HELLISH MIX

Trud-7, 16.09.99

Inventor's Account: The Mystery of the 'Second Substance'

After hearing that terrorists who blew up houses in Pechatniki and on Kashirskoye Highway in Moscow used hexogen, I contacted E.G. Ledin, the inventor featured in the article "The Mystery of the 'Second Substance'" published in Trud on May 12, 1998. I asked if hexogen was the basis of the explosive he invented with V.P. Bogdanov even before the war, noting it was twice as powerful as TNT.

Evgeny Grigoryevich confirmed:

"Exactly that. For a long time, everything concerning the composition of 'A-9-2' — the 'second substance' — was secret, right down to the fact that it contained hexogen."

When asked, "What kind of hellish mix is this?" Ledin explained:

"More than a hundred years ago, a German named Henning obtained a chemical compound under this name, and in 1898 he patented it. For a long time it was of purely theoretical interest, because they did not know how to apply this powder. Only decades later, in countries that do not have their own oil from which TNT is made, for example, in Italy, hexogen began to be added to weaker explosives, but they did not get the effect."

Development and Spread

• Experiments continued in the Soviet Union.
• In 1938, two employees of the Leningrad Technical Laboratory of the Navy—a master and an engineer-sailor (Ledin had just graduated from the Technological Institute and was called up as a private)—managed to select the recipe and manufacturing method for hexogen charges that exploded after the shell pierced armor.
• For many years, no army in the world possessed this, until foreign intelligence agents obtained the secret.
• The formidable weapon spread globally, used in:
  • Shells
  • Bombs
  • Torpedoes
  • Mines
  • Rockets
• Unfortunately, it ended up in the hands of terrorists.

On the Leakage of Explosives

Evgeny Grigoryevich refuted media claims regarding the source of hexogen explosives reaching the Chechens from England or Arab states:

"In Russia, even after a significant part of ammunition production went to Ukraine and other sovereign republics, enough of it is produced, including for sale abroad. And it's not army warehouse warrant officers who trade it: the military is supplied with ready-made ammunition. The most likely possibility of a leak is during inter-plant transport of explosives to filling enterprises. An echelon with a secret cargo—but not secret to criminals—stops somewhere, and it is possible, though risky, to unnoticedly drop off a hundred kilograms. That is where the leak channel must be closed first and foremost."

The veteran also dismissed other media reports, such as the claim that hexane (an ordinary dye solvent) was found near the blast site on Kashirka, emphasizing that hexogen is a far more dangerous combustible component.

Source: Yuri Popov, Novaya Gazeta, No. 13, April 1999**

NITRO-EXPLOSION ON THE RUSSIAN MARKET

After years of journalistic investigation, I am convinced that the old Soviet principle persists in our country: it is not so important to own something, it is much more profitable to control something.

A prime example is how a group of individuals took over an entire industry—the production and sale of explosives.

The Rise of Control

1. Late Eighties: The state concern "Nitro-Vzryv" was created based on one of the main directorates (glavks) of the Ministry of Defense Industry, which managed explosives production for the national economy. The officials leading the glavk smoothly took charge of the state concern.
2. February 10, 1992: By Government Decree of the Russian Federation No. 267-r, the concern was granted the exclusive right to export and import explosives.
3. September 9, 1992: Government Decree of the Russian Federation No. 687 (signed by acting Prime Minister Gaidar) endowed the concern with all functions of control over the production and sale of explosives throughout the country.
4. Transition to JSC: The concern soon ceased to exist, replaced by the open joint-stock company (OAO) "Nitro-Vzryv." The state held no stake in this JSC. Despite this, the JSC retained all the aforementioned functions, effectively acting as a federal government body.
5. Confirmation of Monopoly: Two years later, Viktor Chernomyrdin, with Decree No. 732, reaffirmed "Nitro-Vzryv's" exclusive right to export and import.

The Mechanism of Control

From that point on, official documents showed the JSC as the entity authorized to issue licenses for explosive exports. To export, one needed to contact both the State Committee for Defense Industries and JSC "Nitro-Vzryv." Customs required a "Notice of Attachment to JSC 'Nitro-Vzryv'," a notice previously required by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for transporting and storing explosives. Furthermore, all entities were obliged to report explosive consumption to both Goskomstat and JSC "Nitro-Vzryv."

This resulted in an ordinary commercial structure profiting from explosives production and sales gaining complete control over its competitors—a strange model of free market relations where the possibility of influencing entire industries ended up in private hands. Since mining, transport, and hydraulic engineering construction depend on explosives, this control is immense.

Crucially, JSC "Nitro-Vzryv" gained the opportunity to participate in the control over the production and use of explosives, simply by buying shares. This is highly convenient for terrorists.

Attempts at Reversal

• Last year, the Kirienko government prepared a draft decree to return all control functions to the state, but the August 17 crisis forced Kirienko into resignation, leaving the decree as a draft.
• In January of this year, several shareholders of JSC "Nitro-Vzryv" petitioned First Deputy Prime Minister Maslyukov, strongly requesting "not to allow the destruction of the current system of control over the circulation of explosive materials and to give appropriate orders."
• Maslyukov responded by sending a resolution to the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, and other bodies, asking them to "consider, take measures to further strengthen the system of state control over the circulation of industrial explosive materials."

The author concludes that those claiming Russian authorities do not support private enterprise are mistaken; they are, in fact, ready to give everything to it.