer in Chechnya, was captured by militants, and subsequently joined their side. Izmailov had met him previously while negotiating the exchange of hostages held by Basaev.
• After the Guryanova explosion, Alexander called, and Izmailov agreed to meet him at the Griboedov monument (located on Chistye Prudy, near the editorial office).
• During their 30-minute walk, Alexander provided details about the next planned explosion:
  • District: Pechatniki.
  • Proximity: Near a women's prison.
  • Terrorist Composition: Mostly Slavs, Ukrainians, and Russians who defected to the militants.
  • Affiliations: Two individuals from UNA-UNSO.
  • Logistics: Groups (ten people each) arrived in Moscow and St. Petersburg; they rented separate apartments and received weapons and explosives in the city.
  • Command Structure: The group leader communicates the decision to the direct perpetrators no earlier than half an hour before the operation begins.

Analysis and Conclusion

• Speculation: It is possible the explosion of the house on Kashirka (near a women's prison) could have been prevented, but the public likely should have been warned immediately.
• Official Response: The special services reportedly wanted to verify the information, and the public only learned about Alexander on Monday morning (the explosion occurred at night).
• Current Status: The special services remain reluctant to confirm the information provided to Izmailov.
• Second Contact: It is suggested that RUOP allowed Alexander to escape initially, leading to a second meeting where Izmailov handed him over to the FSB.
• Doubt: The author questions the motives behind the special services' suspicious behavior and the lack of coordination within those services.
• Final Assessment: The author expresses pessimism, stating there is "no glimmer of hope" that the true perpetrators will ever be found, concluding that the public must rely on themselves for protection.

Document prepared for Novaya Gazeta.
Date of Event Focus: September 13th.
Key Figures: Vyacheslav Izmailov, Alexander K., **Turpal Kharakharoev.
Locations Mentioned: Buynaksk, Guryanova Street, Kashirka, St. Petersburg, Rostov.
Agencies Involved: FSB, **RUOP.
Key Dates: August 24 (departure from Chechnya).

THE MASTERMINDS OF THE EXPLOSIONS ARE KNOWN

Novaya Gaz., No. 35, 20-26.9.99

Will they look for those who paid for the order?

In the last issue of Novaya Gazeta, we laid out our version of the terrorist attacks in Moscow. Which the official authorities immediately began to deny, instead of checking it as they should have. At first, the MVD press service claimed that everything stated was a lie. The explosion on Kashirka occurred the next morning, before the echo of these loud denials had even subsided.

Then the Prime Minister assured journalists that everything stated in Novaya Gazeta was true. I wonder what he thought when he learned the next morning about the explosion in Volgodonsk? After all, we had named that region.

We did not claim the laurels. We shared information, as everyone is now being called upon to do. And we hoped for professionalism. Those hopes proved vain. Explosions are nothing, image is everything. Can anyone be better informed than the thousands of employees of the most extensive network of special services in Russia's history?

But what kind of image can we talk about when the special services lose a suspect; when instead of searching for terrorists, they smash watermelon stalls, imitating frantic activity; when they bomb villages in the Botlikh district, having learned with surprise that right under their noses—and not in Chechnya, but in Dagestan—underground terrorist camps were operating?

What kind of image can we talk about if tons of explosives were brought into Moscow, having previously been stolen by the ton from military factories, for whose security the special services are also responsible?

Conducting sweeping searches and re-registration, placing a soldier at every entrance does not require great intelligence. It is much harder to carry out painstaking, daily, and grueling work with agents. And then, perhaps, the special services would have learned that there were many more Slavs than Chechens in the group of terrorists who carried out the explosions in Moscow sooner than the staff of Novaya Gazeta. Note that this information was also rejected because it did not fit into the carefully thought-out scheme of the 'Chechen trace,' which also has a political subtext. Only a few days later did generals begin to speak cautiously about this at press conferences...

Nevertheless, the editorial board pays tribute to the efforts of the MVD and Minister V. Rushailo: thanks to them, many people were saved. We also appreciated the delicate nature of the MVD press service's assessments.

We hope we will work together.

