Terrorist Attacks of 1999: Unanswered Questions

The terrorist attacks of 1999 involved explosions in residential buildings in Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk. The central questions remain:

• What was used for the explosions?
• Where did the explosives come from?

Official Contradictions vs. Independent Scrutiny

The contradictory positions held by representatives of the FSB, MVD, and the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation necessitate turning to an independent analysis.

Comparison with US Post-9/11 Investigation

The text draws a contrast with the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States:

• The report from the special US Congressional commission was extensive and published almost in its entirety.
• Attempts by the administration to classify certain pages caused significant public indignation and negatively affected the American president's image.
• Society formed its own opinion based on available documents, facts, and official evidence, allowing independent experts to assess the situation. This process notably led to the removal of the head of the CIA.

The Russian Situation

In Russia, the situation is markedly different. Nearly six years after the bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk, Russian society still cannot obtain clear and unambiguous answers from state representatives regarding elementary questions:

1. Exactly what explosives or mixtures were used in the attacks?
2. Most importantly, what is the origin of the dozens of kilograms of explosives—substances that are extremely difficult to acquire or transport without state knowledge?

Insoluble Problems in Official Statements

Attention to these two points is crucial because they are fundamental to understanding the crime. After such attacks, the public naturally seeks to know not only who committed the bombing but also with what and where the materials originated. However, these simplest points have become an insoluble problem for the leaders of the FSB and MVD.

Official public statements fundamentally contradict each other and fail to present a unified picture.

The Hexogen Question

Currently, it remains unclear whether hexogen was used in the residential building bombings or if it was not used at all.

The question of hexogen is fundamentally important because:

• It repeatedly enhances the destructive effect of an explosion.
• It is extremely complex in terms of production, storage, and transportation.

It is critical to note that all work involving hexogen must be conducted under industrial conditions using specialized, sometimes remote, equipment due to its high detonation capability and the precision required for its industrial production.

Footnote: Hexogen (according to a scientific reference) is a fine-crystalline, white, tasteless, and odorless brisant (i.e., "shattering") explosive substance belonging to the group of high-power explosives. Regarding ammunition, the term "hexogen" refers to phlegmatized hexogen in products, such as hexogen blocks (designated "A-IX-1") or phlegmatized hexogen mixed with TNT and other explosives ("A-IX-2").

Hexogen Properties and Usage

Chemical and Physical Properties of Hexogen

• Melting Point: 202 degrees
• Flash Point: 215-230 degrees
• Sensitivity: Twenty times more sensitive than TNT.
• Detonation Characteristics:
  • Detonates from a 10 kg weight dropped from a height of 25 cm.
  • Explodes when shot by a bullet or hit by a fragment.
  • Reliably explodes from blasting caps.
  • Energy of explosive transformation: 5.4 MJ/kg
  • Detonation velocity: 8380 m/s
  • Brisance: 24 mm
  • Explosive power: 490 cubic cm
• Chemical Stability and Reactivity:
  • Does not dissolve in water.
  • Is non-hygroscopic and non-aggressive.
  • Does not enter into chemical reactions with metals.
  • Presses poorly.
  • Ignites and burns with a bright white hissing flame; combustion turns into detonation (an explosion).
  • Prolonged stay (60-70 years) in the ground, water, or ammunition casings does not change its explosive properties.
• Applications:
  • Pure form: Used only for filling certain types of blasting caps.
  • Mixtures: Used in high-explosive fragmentation shells for NURS, GRAD, S-13, and other rockets and torpedoes.
  • Other uses:
    • Plastid (PVV-4) also contains hexogen.
    • Other hexogen-containing substances are used for the manufacture of naval mines and shaped charges.
    • For demolition work, it is used in a mixture with TNT, aluminum, and ammonium nitrate.
• Safety Note: It is very toxic, requiring the use of personal protective equipment when working with it.

Hexogen in Moscow Terrorist Attacks

The text raises the question of whether hexogen, an inconvenient explosive requiring special skills and chemical protection due to its toxicity, was used during the terrorist attacks in Moscow and other Russian cities.

Official statements and reports regarding this matter lack clarity and can be divided into two opposing semantic groups: "hexogen was there" and "there was no hexogen."

Chronology of Official Statements and Reports

Explosive Substance Reports: Hexogen and Related Materials

Initial Reports and Confusion (1999-2000)

• September 18, 1999: The newspaper "Kommersant," citing MUR, the FSB, and Minister Rushailo, reported the discovery of materials at 16/2 Borisovskie Prudy Street. The materials included:

  • 2 tons of hexogen mixture
  • 8 kg of plastid
  • 6 timers (Casio wristwatches)

• Ambiguity in Reports: Confusion arose even within consecutive reports regarding the presence of hexogen, specifically concerning:

  • The number of bags (43 vs. 38).
  • The designation of the substance found (ammonal or plastid), or if both were present simultaneously.

FSB Statements on Explosive Composition

• March 16, 2000: At a press conference, General Shagako, First Deputy Head of the Operational-Search Directorate of Department "T" of the FSB, stated that the compositions of explosive substances found in two locations were identical:

  • Basement on Borisovskie Prudy Street in Moscow.
  • A 'ZIL-130' vehicle in Buynaksk on September 4, 1999 (which did not explode).
  • The common composition included: ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, and in some cases, hexogen additives or TNT additives.

• Contradictory Statements on Hexogen:

  • Despite the findings, representatives of the special services continued to speak.
  • March 20, 2000: General Zdanovich, head of the Public Relations Center (TsOS) of the FSB of the RF, publicly stated on NTV (aired March 24) that "hexogen was not used" in the bombings of residential buildings.

Evasion and Detailed Accounts (2000-2002)

• December 22, 2000: In an interview with "Moskovsky Komsomolets" (to Alexander Khinshtein), General Ivan Mironov, head of the operational-search directorate, deputy head of Department "T" of the FSB of the RF, was questioned about how hexogen was delivered to Moscow. While not protesting the term "hexogen," he avoided directly addressing it:

  • He detailed the production of explosive mixture in two sabotage-training camps in Chechnya (Serzhen-Yurt and Urus-Martan).
  • The components of the mixture included: ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, and sugar.
  • Approximately 15 tons were produced; five were used, and ten were seized.
  • The explosives were transported to Kislovodsk and then delivered to Moscow in a heavy-duty van, distributed to addresses including Kashirskoye Highway and Guryanova Street.

• September 9, 2002: General Mironov, in an interview with "Rossiyskaya Gazeta," provided further details on the explosive composition:

  • He stated the composition was used in geological work.
  • The known ratios included: ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, and ordinary technical oil (used as a binding agent).
  • Additionally, dry TNT was added, and plastid was necessarily used as a blast initiator to heat the main mass.
  • Regarding sugar, General Mironov noted: "At first we thought it was used only for conspiracy, to hide the transportation. But it turned out that it is an active..."

Summary of Key Personnel and Dates:

Key Entities and Materials:

• Primary Substances: Hexogen, Ammonium Nitrate, Aluminum Powder, Plastid, TNT.
• Secondary Components: Sugar, Technical Oil.
• Key Organizations: FSB, MUR, TsOS.
• Key Individuals: General Mironov, General Shagako, General Zdanovich, Minister Rushailo.
• Key Dates: September 18, 1999 (Initial Report), March 16, 2000 (Composition Confirmation), March 20, 2000 (Denial), December 22, 2000 (Route Details), September 9, 2002 (Final Composition Details).

Explosive Characteristics and Forensic Findings

Explosion Dynamics

The explosion involves a component that is fully consumed during the event. Simultaneously, a large amount of heat is released, and a significant amount of oxygen is burned. This process creates an airless space at the explosion site, resulting in a high temperature that prevents any living organisms from surviving.

