Analysis of Explosive Substance Transfers

EMERCOM Usage and Deliveries

• EMERCOM of Russia units utilize industrial-grade explosive devices, which are filled with the explosive substance mentioned (hexogen).
• The use of either pure or phlegmatized hexogen by EMERCOM of Russia units in any other capacity is deemed impractical.
• Deliveries of hexogen to EMERCOM of Russia units under contracts with the NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' of the Ministry of Education of Russia were not carried out.

Contradictory Official Statements

In response to an inquiry from Kovalev, the deputy head of EMERCOM, V. A. Vostrotin, stated that:
* In the Main Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations of the Tver region, Colonel Vorobyov did not perform military service during the period from 01.01.1999 to 31.12.2000.

These statements suggest the absence of both a colonel and hexogen. However, this conflicts with reports from Vasily Kolmogorov, Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, in response to Deputy Kovalev's inquiries (letter No. 27/1-534-2001 dated 13.08.2002):

• Kolmogorov reported that the sale of an explosive substance (a mixture of TNT and hexogen, due to the lack of another type of explosive) by military unit No. 68586 in Tver was re-checked.
• Materials from the prosecutor's office of the Tver region indicated that this explosive substance was allocated under the decree of the Governor of the Tver region to the regional GU GOChS (Main Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations) for the purpose of eliminating the threat of flood inundation.

Conclusion from this section: Hexogen was allocated after all.

Subsequent Contradictions Regarding Hexogen Transfer

In a later response (No. 27/1-534-2001 dated 28.11.2002), Kolmogorov wrote:

• According to the report of the Main Directorate of the Tver region, the contract (with NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr') had not been implemented to date.
• Explosive materials from the military unit had not been received by anyone due to the actual refusal of the newly appointed director of 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' to fulfill the terms of the contract.

Contradiction: It is asserted that hexogen was received, and the military unit itself lacked the authority to sell it.

Summary of Logical Inconsistencies

• There is a lack of logic in the reported sequence of events.
• "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" was established specifically to convert military explosives into industrial explosives.
• The Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation claims the scheme for transferring hexogen to the EMERCOM unit bypassed the NII, despite a corresponding contract being signed.
• It appears hexogen was transferred, but the NII was not involved in the transfer.
• EMERCOM denies all involvement, asserting that hexogen in that form is not used by them.

The text questions the transparency of such a scheme, especially when high-level officials "get confused in their testimony."

Case Study: Bryansk Chemical Plant Supply

A similar case involves the supply of hexogen to the Bryansk Chemical Plant.

• "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" issued power of attorney No. 040 (dated May 22) to receive hexogen from military unit No. 92 919 (superseding power of attorney No. 014 dated February 23, 2000), via a letter dated May 19, 2000.
• This concerned five tons of hexogen-containing components of surface-to-surface missile warheads.
• Formal Payment: The institute paid the military unit not for hexogen, but for "gunpowder." This is documented in payment order No. 061 dated April 13 for account No. 15 dated 12.04.2000, for the amount of 15,680 rubles.

Documentation Gaps

• The documentation lacks references to any specific contract regarding hexogen.
• In the reconciliation statement between the Bryansk Chemical Plant and NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" (as of March 1, 2001), the shipped five hexogen-containing tons do not appear.
• According to the former acting director of the NII, Nikita Chekulin, this could imply that 5 tons of hexogen-containing components of warheads "disappeared without a trace."

Further Inquiry

Attention is drawn to the response to Deputy Kovalev's inquiries to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (No. KS-2319 and KS-2320 dated 13.06.02), where the first deputy minister (and now minister) Rashid...