Explosives Supply and Corruption Concerns

Conflicting Reports on Explosives Supply

• Nurgaliev's Reply (Letter No. 3/16760 dated 26.11.02): Stated that information regarding illegal supplies of explosives by the NII 'Roskonversvzryvtsentr' involving the Federal State Unitary Enterprise 'Bryansk Chemical Plant' and military units No. 68 586 and No. 92 919 was not confirmed.
• Deputy Prosecutor General Vasily Kolmogorov's Supplement (Letter No. 27/1-534-2001 dated 13.08.2002):
  • Indicated that military unit No. 92919 had no relationship with NII 'RKVTs' ('Roskonversvzryvtsentr').
  • Reported that in 1999, the specified military unit supplied explosives containing hexogen to the Bryansk Chemical Plant without the participation of NII 'RKVTs'.

Ambiguities and Documentary Evidence

The situation presents contradictory accounts:
* Some officials claim that "hexogen supplies were not confirmed."
* Others assert that supplies occurred from the military unit to the plant, but completely without the participation of "Roskonversvzryvtsentr."

A critical point remains: documentary evidence exists showing that the institute issued a power of attorney to the Bryansk chemical plant to receive hexogen specifically from military unit No. 92 919.

These contradictory and illogical answers undermine confidence in the objectivity of investigations conducted by the special services, the prosecutor's office, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Concerns Over Documentation and Scale

Even setting aside the worst-case scenario, the documentation for the transfer of:
* One ton of hexogen.
* Five tons of hexogen-containing components.

...is considered unimpeachable. The paperwork transforms what should be an official disposal process into a "shadowy, completely opaque deal."

Similar issues are suspected regarding other explosives, measured in tens and hundreds of tons. Crucially, there is no guarantee that the same level of "paperwork" for many tons of hexogen did not occur at NII "Roskonversvzryvtsentr" prior to the 1999 terrorist acts (bombings in Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk).

Corruption and Terrorism

It is argued that in a closed and corrupt system, tracking the movement of money, weapons, and dangerous materials becomes significantly harder. Hexogen and other explosives can become a commodity, generating profit and personal enrichment. This conspiratorial mechanism of bribes and unofficial services, while unlikely to cause terrorist acts, certainly benefits their organizers.

Example of "Commodity-Money" Relations

Nikita Chekulin, former acting director of the NII and commission member, cited a document illustrating "commodity-money" relations between:
* Management of "Roskonversvzryvtsentr"
* Commanders of military units
* Management of mining companies
* Leadership of the Russian Gosgortekhnadzor

This evidence includes a memorandum from institute employee Severov addressed to Director Shchukin, which bears the visa of the accounting department.

The document specifically testifies that, for instance, one wagon of the explosive granipor (50 tons), supplied from military unit No. 86 696 to... (text cuts off).