Manufacturing Possibilities

Mironov noted that a mixture used in the explosion could be prepared under relatively simple conditions:
* "The option for manufacturing the explosive is relatively simple (...), because it consists of substances that can be found almost in the kitchen."

However, this contrasts with earlier identification:
* The general initially identified plastid.
* Plastid (or PVV-4) is a hexogen-containing mixture that is almost exclusively of industrial production and cannot be cooked in a pot.

Forensic Evidence from Terrorist Case

A document from the closed trial concerning the terrorists confirms the presence of hexogen:
* Materials from volume 3 of criminal case No. 18/230300-02 testify that hexogen was indeed present in the explosives used in the apartment building bombings.

Official Expert Conclusion

On December 8, 1999, the forensic laboratory (military unit 34435) issued an official conclusion following a request from the UFSB for the Rostov region regarding the Volgodonsk apartment building explosion (under criminal case No. 173).

Expert Conclusion No. 4/197 stated:

"We, employees of the forensic laboratory of military unit No. 34435, Vinogradova Tatyana Viktorovna, Stovbur Konstantin Nikolaevich, in connection with the assignment to perform an expert examination for criminal case No. 173, were warned by the head of the expert institution under Article 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation about the responsibility for giving a knowingly false conclusion (...). The study was conducted using methods of optical microscopy, high-performance thin-layer chromatography (...), ion chromatography (...), chromatography-mass spectrometry (...). Based on the physical and chemical studies conducted, the following conclusions can be drawn. As an explosive charge, (...) an explosive was used, which included TNT, hexogen and, most likely, aluminum, and in addition, ammonium nitrate or a combination of the substances listed above and explosives based on them could have been included (...)."

Key Takeaway: The official expert examination confirmed the presence of hexogen long before General Zdanovich made public statements denying its presence.

Contradictions and Questions

The discrepancy between the official expert findings and the subsequent public statements by General Zdanovich raises significant concerns:

• Why the contradictory self-expression?
• Were these issues due to internal contradictions or failures within the FSB information system?
• Why did no official representative correct General Zdanovich on the NTV program, despite the expert examination confirming hexogen?
• What prompted the urgent need to deny the presence of hexogen or speak vaguely about it?

Questions Following Official Statements

While some might dismiss these contradictions as routine confusion within the security agency, the rapid evolution of the explosive used in the terrorist attacks—from containing hexogen to a supposed "hexogen-free" version—raises critical questions regarding the coordination of national security activities.

• How do the agency's employees coordinate activities if they are not consistently confident in their own findings?
• What explains the shift in the reported composition of the explosive?

Questions Regarding the Hexogen Explosives

Contradictions in Official Statements

• Why do the statements of FSB generals regarding hexogen still contradict each other, despite the results of the official forensic examination, which they are all required to know by virtue of their official duties?
• Why were there initially statements from the UFSB for Moscow and the Moscow Region, as well as the heads of the FSB system, Generals Patrushev and Shagako, and other officials about the presence of hexogen, and then General Zdanovich disavowed all of this, after which (in official comments) the FSB generals carefully avoided the word "hexogen"?
• Why did the MVD of the RF report industrial explosives (that is, created at a state production facility for very specific tasks), while FSB General Mironov specifically noted a "kitchen" method of its preparation?

The differences are significant, since industrial explosives are a matter of special accounting, and handling them is strictly regulated. If the explosives were indeed industrial, such a fact dictates additional questions:

• Where exactly in the state system of explosive circulation did a breach occur?
• And why, and at what stage, did the accounting and control system fail? (This point will be considered in detail in the next part.)

The "kitchen" method of preparing the explosive mixture, which FSB General Mironov spoke about, does not allow one to even think that a leak occurred from some state enterprise, and excludes these two questions in advance.

Official Position and Public Trust

• Is there, finally, a final, agreed-upon and approved position of the FSB of the RF and other security forces regarding the explosives used in the 1999 terrorist attacks?
• If there is, why has this position, despite the international scandal surrounding the situation with the apartment building bombings, still not been published along with the experts' conclusions?

When officials are unable to join forces and say something unambiguous (even if by agreement), this causes a quite natural public distrust of information from state sources. And it leads to the emergence of other, independent versions of what actually happened.

Most Serious Version of the Origin of Hexogen

There are documentary grounds to believe that some components of the explosives, namely its most powerful element—hexogen—did indeed have an industrial origin (as noted in the statement of the MVD of the RF). Moreover, it could have reached the "black market," and subsequently the terrorists, due to the state of affairs at a state institution—the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr," located in the center of Moscow in close proximity to the complex of buildings of the FSB of the RF and the UFSB for Moscow and the Moscow Region.

Background on NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"

• The Research Institute "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" was formed by a decision of the government of the RSFSR in 1991 to conduct research and development work on the problem of ammunition disposal and the creation of industrial explosives based on them.
• Due to various circumstances, the institute was transferred to the management of the Ministry of Education of the RF.

By the period of the terrorist attacks in Moscow and other Russian cities, an extremely difficult situation had developed in this NII: in the illegal, shadow turnover (besides... [text cuts off]).

Analysis of Events at NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr'

The investigation revealed that the explosives, initially thought to be TNT and other explosives, were actually 6 tons of hexogen. Despite the initiation of a criminal case (No. 9271) regarding the illegal sale of explosives, the FSB and the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation took no action. Furthermore, they refused to investigate, even after repeated official appeals from the Ministry of Education, which held jurisdiction over the institute. The potentially catastrophic consequences of this inaction by the prosecutor's office and special services could have been foreseen.

We detail the events at the institute, which are socially significant and have documentary confirmation, yet remain outside the attention of the Prosecutor General's Office and the FSB of the Russian Federation. In addition to documents, we possess testimony from a leader of the NII (Research Institute), N. S. Chekulin, the former acting director of 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr'. He provided a detailed analysis of the institute's situation (see: N. S. Chekulin, 'Analysis of versions of the origin of explosives used in the bombings of residential buildings in 1999').

The Situation at NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' Before and After the 1999 Terrorist Attacks

During a press conference on March 16, 2000, discussing the terrorist attacks, FSB General Zdanovich stated: "Were there thefts of these explosives from state factories where they are produced according to certain technologies? I can say right away — there were none, or, at least, we have no such data at the disposal of the investigation."

This statement seemed strange, given the regular flow of data received by the FSB.

Testimony of Nikita Chekulin

According to the testimony of Nikita Chekulin, the former acting director of NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr':

• Background: Nikita Sergeyevich Chekulin (born October 12, 1956) graduated from the Moscow Automechanical Institute and the All-Union Academy of Foreign Trade. He worked in foreign trade associations in Moscow, on a trade mission abroad, and in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR. For about ten years, he headed various enterprises within the RSFSR State Committee for Petroleum Products system.
• Roles at NII:
  • April 2000 to May 2001: Deputy Director of NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' for foreign economic relations.
  • May 26, 2000: Acting Director and a member of the Ministry of Education commission tasked with reviewing the activities of NII director Yu. G. Shchukin.
• Current Status: Nikita Chekulin currently resides in London.

Nikita Chekulin claims that an entire system was established for the illegal trafficking of explosives within the country and their supply abroad, involving representatives of Russian special services and law enforcement agencies.

He asserts that:
* The direct supply of explosives was channeled through the existing agent network of the FSB, and critically, the MVD, which is legally responsible for monitoring the movement of explosives across Russia.

Allegations Regarding FSB and MVD Involvement

The former acting head of NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' stated that as early as 1997, the FSB leadership assigned a task to MVD General Nelezin. Under his control in Moscow, a group of individuals, led by Shchukin (director of NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr'), was involved.

