Notes

• Rebnikova Elena Mikh. $\rightarrow$ "Consul Business" $\rightarrow$ auth. Gennadiy Lappanov.
• Brother-2

Faint Text

• September 11, 2001
• FSB
• Alexander Litvinenko
• apartment bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk in September 1999
• Ryazan
• hexogen

Analysis of Device Construction

Detonator Construction

• A detonator based on a hunting cartridge was unlikely to have been made without soldering.
• Judging by the appearance of the detonator, it was made according to a well-known terrorist technology—using a cracked lightbulb.
• A hole was cut in the cardboard casing of the cartridge with a knife, and a lightbulb was inserted into it in such a way that the exposed filament was immersed in gunpowder, while the base remained outside (Fig. 3).

Circuit Element Assembly

• The electrode on the base of a car lamp or a flashlight lamp has a diameter of no more than 3 mm, and it is extremely difficult to attach the end of a wire, especially a stranded one, to it purely mechanically (without soldering).
• The closing element, made from a watch, could not have been made without soldering.
• The circuit elements in such watches are very small: the size of the board contacts is about 1 mm, the gaps between them are fractions of a millimeter.
• It is impossible to reliably attach wire ends to them, even single-core ones, or at least create the appearance of a real attachment without soldering.

Assembly Discrepancies

• The fact that the setting and conditions in which the closer (watch) and detonator (cartridge) were made differed significantly from the conditions in which the power supply was made and the final assembly of the circuit was carried out is confirmed with high probability by the presence of several twists between the wires in the circuit.
• Ideally, three wires would have been enough to make the circuit (Fig. 4).
• These twists do not carry an "intimidating" function; on the contrary, they make the circuit look less reliable, while the closer and detonator give the impression of being made very carefully.
• Consequently, the twists were needed to connect elements that already had leads coming out.

Watch Case Construction

• The care taken in making the closer is also evidenced by the fact that the watch case in the photographs is closed, and no gap is visible in it.
• Undoubtedly, a recess for the wires was cut into the edges of one or both halves of the case.
• To ensure a neat lead-out of the wires and the snapping shut of the watch case requires time comparable to the time it takes to make the rest of the circuit (or even more, if the detonator is made with soldering).
• To create a mock-up, this was completely unnecessary—it would have been enough to wrap the watch case with electrical tape.
• This work made sense only in anticipation of either transporting the element or handing it over to less careful hands.
• The concern for the reliability of the circuit's operation is also confirmed by the connection of a third battery that did not fit in the box. This battery does not add to the "intimidating effect," but it does add voltage.

Conclusions

1. The explosive circuit closer made from an electronic watch was NOT made in the same conditions as the power supply. The detonator made from a cartridge most likely was not either.
2. In the manufacture of the explosive circuit, the main attention was paid not to the persuasiveness of the imitation, but to the reliability of the device's operation.

Other News

• They are no longer being sought
• Anatoly Mylnikov was detained at the Ukrainian border while attempting to leave the CIS.
• Taukan Frantsuzov, arrested in 2000, was sentenced in 2001 along with four comrades by the Stavropol Regional Court for preparing other terrorist acts. He received 13.5 years. The court dropped the charges of preparing the Moscow bombings for all the defendants.
• It is unknown what happened to Ruslan Magayev. The press reported that in the fall of 1999 he was detained in Kislovodsk (a KamAZ truck in which explosives were stored was rented in his name) and placed in the FSB's Lefortovo detention center. No further reports on his fate were made. His name is mentioned neither in connection with the Stavropol trial nor in connection with the Moscow trial that has begun.
• Alexander Kapanadze has disappeared—a retired warrant officer who in September 1999 gave "Novaya Gazeta" material for the publication "We know who went on that bloody raid"—about how the apartment bombings were organized by Basaev and Khattab. One of the soldiers' mothers promised three years ago to give us the Tbilisi address of Kapanadze's parents. It recently turned out that she was unable to reach us by phone then, and later...

People and Firms

• People in whose name (as heads or founders) many firms are registered.
• The largest Russian industrialist should be considered Gerasimchik Yuri Vladimirovich, the head of 1436 firms.
• Many firms are still listed at the apartments of their owners.