Timeline of Events and Information Flow

• September 8: A report about a terrorist group arriving in Moscow and 10 planned explosions reached the Novaya Gazeta editorial office, 12 hours before the explosion on Guryanova Street.
• Immediately after: The information and its sources were reported to the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime.
• 11 hours and 30 minutes after the explosion on Guryanova Street: The source of information got in touch again.
• Two hours after that: The source began talking to special services officers.
• Later: The leadership of the FSB and MVD effectively confirmed the information about the masterminds of the explosions: Khattab and Basaev.
• September 9, 14:30: Alexander Kapanadze was handed over to the GUBOP leadership.
• September 10: A GUBOP officer informed the author that Kapanadze had escaped.
• September 13: Another terrorist attack occurred in Moscow—on Kashirskoye Highway.
• September 15: Alexander Kapanadze contacted Novaya Gazeta again and confirmed his earlier information.
• September 16: A terrorist attack occurred in Volgodonsk, Rostov region.

Key Individuals and Details

Conclusion

We also know of other former captured Russian servicemen who were in captivity together with Kapanadze.

We suggested to Alexander Kapanadze that he tell the Russian special services what he knew about the terrorists and handed him over to the GUBOP leadership at 14:30 on September 9.

A day later, that is, on September 10, a GUBOP officer informed the author of these lines by phone that Kapanadze had escaped. I would like to emphasize that he was not released—he specifically escaped. Moreover, I was asked to assist in the search for him.

On September 13, another terrorist attack occurred in Moscow—on Kashirskoye Highway, and on September 16—in Volgodonsk, Rostov region.

On September 15, Alexander Kapanadze contacted us again. And in the presence of many newspaper employees, he confirmed the information he had given earlier.

GUBOP asked not to hand Kapanadze over to any other special service, but to return him specifically to them.

Which was done...

Only now, after the third explosion in Moscow, did the authorities and the leadership of the security structures realize that measures for the self-defense of the population could not be avoided.

Nor can we do without properly informing people about the [danger] threatening them.

Correspondence and Interview Transcript

Letter to Comrade Major

To: Comrade Major
From: Alexander
Subject: Meeting regarding recent events in Moscow

Body:
Alexander is writing to you. We need to meet with you regarding the events that recently took place in Moscow.

We arrived from Chechnya on August 21 in a group of 10 people; the group is led by Turpal Karkaroev.

I cannot find anyone in the FSB, but I trust you.

Respectfully,
Alexander K.

I will call you today.

Note Received By: V.Ya. Izmailov on the afternoon of September 8, 1999.

Radio Interview Transcript

Program: Radio "Echo of Moscow"
Participants: Sergey KORZUN (Interviewer) and Major Vyacheslav IZMAILOV (Interviewee)

Sergey KORZUN:
Why do you think no one has taken responsibility (well, if we exclude that phone call, a completely anonymous one, from a person with a Caucasian accent) for these explosions—Buynaksk and three times in Moscow? If the handwriting is the same... What are they trying to achieve? Is it just terror, so to speak, so that people look in all directions out of horror?

Major Vyacheslav IZMAILOV:
There is an example of this, and the scheme is known. Remember when our troops were finishing off the bandits in Chechnya? It was late May – June 1995. Basaev commits a terrorist act—a raid on Budyonnovsk. And then they played into his hands, and then the war changed a bit, it followed a different scenario. So the hope is that... it was correctly stated in the media today, I agree: that the population will get scared, the population will panic, and will demand the return of our servicemen from the combat zones. This is what the terrorists are counting on.

Summary of Key Points

• Travel Group: Arrived from Chechnya on August 21 (Group led by Turpal Karkaroev).
• Document Receipt Date: September 8, 1999.
• Interview Focus: Responsibility for explosions in Buynaksk and Moscow.
• Historical Precedent Cited: The Basaev raid on Budyonnovsk in May–June 1995.
• Terrorist Goal (According to IZMAILOV): To cause public panic and pressure for the return of servicemen from combat zones.