This group, operating under the guise of conducting research and development on ammunition disposal and the creation of industrial explosive materials, was engaged in:
* Illegal trade in explosives.
* Embezzlement of funds and explosives, including those used in warheads and solid fuels for surface-to-surface missiles.

Lieutenant General Nelezin headed the Economic Department of the MVD of the Russian Federation. He was then appointed Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs for Logistics.

Activities of NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"

Institutional Background and Facilities

• Personnel: Vladimir Rushailo received the rank of colonel-general.
• Premises: In December 1997, General Nelezin provided the "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" Research Institute (NII) with premises adjacent to the FSB building complex in Moscow, located at Bolshaya Lubyanka St., 18, building 3.
• Utilities: The institute did not pay for utility and maintenance. International and long-distance telephone calls were covered by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the Russian Federation, as the institute was assigned several MVD switchboard numbers (e.g., 222-4961, 222-3612).

Unauthorized Explosives Trade

The institute traded in explosives both within Russia and internationally without the necessary permits.

Regulatory Review

A review of the documents regulating the NII's activities revealed no authorization for the sale of explosives:

• Government Order of the RSFSR (October 24, 1991, No. 1114-r): This order, which created "Roskonversvzryvtsentr," did not grant the right to engage in such trade.
• Certificate of State Accreditation (July 27, 1999, No. 1536): Issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Russia, this certificate made no mention of explosives trade.
• License of the Ministry of Economy of Russia (May 21, 1999, No. U-0071): This license permitted the disposal of conventional ammunition for creating industrial explosive materials and technologies, but did not specify the right to sell hexogen.
• Gostekhnadzor License (September 17, 1999, 00VR No. 010742): This license authorized activities for developing and testing products from industrial explosive materials and defining technical requirements, but it also did not specify the right to sell hexogen.

Conclusion: In none of these official documents was the trade in explosives permitted.

Alleged Operations

• According to Nikita Chekulin, the former acting head of the institute, this trade did occur.
• To move explosives across Russia, special permits were obtained from the MVD, the body theoretically responsible for supervising and suppressing illegal turnover.
• Under the leadership of Yu. G. Shchukin, "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" supplied explosives through:
  • Direct purchase and sale agreements.
  • Veiled agreements disguised as "transfer of scientific and technical products."
• Invoicing Examples:
  • In the "name of goods" column, only the names of explosives were listed.
  • Payment orders included descriptions such as: "payment for TNT," "payment for ballistic blocks," and "payment for granipor."
• Export Violations: Exporting explosives abroad violated legislation concerning the licensing of foreign economic activity and the procedures established by the Government of Russia.

State Oversight Concerns

It was emphasized that control over explosives originating from a state NII under these circumstances was unlikely. The turnover of these extremely dangerous materials, usable by both criminal elements and terrorists, effectively became barely noticeable to the state. This was partially confirmed by an audit conducted by a special commission of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation.

Audit Results

The commission, established by order of Minister V. M. Filippov (No. 70 dated May 25, 2000), reviewed the institute's activities for the period from January 1, 1998, to May 25, 2000.

Investigation Findings: NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"

Contract Analysis and Missing Data

• Commission Findings: Commission member Dr. Brinza (Doctor of Technical Sciences) analyzed a total of 245 contracts.
• Additional Documents: 33 additional payment documents revealed 33 contracts missing from the institute's materials.
• Explosive Transactions:
  • NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' purchased 34,157 tons of explosives from military units and chemical plants.
  • The institute was documented to send only 23,161 tons of explosives to consumers.
  • Missing Data: Data on 10,996 tons of explosives was missing from the presented documents.

Administrative Actions

• By order of the Minister of Education (No. 2056 of 06.07.2000), the director of NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr", Yu. G. Shchukin, was dismissed from his post following the inspection.
• Note: Shchukin was later reinstated.

Statements and Gaps in Investigation

• In December 2001, during an interview with 'Ren-TV', Yuliy Shchukin stated that he dealt not only with hexogen but also with more dangerous substances, such as octogen.
• Commission Limitation: The commission did not receive a single contract regarding hexogen or octogen.
• Conclusion: It was concluded that the specialists from the Ministry of Education of the RF were only partially able to study the institute's activities, and the question of hexogen among the unaccounted 10,996 tons remains open.

Illegal Circulation of Explosives

Systemic Failures

• The illegal circulation of explosives is not limited to direct black market sales.
• In the case of NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr', the state itself created conditions for the leakage of dangerous substances by failing to establish a clear legislative framework strictly regulating the circulation of explosives (at least between state organizations).
• The institute's accounting and control system failed at every step, with documentary evidence supporting this.

Specific Transaction Evidence

• The institute released hexogen by the ton, operating outside the legislative field.
• Testimony of Nikita Chekulin: Colonel Vorobyev from the Main Directorate of Civil Defense and Emergency Situations of the Tver region attempted to obtain one ton of hexogen checkers via proxy from NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr'.
• Formalization: This transaction was formalized by General of the Ministry of Emergency Situations V. V. Stepanov as a delivery of TNT (contract No. 11509795-142-99 of December 24, 1999), with a payment order to the institute's account, listed as 'for TNT'.
• Power of Attorney: On April 27, 2000, Shchukin issued a power of attorney to the Tver Directorate of Civil Defense and Emergency Situations to receive one ton of hexogen from military unit No. 68 586.
• Continuation of Attempt: Colonel Vorobyev attempted to obtain the ton even during the inspection period, citing prior payment, but was denied a new power of attorney. However, the hexogen was reportedly received because the organization's accounting department made no claims against the institute.
• Justification: When Pavel Voloshin of 'Novaya Gazeta' questioned Shchukin in Fall 2001 about the need for hexogen checkers by the Tver Directorate of GO and ChS, Shchukin replied: "For the settling of houses in Tver."

Official Denial

• The Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia resolutely denied both the possibility of such a transaction and the existence of Colonel Vorobyev.
• In response to a request from State Duma deputy Sergei Kovalev addressed to Minister for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu (KS-2260 of 16.05.02), State Secretary, Deputy Minister A. P. Moskalets replied (letter No. 30-90-11 of May 27, 2002).

Analysis of Explosive Substance Transfers

EMERCOM Usage and Deliveries

• EMERCOM of Russia units utilize industrial-grade explosive devices, which are filled with the explosive substance mentioned (hexogen).
• The use of either pure or phlegmatized hexogen by EMERCOM of Russia units in any other capacity is deemed impractical.
• Deliveries of hexogen to EMERCOM of Russia units under contracts with the NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' of the Ministry of Education of Russia were not carried out.

Contradictory Official Statements

In response to an inquiry from Kovalev, the deputy head of EMERCOM, V. A. Vostrotin, stated that:
* In the Main Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations of the Tver region, Colonel Vorobyov did not perform military service during the period from 01.01.1999 to 31.12.2000.

These statements suggest the absence of both a colonel and hexogen. However, this conflicts with reports from Vasily Kolmogorov, Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, in response to Deputy Kovalev's inquiries (letter No. 27/1-534-2001 dated 13.08.2002):

• Kolmogorov reported that the sale of an explosive substance (a mixture of TNT and hexogen, due to the lack of another type of explosive) by military unit No. 68586 in Tver was re-checked.
• Materials from the prosecutor's office of the Tver region indicated that this explosive substance was allocated under the decree of the Governor of the Tver region to the regional GU GOChS (Main Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations) for the purpose of eliminating the threat of flood inundation.

Conclusion from this section: Hexogen was allocated after all.

Subsequent Contradictions Regarding Hexogen Transfer

In a later response (No. 27/1-534-2001 dated 28.11.2002), Kolmogorov wrote:

• According to the report of the Main Directorate of the Tver region, the contract (with NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr') had not been implemented to date.
• Explosive materials from the military unit had not been received by anyone due to the actual refusal of the newly appointed director of 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' to fulfill the terms of the contract.