Tax Officials and Business Startups

• Do tax officials deliberately invent difficulties with addresses for beginning businessmen to force them to go to paid "legal firms" with the ominous crosshairs on their advertisements?
• Or were the employees of these companies, stamping out little firms for sale in their own names, just lucky in life — they know the secret addresses where one can without problem squeeze a hundred or two businessmen into one room?
• It seems to be both.
• However, for this, the "godmothers" must have good friends both among the tax inspection employees, who will turn a blind eye to anything, and among the owners of the premises.

Legal REGISTRATION UNION MULTI-CHANNEL (095) 933-...
Here they will incorporate and liquidate you
And in this house — 3353 firms

Koroleva's Firm Addresses

• Koroleva's firm addresses are interesting.
• She registered three firms at the address Malaya Lubyanka, 8/7, bldg. 10 (a building adjacent to house 3 on Furkasovsky).
• Five firms — at the address Maly Kiselny Lane, 6, bldg. 1 (this building is adjacent to the building of the FSB Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region).
• Several more firms — in Pechatnikov Lane, also a stone's throw from the Lubyanka quarter of the FSB.
• Thus, a vector has emerged. Of the three main directions in which the organizers of the bombings are called Chechens (Basayev), the FSB, or Berezovsky, the second remains.
• The connection of Lazovsky's people with the FSB still needs more rigorous proof.
• But no one wrote about their connection with Basayev or Berezovsky even as a joke.

MISCELLANEOUS

The Uzbek Trace

• The company "Kapstroy-2000", which rented the garage on Krasnodarskaya, was founded by Achemez Shagabanovich Gochiyayev and Alexander Yuryevich Karmishin; the head is Alexander Karmishin.
• Mikhail Trepashkin found this information the day after Gochiyayev's letter was made public at a joint meeting of the Commission and the London Group in August 2002.
• When in March 2003 "Novaya Gazeta" published the text of Gochiyayev's interview received from Yuri Felshtinsky, we suggested that the provocateur K., whom Gochiyayev speaks of, might mean specifically Karmishin.
• Felshtinsky agreed with this assumption and then, in March, mentioned him in his article.
• No reaction followed — neither from the generals nor from Karmishin himself.
• No one came to the door of the apartment in Vyazma, Smolensk region, where he is registered, when we rang.
• Neighbors only said that "Sasha, a tall guy like that" really lives there.
• Mikhail Trepashkin asked investigator Ignatiev about Karmishin when he met with him as a lawyer for the victims (he was never allowed to familiarize himself with the case).
• The investigator replied that Karmishin had had no contact with Gochiyayev since 1997.
• Karmishin's passport data is interesting.
  • The passport was issued to him in the Kyzyl-Orda region: in the early 80s he either lived there or was "serving time."
  • In combination with this data, the geographical origin of other people from the inner circle of the main accused is also interesting.
• Let's see who was near Gochiyayev in the days preceding the bombings.
  • Partner Karmishin. Kyzyl-Orda region is Kazakhstan, but it is much closer to Tashkent than to Alma-Ata.
  • Girlfriend Tatyana Koroleva. Registered in the Volgograd region, but the passport was issued in the Chimkent region — neighboring Kyzyl-Orda.

16

Friends

The court process in 1999 was covered by the correspondent of "Literaturnaya Gazeta," Igor Gamayunov. Unfortunately, our suggestion of a possible connection between the defendants in that case and the bombing case seemed too absurd to him, and he refused to speak with us. The widow of one of the factory directors also canceled a scheduled meeting—as could be understood from her words, on the advice of her current husband, who works for the FSB.

The "Moven" factory stands on Plekhanov Street in the same Perovo district where the Zander family lives. Regardless of whether Scientology—the philosophical basis on which the first director (and according to some publications, the second as well) built the production—is correct or not, the economic part of the teaching, by all appearances, yielded a good result. Almost second-by-second control over every worker, carrot-and-stick stimulation for technological creativity, and a quick transition to popular products (air conditioners) made the factory a very attractive property object.

And from all the publications about the trial, one gets the impression that the administrator Proshin waged the bloody struggle for the enterprise alone. Aside from two auto mechanics, no one helped him in this struggle.