Interview Transcript Summary

Key Events and Statements

• The individual was eventually handed over to the Directorate for Combating Organized Crime, where MVD officers began working with him.
• Question Posed: "Answer what happened to the person you met with and who allegedly told you everything about the explosions in Moscow and other locations."
• Initial Contact: The interviewee received a letter from the person, but could not meet him the same day. This was twelve hours before the explosion on Guryanova Street.
• Information Flow: Even before the explosion, there was a report regarding the number of bandits who had arrived and their leader, which was immediately passed to the special services.
• Meeting After Explosion: The next day, after the explosion, the person reached out. The interviewee met with him after warning the special services, who were nearby.
• Decision to Hand Over: The interviewee, despite having 27 years of military service and not considering himself an amateur, felt the person must be handed over to law enforcement agencies due to the gravity of the situation.
• Condition Set: The person set a condition that the meeting be held alone. The interviewee declined this, stating he did not have the right to take such responsibility.
• Disappearance: The person was handed over to law enforcement structures and was reportedly working with them. However, the next day, the interviewee was informed that this person had disappeared.
• Uncertainty: The interviewee stated he did not know the definitive answer, only that he was told this by the people to whom the person was handed over and with whom he was staying.

Official Statements

General V. Kozlov (Head of GUOP MVD) - "Echo of Moscow" Radio

• Statement: "We didn't lose this person, we just let him go."
• Observation: He characterized the individual as a "sick man," and the people he pointed out as terrorists turned out to be his hospital neighbors (from the ward on the right and the ward on the left).

V.Ya. Izmailov (Statement dated 18.12.1999)

• Second Handover: The last time Alexander Kapanadze was seen was when he was handed over for the second time to GUBOP, personally into the hands of General Kozlov.
• Current Status: Izmailov stated he did not know where he was now and was not interested.
• First Incident: The first time, they lost him. They gave him a mobile phone and told him to keep in touch, but he slipped away.
• Second Meeting: After the second explosion, he came to Izmailov again, guarded by Igor Bederov and Yura Lizunov.
• Escalation: This time, people from both GUBOP and the FSB arrived. GUBOP did not want to take him, but Izmailov insisted they take him, and he went with them.
• FSB Inquiry: A few days later, people from the FSB visited the editorial office to ask about him, stating he had long been in Moscow engaging in [cut off].

Summary Table of Key Individuals and Agencies

Interview Transcript Excerpts

Handover and Subsequent Events

• The individual was handed over to law enforcement structures.
• The narrator stated that the information must be brought to law enforcement agencies and could not keep it to themselves.
• Conditions Set by the Individual:
  • He requested to meet with the narrator alone.
  • The narrator declined, stating they did not have the right to take such responsibility upon themselves.
• Disappearance: The next day, the narrator was informed that the person had disappeared, despite being with law enforcement structures.
• Doubt: The narrator questioned whether the person was "practically let slip away" or if there was another version of events.
• Source of Information: The narrator stated they were told this by the people to whom the individual was handed over and with whom he was staying.

Statements from Authorities and Witnesses

General V. Kozlov (Head of GUOP MVD) - "Echo of Moscow" Radio

• Statement: "We didn't let this person slip away, we simply let him go."
• Assessment: He described the person as a "sick person."
• Allegations: The individuals the person pointed out as terrorists turned out to be his hospital neighbors (from the ward on the right and the ward on the left).

V. Ya. Izmailov (Statement dated 12.18.1999)

• Second Handover: The last time Alexander Kapanadze was seen was when he was handed over for the second time to GUBOP, personally into the hands of General Kozlov.
• Current Status: Izmailov stated he did not know where the person was and was "not interested at all."
• First Incident: The first time, the person was allowed to slip away. They were given a mobile phone and told to keep in touch, but he subsequently slipped away.
• Second Incident: After the second explosion, the person came to Izmailov.
  • He was guarded by Igor Bederov and Yura Lizunov.
  • Personnel from both GUBOP and the FSB were present.
  • Izmailov insisted that GUBOP take him, despite their initial reluctance, and he went with them.
• FSB Inquiry: A few days later, FSB personnel visited Izmailov's editorial office regarding the person.
  • They stated that he had been involved in "some schemes and fraud in Moscow for a long time."
  • Izmailov was unsure if this was immediately before the explosions or long before.
• Location: The person was in a regular hospital (not a psychiatric one) with a hip fracture.

Witness: Lyudmila Evtifeeva