Contradiction: It is asserted that hexogen was received, and the military unit itself lacked the authority to sell it.

Summary of Logical Inconsistencies

• There is a lack of logic in the reported sequence of events.
• "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" was established specifically to convert military explosives into industrial explosives.
• The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation claims the scheme for transferring hexogen to the EMERCOM unit bypassed the NII, despite a corresponding contract being signed.
• It appears hexogen was transferred, but the NII was not involved in the transfer.
• EMERCOM denies all involvement, asserting that hexogen in that form is not used by them.

The text questions the transparency of such a scheme, especially when high-level officials "get confused in their testimony."

Case Study: Bryansk Chemical Plant Supply

A similar case involves the supply of hexogen to the Bryansk Chemical Plant.

• "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" issued power of attorney No. 040 (dated May 22) to receive hexogen from military unit No. 92 919 (superseding power of attorney No. 014 dated February 23, 2000), via a letter dated May 19, 2000.
• This concerned five tons of hexogen-containing components of surface-to-surface missile warheads.
• Formal Payment: The institute paid the military unit not for hexogen, but for "gunpowder." This is documented in payment order No. 061 dated April 13 for account No. 15 dated 12.04.2000, for the amount of 15,680 rubles.

Documentation Gaps

• The documentation lacks references to any specific contract regarding hexogen.
• In the reconciliation statement between the Bryansk Chemical Plant and NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" (as of March 1, 2001), the shipped five hexogen-containing tons do not appear.
• According to the former acting director of the NII, Nikita Chekulin, this could imply that 5 tons of hexogen-containing components of warheads "disappeared without a trace."

Further Inquiry

Attention is drawn to the response to Deputy Kovalev's inquiries to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (No. KS-2319 and KS-2320 dated 13.06.02), where the first deputy minister (and now minister) Rashid...

Explosives Supply and Corruption Concerns

Conflicting Reports on Explosives Supply

• Nurgaliev's Reply (Letter No. 3/16760 dated 26.11.02): Stated that information regarding illegal supplies of explosives by the NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' involving the Federal State Unitary Enterprise 'Bryansk Chemical Plant' and military units No. 68 586 and No. 92 919 was not confirmed.
• Deputy Prosecutor General Vasily Kolmogorov's Supplement (Letter No. 27/1-534-2001 dated 13.08.2002):
  • Indicated that military unit No. 92919 had no relationship with NII 'RKVTs' ('Roskonversvzryvtsentr').
  • Reported that in 1999, the specified military unit supplied explosives containing hexogen to the Bryansk Chemical Plant without the participation of NII 'RKVTs'.

Ambiguities and Documentary Evidence

The situation presents contradictory accounts:
* Some officials claim that "hexogen supplies were not confirmed."
* Others assert that supplies occurred from the military unit to the plant, but completely without the participation of "Roskonversvzryvtsentr."

A critical point remains: documentary evidence exists showing that the institute issued a power of attorney to the Bryansk chemical plant to receive hexogen specifically from military unit No. 92 919.

These contradictory and illogical answers undermine confidence in the objectivity of investigations conducted by the special services, the prosecutor's office, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Concerns Over Documentation and Scale

Even setting aside the worst-case scenario, the documentation for the transfer of:
* One ton of hexogen.
* Five tons of hexogen-containing components.

...is considered unimpeachable. The paperwork transforms what should be an official disposal process into a "shadowy, completely opaque deal."

Similar issues are suspected regarding other explosives, measured in tens and hundreds of tons. Crucially, there is no guarantee that the same level of "paperwork" for many tons of hexogen did not occur at NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" prior to the 1999 terrorist acts (bombings in Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk).

Corruption and Terrorism

It is argued that in a closed and corrupt system, tracking the movement of money, weapons, and dangerous materials becomes significantly harder. Hexogen and other explosives can become a commodity, generating profit and personal enrichment. This conspiratorial mechanism of bribes and unofficial services, while unlikely to cause terrorist acts, certainly benefits their organizers.

Example of "Commodity-Money" Relations

Nikita Chekulin, former acting director of the NII and commission member, cited a document illustrating "commodity-money" relations between:
* Management of "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"
* Commanders of military units
* Management of mining companies
* Leadership of the Russian Gosgortekhnadzor

This evidence includes a memorandum from institute employee Severov addressed to Director Shchukin, which bears the visa of the accounting department.

The document specifically testifies that, for instance, one wagon of the explosive granipor (50 tons), supplied from military unit No. 86 696 to... (text cuts off).

Financial Irregularities and Hidden Income Analysis

Expenditures of the Institute

The Alexandrian mining company paid NII 270,000 rubles. The institute's expenses were detailed as follows:

• Officially to the military unit for granipor (by bank transfer): 97,000 rubles
• Unofficially to the commander of the military unit (in cash): 15,000 rubles
• Unofficially to the employees of the military unit for dangerous work: 200 dollars (5,400 rubles at the exchange rate of that time)
• Unofficially to the management of the mining company (for the risk of using explosives): 20,000 rubles

Conditional Profit and Unaccounted Funds

• The conditional profit for one wagon of granipor was 132,600 rubles.
• For four additional wagons under the same scheme, the "unofficial" cash payments included:
  • The commander of the military unit
  • His employees
  • A "kickback" to the mining company

According to the memo's author calculations, the conditional profit, or "officially unaccounted 'black cash'," amounted to 574,960 rubles for 250 tons of explosives.

Testimony from Nikita Chekulin

Nikita Chekulin, a member of the commission for checking "Roskonversvzryvtsentr," provided the following insights from the memo's drafter:

• "7 percent of this amount is pure earnings."
• The remainder was kept personally by the director of the NII, who was supposed to share it with the deputy chairman of Gosgortekhnadzor of the RF, Subbotin.
• Subbotin supplied the director with permits for conducting tests.
• The director was also involved with the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate and the Main Directorate of Ammunition of the Ministry of Defense, which issued orders for the sale of artillery powder and the removal of ammunition components from military units.

Key Findings:

• The commission of the Ministry of Education identified contracts for the supply of several tens of thousands of tons of explosives.
• This suggests that the real hidden income from the trade in explosives could amount to tens of millions of rubles.
• The institute also supplied components for "surface-to-surface" class missiles (the hexogen-containing components mentioned by the authors), which were not reflected in the accounting data, and whose real value is difficult to estimate even at black market prices.

Trading Partners of NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"

Nikita Chekulin submitted the full list of trading partners of NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" to the Commission of the State Duma of the RF for Combating Corruption.

Frequent Partners (1998-1999)

The following entities interacted with the institute most frequently during 1998-1999:

• Mining and Processing Plants:
  • Kovdorsky
  • Yaroslavsky
  • Uchalinsky
  • Olenegorsky
• Plants and Factories:
  • Achinsk alumina plant
  • Alexandrian mining company
  • Nizhny Tagil Institute of Metal Testing
  • Moscow plant of reinforced concrete products and pipes
  • Studenovskaya mining company
  • Bryansk and Chapaevsk chemical plants
  • "Elastik" (in the Ryazan region)
  • "Metallist" plant
  • Far Eastern PA "Voskhod"
  • OJSC "Apatit"
  • "Metallurg-Trans"
  • "Karelsky Okatysh"
  • "Dolomit"
  • "Yamalgeofizika"
  • "Tekhnicheskaya khimiya"
  • "Safyanovskaya med"
  • "Promnerud"
  • "SODA"
  • SUE "Oboronresurs"
  • "Ufa Management of BUR"
  • PA "Avangard" (in Sterlitamak)
• Belarusian and Local Entities:
  • Belarusian enterprises "Granit" (in the village of Mikashevichi)
  • Crushed stone plant (in the village of Glushkevichi)
  • Nizhny Tagil quarry
  • "Pokrovskoye" quarry
  • Kuplursky machine-building plant
  • Association of Cartridge Plants

Offshore Firms

The partners of NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" also included several offshore firms:

• "HUKO"
• "Rugialis"
• "Novotekh"
• "Eurobaltstroy"
• "Gatviu statyba"
• "Kelda"
• "Milsa"
• "Limbazu celi"
• "Panevezio keliai"
• "Fegda"
• "Selenium"
• And others.

Document Summary

Military Unit Cooperation

15 military units cooperated with the institute. These units were:
* Nos. 11 700
* 11 777
* 34 236
* 56 007
* 62 758
* 63 184
* 63 196
* 67 708
* 67 784
* 68 586
* 8
* 86 669 233
* 74 0096
* 86 741
* 92 919

Explosives and Oversight Concerns

The text notes that under the system of relations reflected in a memo addressed to the head of the NII (Research Institute), hexogen, TNT, and other explosives could potentially have fallen into the hands of both criminal communities and terrorists.

Despite these findings, the FSB and the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation did not express concern, even following appeals and demands from the Minister of Education Filippov, under whose jurisdiction "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" formally fell.

Criminal Case Initiation

Criminal case No. 9271 was initiated by the Investigative Committee under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. The case was opened by senior investigator for particularly important cases of the IC under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Vazhdalov, concerning:
* "the facts of illegal sale of explosives by the heads of the NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' based on the signs of a crime provided for by Part 2 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation."

However, this case had no prospects.

Appeals of the Minister of Education Vladimir Filippov and the Response

Initial Statement (July 5, 2000)

On July 5, 2000, Minister of Education Vladimir Filippov sent a statement to the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs (GUVD) of Moscow. The statement detailed the findings of a departmental audit conducted at the state research institute NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' based on an order from the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation dated May 25, 2000, No. 70.

Key Findings of the Audit:
* Serious violations of financial and economic discipline were identified.
* The commission concluded that the suspended director of the institute, Yu. G. Shchukin, needed to be brought to administrative responsibility.
* The commission noted several deficiencies in documentation provided by Yu. G. Shchukin, including:
* Lack of contracts for service provision and product supply.
* Absence of specific volumes, quantities, and costs in individual contracts.
* Numerous instances of non-receipt of funds for supplied products into the institute's settlement account.

Request: The minister requested an audit of Director Yu. G. Shchukin's activities to identify signs of economic offenses.

Note: The minister's statement, which included a 76-page documentary appendix, was not properly received.

Subsequent Appeals and Investigations

• August 17, 2000: Minister Filippov appealed to the Minister of Internal Affairs Rushailo (letter No. 01-52-146). He noted that GUVD of Moscow had taken no active steps and that the objective audit of the information provided by the Ministry of Education of Russia was being delayed. Due to the special nature of the institute's activities, the minister requested the audit be assigned to the relevant units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Following this letter, an investigation was started in the Investigative Committee under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, but it was subsequently prevented from being completed.
• November 2, 2000: Minister Filippov wrote to Minister of Internal Affairs Rushailo, stating that "no productive work is being carried out." He pointed out that the internal affairs bodies had initiated two criminal cases on August 12 of that year (No. 121873, on the grounds of fraud) and August 24 of that year (No. 9271, on the grounds of illegal circulation of explosive materials). Crucially, these cases related only to two episodes of the institute's activities that occurred after Yu. G. Shchukin was removed from his position.

At the same time, the operational investigative group headed by senior investigator S. K. Vazhdalov was created for the investigation.

Timeline of Investigative Actions Regarding "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"

The investigation into "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" involved a significant volume of materials related to:
* Multi-year illegal turnover of explosive materials
* Theft
* Abuse of power
* Fraud
* Tax evasion

It was noted that the investigative group was disbanded shortly after the minister provided all the materials he had regarding "Roskonversvzryvtsentr". Furthermore, in October of that year, nearly all members of the investigative group were replaced by new employees.

Key Dates and Events

November 8, 2000

• The head of the Ministry of Education contacted the following individuals:
  • Matvienko (Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation)
  • Klebanov (Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation)
  • The State Duma Committee on Security
• The purpose of the contact was to state that the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the Russian Federation had not taken proper measures to investigate the criminal case.

December 4, 2000

• Filippov requested FSB Director Patrushev to ensure that criminal case No. 9271 was transferred for investigation to the Investigative Department of the FSB of the Russian Federation.
• The minister also addressed the same request to Prosecutor General Ustinov.
• In his appeal (No. 01-52-239), the minister specifically requested:
  • To seize the materials from the Investigative Committee under the MVD of the Russian Federation and transfer them to the proceedings of the Prosecutor General's Office.
  • The possible involvement of FSB officers in this work.
  • To "give instructions to the relevant officials to study the materials uncovered during the work of the commission of the Ministry of Education of Russia."
• Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, was also informed about this issue.

Response from the Investigative Committee

The reaction to these appeals was paradoxical. The Investigative Committee under the MVD of the Russian Federation officially refused the minister's request to review a copy of the decision to initiate a criminal case, despite the document containing no secrets.

Details of the Criminal Case Initiation (August 24, 2000)

On August 24, 2000, Colonel of Justice S. K. Vazhdalov, Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases of the Investigative Unit of the Investigative Committee under the MVD of the Russian Federation, established the following after reviewing materials regarding the illegal sale of explosives received from the GUBOP of the MVD of Russia:

Illegal Sales by Heads of the Research Institute 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' (State Enterprise):

• Period: March 7, 2000, to June 16, 2000
• Action: The heads of the Institute supplied and illegally sold 397,758 units of ballistic blocks and Granipor PFZ (phlegmatized granular powder)—both explosives—to:
  • The State Enterprise 'Granit'
  • The Open JSC 'Dolomit' (located on the territory of the Republic of Belarus)
• Second Sale: On July 25, 2000, the heads of the Institute supplied and illegally sold 16 tons of ballistic blocks (explosives) to the Uchalinsky Mining and Processing Plant.

Decision Made by S. K. Vazhdalov:

Taking into account that the materials contained sufficient data indicating signs of a crime under Part 2 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, guided by specific articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, the following decisions were made:

1. To initiate criminal case No. 9271 regarding the illegal sale of explosives by the heads of the Research Institute 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr'.
2. To take the criminal case into its own proceedings and proceed with the preliminary investigation.
3. To send a copy of this decision to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation.

Signatory: Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases, Colonel of Justice S. K. Vazhdalov.

Investigation into NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"

Procedural Developments and Conflicts

• Deputy Prosecutor General Vasily Kolmogorov's Response (December 15, 2000): Kolmogorov reported that the verification material concerning the former director of NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" Shchukin Yu. G. was returned to the GUBOB of the MVD of Russia for additional verification measures.
• Procedural Concerns: It was revealed that the prosecutors had removed a significant portion of the case from the Investigative Committee and transferred it to GUBOB for indefinite "additional measures"—the very body from which the materials originated. This raised questions about how a full investigation could proceed in the Investigative Committee under these circumstances.
• Clarification from Moscow Prosecutor: The prosecutor of the Central Administrative District of Moscow, Buksman, clarified the actions of the General Prosecutor's Office:
  • The verification of statements regarding Shchukin Yu. G.'s illegal activities was being conducted by GUBOB MVD RF operative Shchavinsky B. V.
  • Supervision over this unit was maintained by the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF.

Issues with Case Materials

The investigation lacked access to crucial documents:

• Materials from the institute's audit by the Ministry of Education commission sent by Minister Filippov.
• Documents detailing violations in the NII's work.
• Audit materials from the Department for Combating Economic Crimes (OBEP) of the Central Administrative District of Moscow.

The General Prosecutor's Office immediately removed these materials from the case and fragmented them, despite the minister's requests to keep the information consolidated.

Conflicting Directives

• Kolmogorov's Stance: Deputy Prosecutor General Kolmogorov argued that there were no grounds for conducting a full-fledged investigation outside the MVD RF. He informed Minister Filippov: "There are no grounds for removing the criminal case from the Investigative Committee at the MVD RF and taking it into production by the department for the investigation of especially important cases of the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF."
• Parallel Actions: Concurrently, the General Prosecutor's Office removed other high-profile criminal cases from the Investigative Committee at the MVD RF for unrelated reasons, often involving smuggling and money laundering (e.g., the "Three Whales Case," which was closed with procedural violations).
• Discrepancy: It was noted as strange that the prosecutors treated the NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' case differently, leaving it within the MVD. This was attributed to the MVD's strong ties with the institute, which provided premises, paid utilities, and allegedly ignored the illegal transportation of explosives, according to the former head of the institute.

Political Involvement and Subsequent Developments

• Security Council Involvement (Early January 2001): Secretary of the Security Council of the RF Ivanov reacted to Minister of Education Filippov's statement. During a meeting with President Putin, the issue was raised, and Vladimir Putin appeared interested, instructing that the situation be considered at the next Security Council meeting regarding ammunition disposal and export control.
• Institute's Activities (Nikita Chekulin): Former acting director of 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' Nikita Chekulin reported that institute employees were tasked with preparing materials on problems, achievements, and future tasks. At that time, they were actively involved in creating technological lines for ammunition disposal at military bases in Sevastopol and Kronstadt, and developing new-generation industrial explosives.
• Lack of Follow-up: Weeks passed without any instruction from the Security Council regarding the issue.
• Meeting with Minister Filippov (March 16): During a reception with Minister Filippov, Chekulin learned that no progress would be made, and promised funding for the institute was not expected. When asked directly if Filippov would contact Patrushev (Director of the FSB) regarding the crimes, Filippov replied... (text cuts off).

Investigation into the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"

Patrushev told Filippov that he "...had not dealt with this matter, and would not deal with it."

Based on the conversation with Filippov, it was Patrushev who influenced Putin's decision—specifically, to cancel the decision made by the President during a meeting with Security Council Secretary Ivanov regarding the NII (Research Institute) "Roskonversvzryvtsentr."

It is believed that Patrushev explained to Putin that a hearing on this issue could have an extremely undesirable effect on the FSB's version of the origin of the explosives used in the 1999 bombings, and highlighted the reasons for the lack of a proper investigation. However, it is noteworthy that the hearing initiated by Filippov took place at a Security Council meeting in February 2001, but without mentioning the NII.

Timeline of Events

The outcome indicated that the activity of law enforcement agencies yielded zero result. The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation and the FSB did not deem an investigation necessary, and the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) was unable to proceed.

Conclusion on State Involvement

After reviewing the evidence and materials of official correspondence, a firm conviction is formed: the special services and the prosecutor's office actively worked to prevent a large-scale investigation based on the full volume of documents concerning the activities of the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr." State representatives deliberately avoided such an investigation, and appropriate measures were taken, including intimidation and pressure on witnesses.

Pressure on Witnesses

Nikita Chekulin, the former acting director of the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" and a member of the departmental commission for checking the institute, reported that attempts were made to pressure him and his family members to conceal information about the institute that was significant to society.

Nikita Chekulin did not limit his actions to officials; he frequently spoke with journalists, gave repeated interviews to Moscow newspapers, and made public numerous documents detailing the true state of affairs regarding the turnover of explosives, particularly hexogen, before and after the 1999 terrorist attacks.

This generated significant public outcry, which could not go unnoticed by representatives of the special services. Nikita Chekulin claimed the following:

"Until a certain period of time, the department of Colonel Igor Alexandrovich Dyupyu (of Department 'T' – for the protection of the constitutional order and the fight against terrorism, -- note) with the sanction of the Moscow City Court and with the knowledge of the head of Department 'T' Rear Admiral Ugryumov carried out operational-search activities based on the application of the Minister of Education (...)."

Testimony of Nikita Chekulin

Nikita Chekulin, the former acting director of 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr', began assisting the FSB of the Russian Federation because he believed it would aid the investigation into the case, specifically regarding the origin of industrial explosives containing hexogen used during the 1999 terrorist attacks.

Hopes for an objective investigation faded after the criminal case was terminated, leading Chekulin to realize that authorities intended to either prosecute him or eliminate him.

FSB Surveillance and Monitoring

Chekulin claimed that since the summer of 2000, the FSB had been conducting:
* Physical surveillance on the institute's director, Shchukin.
* Wiretapping of the institute's phones.

These measures also revealed that the GUBOP of the MVD of the Russian Federation was collecting information and covertly monitoring Chekulin.

Events in July 2000

In July 2000, Senior Lieutenant Pozdnov from the Department for Combating Economic Crimes of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Central Administrative District of Moscow visited the institute.

• Context: Pozdnov was working on verification materials based on a statement by Minister of Education Filippov.
• Action: He arrived to seize documents, allegedly as part of a criminal case already initiated against Chekulin under the fraud article.
• Chekulin's Account: Chekulin reported that Pozdnov appeared depressed and stated he had received instructions regarding the fraud case from the 9th department of the GUBOP of the MVD of Russia, in the presence of Shchukin. Pozdnov also warned about impending searches, including at the place of residence.

Information Provided to the FSB

While in contact with Colonel Dupuy (Department 'T' of the FSB of the Russian Federation), Chekulin provided information valuable to FSB officers:

• He helped decode Shchukin's telephone conversations.
• He viewed video materials from physical surveillance.
• Chekulin noted that a person named Kotov Vladimir Borisovich frequently appeared in telephone conversations, who arranged an early meeting between Shchukin and the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Kozlov to resolve issues.
• The wiretapping of Shchukin's conversations allowed for the identification of a planned attack against Chekulin.

Escalation and Threats

The following timeline details the escalating threats against Chekulin:

According to Nikita's report...

Investigation into Explosives Trafficking and Government Involvement

Operative Identification

• "Kotov" was revealed to be an operative of the 9th department of GUBOP, whose real surname was Shchavinsky.

Events in 2000

• September 2000: Nikita Chekulin, the former acting director of "Roskonversvzryvtsentr," gave testimony at the Investigative Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.
  • The testimony took place in the presence of investigator Vazhdalov and operative Vasiliev.
  • Evidence presented included fake invoices bearing the forged signatures of Chekulin and the accountant, concerning the shipment of 16 tons of ballistite charges from the Chapaevsk Experimental Plant to the Uchalinsky GOK in the Republic of Bashkortostan.
  • It was evident to the investigators that the fabrication of a criminal case against Chekulin was obvious.
• December 2000: The leadership of the FSB of the Russian Federation terminated operational-search activities regarding the situation at the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr."
  • Colonel Dupuy, head of the department of Directorate "T" of the FSB of the Russian Federation, was informed that the case was not promising.
  • The officer who interacted with Nikita Chekulin was sent on a mission to Chechnya.
  • A year later, upon returning from this mission, the officer reported to Chekulin that the materials concerning the NII had vanished from his safe.
• Subsequent Actions:
  • Investigator Vazhdalov and his group, who had gathered substantial factual material on the state of affairs at the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" and the trade in explosives, were removed from the investigation.
  • By March 2001, the criminal case was closed.

Seeking External Help

• Having exhausted all possibilities for an objective investigation within Russia, and recognizing that even the Minister of Education (a member of the Russian government) could not ensure a comprehensive investigation, Nikita Chekulin sought assistance from Boris Berezovsky in London.
• The goal was to prevent the topic of the institute and the associated problem of explosive circulation from being permanently buried through a public address abroad.

Press Conference in London (March 5, 2002)

On March 5, 2002, in London, Nikita Chekulin participated in a press conference for the film "Assassination of Russia" and stated the following:

• Self-Identification: Nikita Chekulin, former acting Director of the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr," was recruited by the FSB in 2000 as a secret agent of Department "T" (counter-terrorism).
• Evidence of Conspiracy: He possesses documentary evidence of a secret scheme involving:
  • The theft of explosives from military warehouses.
  • The participation of high-ranking officials of the Russian government in concealing facts and obstructing the investigation.
• Explosive Procurement:
  • Documents from the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" (Ministry of Education of Russia, located at Bolshaya Lubyanka, house 18, building 3) show that significant quantities of hexogen were purchased between 1999-2000.
  • The sources of the explosives included Military Unit No. 68586 and No. 92919.
  • Tons of this material, falsely labeled as gunpowder and TNT, were shipped via the institute's powers of attorney to various regional institutions.
• Internal Investigation and Obstruction:
  • An internal investigation within the Ministry of Education led to an appeal by Minister Vladimir Filippov to the highest Russian officials, requesting an investigation involving the FSB.
  • Officials informed of the potential terrorist activity included:
    • Deputy Prime Ministers: Valentina Matviyenko and Ilya Klebanov.
    • FSB Director: Nikolai Patrushev.
    • Minister of Internal Affairs: Vladimir Rushailo.
    • Security Council Secretary: Sergei Ivanov.
  • However, Mr. Patrushev banned the investigation, a decision officially notified to the Ministry of Education by his deputy, Yuri Zaostrovtsev.

Testimony and Investigation Concerns

Nikita Chekulin's Account

According to the testimony of Nikita Chekulin, after his participation in the London press conference, he began receiving offers from FSB officers (which he recorded on a voice recorder) to return home as soon as possible. However, he was warned of the danger posed by the FSB, so he had to stay in London.

Despite this, certain consequences followed:
* On May 10, 2002, a branch of "Alfa Bank," where Chekulin had accounts, refused to open an account for his father-in-law and spouse.
* Bank employees explained that this refusal was based on a ban received from the FSB.

Questions Regarding the Investigation

While one can be critical of the statement and testimony of the former acting director of "Roskonverzvzryvtsentr," Nikita Chekulin, he possesses clear facts and documents that compel questions to be directed to the authorities regarding the suddenly terminated criminal investigation.

Key questions raised include:
* Why could the numerous statements of the Minister of Education—a member of the Russian government—not lead the General Prosecutor's Office, the FSB, or the MVD of the Russian Federation to study all the circumstances of this case in their entirety?
* What is the reason that the investigative group in the Investigative Committee under the MVD of the Russian Federation, which was precisely trying to gather all the materials, was suddenly replaced?
* Why was the replacement investigator uninterested even in the results of the departmental audit of the NII "Roskonverzvzryvtsentr"?

Attempts by State Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev to Clarify the Situation

State Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev attempted to clarify the circumstances surrounding the NII "Roskonverzvzryvtsentr" by sending a dozen inquiries to various state agencies, including:
* FSB
* General Prosecutor's Office
* MVD
* Other state agencies

Only the Minister of Education, Vladimir Filippov, responded definitively to the inquiries. He provided the deputy with:
* All his correspondence with the heads of the security forces.
* All materials he had preserved concerning "Roskonverzvzryvtsentr."

Minister Filippov's Response

In response to Sergei Kovalev's letter (No. 2143-KS dated 22.04.2002), Minister Filippov reported (No. 01-50-689/32-10 dated 08.05.2002):

"Regarding the documents concerning the specific activities of a number of former employees of the NII, including the invoices, powers of attorney, and other documents you are interested in related to the supply of explosives, I inform you that almost all documentation on the financial and economic activities of the institute was seized in 2000 by the Investigative Committee under the MVD of Russia."

This indicated that the investigation had an effect, resembling a "cleanup"—the collection and concealment of serious papers that could shed light on how the state controlled the turnover of hexogen and other explosives during the 1999 terrorist acts.

Minister Filippov is credited with ensuring an objective investigation took place, though it unfortunately could not develop due to reasons beyond his control.

Other significant responses to Deputy Kovalev's inquiries noted that top officials from the MVD, EMERCOM, and the General Prosecutor's Office could not develop a unified position on whether there was distribution.

Conclusions and Assumptions

After considering all the listed documentary evidence, a justified alarm arises. This alarm stems from the fact that terrorists could indeed have used explosives (and in particular, hexogen), which gained uncontrolled circulation due to the situation at the NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr".

The following factors suggest a highly suspicious situation:

• Confused statements by officials.
• Incredible figures for the accounting of explosive substances.
• The history of the former heads of the institute.
• The stubborn unwillingness to conduct any checks and investigations by the forces of the General Prosecutor's Office and the FSB of the RF.

The text raises critical questions:

• Why did the special service and the prosecutor's office not pay enough attention to the critical situation, and even now try not to raise this issue?
• There are grounds to believe that a serious investigation would reveal that the heads of the special services and the General Prosecutor's Office reacted inadequately to operational data and numerous appeals from the Ministry of Education regarding the catastrophic situation at the institute. This suggests that the prosecutors and the FSB leadership remained idle.
• If this inaction led to the tragic consequences—the terrorist attacks of 1999—and the inability to identify all those responsible, doubts will naturally arise regarding the competence and professionalism of the heads of the General Prosecutor's Office and the FSB.

The author concludes that, for understandable (including political) reasons, this issue cannot be addressed in Russia. Consequently, the entire story concerning "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" and the possible origin of the hexogen used in the Moscow and other Russian cities terrorist attacks will remain hidden. An objective, full, and comprehensive investigation into the crime, which resulted in hundreds of deaths, is once again sacrificed to current short-sighted political interests.

Addition to the Text: Appeal to Justice

At the beginning of 2003, Deputy Sergei Kovalev, with the support of Lev Levinson, filed two applications in Moscow courts:

1. To the Meshchansky court against the leadership of the FSB of the RF.
2. To the Tverskoy court against the Prosecutor General.

This action was forced because the prosecutor and representatives of the special services completely ignored the right of the parliamentarian (representing the voters/society) to receive adequate information about the Ryazan exercises during a long official correspondence.

The officials who initiated these exercises remained anonymous. The plan for the exercises (whether it even existed is unclear) was only slightly revealed in newspaper publications. The text notes that those who approved and carried out the exercises... (the sentence is incomplete).

Secrecy and Impunity: A Case Study

The actions remained in the shadows of secrecy. Consequently, residents of Ryazan who suffered during the "operational measures" were unable to sue or seek fair compensation for the damage caused. No officials were named as personally responsible; instead, the public was confronted only with the abstract essence of the entire state apparatus.

Legal Proceedings in the Tverskoy Court

In the Tverskoy Court, Deputy Kovalev demanded two documents from the General Prosecutor's Office:
1. The prosecutorial decision refusing to initiate a criminal case against FSB officials involved in the exercises.
2. The decision of the UFSB for the Ryazan region regarding the initiation of a criminal case concerning the events in Ryazan.

The Tverskoy Court stated in its decision (dated February 4, 2003):

"In response to the specified appeals, the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, signed by deputy general prosecutors of the Russian Federation, provided written responses refusing to provide copies of the requested documents."

The court noted that these circumstances formed the basis for filing a complaint. In light of the entry into force of the GPC RF (Code of Civil Procedure), this complaint was framed as an application to recognize the actions of the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation as illegal.

Judicial Findings and Critique

The outcome of such complaints was predictable. Tverskoy Court judge A. Sevalkina decided:

"Since the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation found no grounds for providing copies of the requested documents, the refusal to provide these documents is lawful."

The general implication of this verdict is that if an official wishes to avoid accountability to society's representatives, they can choose to do so, limiting themselves to empty formal replies.

This decision was made despite the judge quoting verbatim the Federal Law "On the Status of a Member of the Federation Council and the Status of a Deputy of the State Duma...". Specifically, Part 2 of Article 17 of this law mandates:

"Upon the appeal of a member of the Federation Council or a deputy of the State Duma on issues related to their activities, officials of state authorities, local self-government bodies, public associations, and organizations shall immediately (and if additional materials are needed, no later than 30 days from the date of receipt of the appeal) provide a response to this appeal and provide the requested documents or information. At the same time, information constituting a state secret is provided in the manner established by the federal law on state secrets."

The court identified a seemingly invisible loophole in the law: the requirement to provide "documents or information." Exploiting this, the court observed:

"Based on the meaning of the law, it follows that the decision on whether to provide copies of documents or information in connection with the received appeal falls within the exclusive competence of the person possessing this information (documents) by virtue of their official duties."

This loophole allows any civil servant to effectively ignore deputy inquiries. The term "Information" is excessively broad. One can provide two or three words that convey nothing in response to specific questions, yet still qualify as "information." Furthermore, no one can prove that this situation is not a mockery of common sense.

Parallel Case in the Meshchansky Court

A similar situation unfolded in the Meshchansky Court, which reviewed a complaint against the FSB leadership—Director N. P. Patrushev and his first deputy V. E. Pronichev. The only difference was that the court session was closed to the public.

Court Decision Analysis and Appeals

Initial Court Decision (Dated April 2, 2003)

The judge's decision was notably dismissive of the submitted written evidence. Specifically:

• The judge ignored the article by Rustam Arifdzhanov, titled "And the city didn't know that exercises were underway," which partially quoted documents relating to the Ryazan events.
• The judge resolutely rejected the motion to summon the author of the article as a witness.

Ignored Special Service Documents

Crucially, the court completely disregarded documents obtained by Deputy Kovalev from the special services:

1. A copy of the Resolution to initiate a criminal case, accept it for proceedings, and create an investigative group by an investigator of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate for the Ryazan Region dated September 23, 1999.
2. The Resolution to refuse to initiate a criminal case by the Senior Assistant to the Prosecutor General of the RF dated March 22, 2000.
3. The Resolution to terminate the criminal case by the senior investigator of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate for the Ryazan Region dated April 6, 2000.

The grounds for rejecting these important materials remained a mystery, suggesting either:
* A terrible mess within the FSB of the RF system.
* The fact that there were no exercises at all, given that the FSB's own employees initiated a criminal case regarding them.

Paradoxical Actions of the Meshchansky Court

The Meshchansky Court acted paradoxically:

• It ruled that a State Duma deputy is not entitled to control the activities of the federal security service bodies and denied the complaint.
• This ruling was made despite Sergei Kovalev merely requesting information and documents, attempting to exercise his right to obtain objective data in accordance with the law on the status of a deputy.

Uncovered Information and "Operational Experiment"

Despite the unfavorable outcome of the closed trial, some results emerged:

• Additional documents came to light, revealing that in Ryazan, a certain "operational experiment" (something fundamentally new) was conducted within the framework of the exercises.
• This conclusion was drawn from a letter submitted to the court, addressed to the deputy head of the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and the Fight against Terrorism of the FSB of Russia dated 14.09.99.
• The court easily concluded that what occurred in Ryazan was not an exercise, but an "operational experiment," which legally refers to operational-search activities and constitutes a major secret.

Contradictions in Official Statements

The judge overlooked obvious contradictions:

• In his official response to a deputy's inquiry (18.10.2002 No. K-5345), Acting FSB Director Pronichev stated that exercises were conducted in Ryazan, while operational-search activities were conducted in Ivanovo, Kursk, and Orel.
• This discrepancy led to the conclusion that what happened in Ryazan was in no way an operational-search activity.
• If Pronichev's letter is considered unserious, it implies that the leadership of the special services is fickle, and unimaginable confusion reigns within the department, posing a danger to society and the state.

Appeal to the Moscow City Court

Deputy Sergei Kovalev did not limit himself to the first-instance court decision. On April 24, 2003, he appealed to the Moscow City Court.

In his cassation appeal against the Meshchansky Court decision, he protested that even this predictable process was shielded from society by an impenetrable wall. He specifically noted:

"The court made an unfounded decision to hold a closed court session. The reason for declaring the court closed was the defendant's (a representative of the FSB of the RF, -- note) presentation for inspection of a document marked 'for official use' -- a letter addressed to the head of the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and the Fight against Terrorism of the FSB of Russia dated 14.09.99."

He further cited the legal basis for closed sessions:

"In accordance with Article 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the RF, proceedings in closed court sessions are carried out in cases containing information constituting a state secret, the secret of adoption (adoption) of a child, as well as in other cases if provided for by federal law. Proceedings in closed..."

Legal Analysis and Procedural Violations

Court Hearing Restrictions

Court hearings are permitted only upon the granting of a motion by a participating party that cites one of the following reasons:
* The need to preserve a commercial or other legally protected secret.
* The inviolability of the private life of citizens.
* Other circumstances where public discussion could interfere with the proper trial or lead to the disclosure of secrets or the violation of citizens' rights and legitimate interests.

Findings in the Current Case

• Lack of Evidence for Secrecy: No evidence was presented regarding the commercial value of the submitted document copy, nor was there evidence of a lack of free legal access to it.
• Conclusion on Secrecy: Consequently, there were no grounds to classify the specified document copy as a service secret protected by federal law.
• Illegality of Closed Session: Based on this, the court's ruling to hold a closed court session was deemed illegal.

Violation of Public Announcement Requirements

• Legal Mandate: According to Article 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation, the court's decision regarding a closed court session must be announced publicly.
• Failure to Comply: This legal requirement was not met, as confirmed by the testimony of journalists, specifically the correspondent of the "Prima" information agency, A. Antonov.

Additional Violations Noted by Cassation Appeal

The cassation appeal highlighted several other procedural violations:
* Unmotivated silence regarding the examination of documentary evidence.
* Refusal to interrogate a witness.
* Incorrect application of legal norms, where the judge improperly favored the law "On the Bodies of the Federal Security Service," bypassing the norms of the law "On the Status of a Member of the Federation Council and the Status of a Deputy of the State Duma..."

Moscow City Court Ruling

• Decision: The Moscow City Court did not find merit in the listed points.
• Ruling Details: In its ruling dated April 4, 2003, the judicial collegium for civil cases—comprising presiding judge Yudin V. G. and judges Milykh M. V. and Ionova I. A.—rejected the cassation appeal of Sergei Kovalev, duplicating the reasoning of the district courts.

Conclusion on Activism and State Control

• Value of Efforts: The efforts by human rights activists were deemed worthwhile, despite the anticipated negative outcome.
• Systemic Crisis: Attempts to obtain objective information from the state, its special services, and the prosecutor's office regarding the Ryazan FSB exercises revealed that the system of public control over the state apparatus is in a deep crisis.
• Power Dynamics: The findings suggest that power structures easily suppress any legal methods of influencing this system.
• Broader Implications: This experience provides insight into recent and current phenomena (such as the changes at NTV or the "YUKOS" case) and allows for predictions regarding civil society's resistance against the "power vertical."
• Positive Outcome: The positive result is that these attempts have occurred and continue, leading to the availability of new documents and evidence for society, enabling experts and interested parties to build an objective and independent picture of events.