But Proshin was not the only contender for the director's chair; he must have had overt or covert rivals. Committing such a daring crime and leaving practically direct witnesses, Proshin could not rely solely on the loyalty of the staff, even one raised according to Scientology recipes. Only a very naive person could count on all ill-wishers trembling with fear before his pistol (just whisper something—and he'll come and shoot you himself), which the schemer Proshin could not have been.

One can be sure that a person who twice committed "high-profile" murders had some more powerful force behind him than his own "TT" [pistol]. The factory could well have been of interest to some financial-industrial group, but such groups seize enterprises by other methods, and if they do shed blood, they do it in such a way that the crime cannot be solved for years and even its motive is unclear. The style we see in Perovo is more characteristic of territorial criminal groups.

In the neighborhood of Plekhanov Street, on 2nd Vladimirskaya, lived the head of one such group—Maxim Lazovsky. People from his gang also very easily used a pistol, an automatic rifle, or a knife. Judging by the press and the court sentence, this gang did not commit crimes in Perovo: what leader would arrange a shootout under his own windows? Lazovsky's men conducted bloody commercial showdowns in various parts of the city (mainly in the Nemetskaya Sloboda, where the "Lanako" office was located in Perevedenovsky Lane) and bombings on transport in the Prospekt Mira area. Apparently, the only exception was the murder of Said Nataev in a remote place on Biryukova Street.

On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that Lazovsky would allow any other gang to operate in his home district.

But we found no links between Lazovsky, Zander, and Mylnikov.

VECTOR

Recently, Yuri Felshtinsky published ("Novaya Gazeta," No. 84, 2003) the results of an analysis of information about the accused and people associated with them (including information found by Trepashkin). The results are very interesting and easily verifiable.

The firm that helped Gochiyayev register a fake legal entity and in which his mistress Tatyana Koroleva worked or still works, indeed turned out to be connected with Lazovsky's firm.

We checked the information on which Felshtinsky builds this conclusion. We seem to have found one mistake: that Koroleva's firm registered the firm "Kapstroy-2000." In Syun's article, which started this line of investigation, another Gochiyayev firm is mentioned—"Brand-2." This seems more correct because Koroleva's firm "Delovaya Kompaniya" [Business Company] came into existence slightly later than "Kapstroy."

The firm "Delovaya Kompaniya" (later "Lantana-L") is listed at the address Shokalsky Passage, 17. Telephone: 928-50-39. Felshtinsky believes that the firm was named "Lantana-L" in honor of Tatyana Lazovskaya or Tatyana Koroleva. We think it more likely that Tatyana Khaustova—the founder of both firms—was meant. The address of "Delovaya Kompaniya" changed several times; at one time it was registered opposite the main FSB building (Furkasovsky Lane, 3)—in the same place as the scientific-production association (NPO) "Priroda" that founded it. The telephone number remained the same—928-50-39.

The firm "Lanako" is listed at the address Michurinsky Prospekt, 31, bldg. 1, but its telephone number 267-61-19 is at the old address of "Lanako": Perevedenovsky Lane, 2. The managers were initially Lazovsky V.O., then Kasna G.N.; no information could be found on either of them.

14

Khasbulat's Claim

A person calling himself Khasbulat, introducing himself as a "responsible person of the Liberation Army of Dagestan," stated that the explosion in the shopping complex on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow was carried out by militants of this organization. He added, "Terrorist acts on the territory of Russia will continue until federal troops leave Dagestan," and then hung up.

The Informant Theory

The information from the FSB to "MK" (Moskovsky Komsomolets) was most likely brought by Alvi Zakriev—after all, he worked for both "MK" and "Deutsche Welle." Alvi, the FSB, and the management of "Deutsche Welle" knew about the threatening call to Anatoly. However, Alvi had no way of knowing about Anatoly's visit to the FSB, unless he himself went there on the same day or the next. Therefore, we will call the author of the note simply the Informant.

However, perhaps the publication was about a different call? This is especially true since the author of the note writes about "international telephone communication," while Datsenko, who hosted Caucasian themes on "Deutsche Welle," was in Moscow.

Let's assume there was a second call from terrorists to "Deutsche Welle." Then we would have to assume:
* The management decided not to inform its employee who received a similar call, but instead informed the FSB.
* Within a few days, two different employees of the same radio station approached the FSB.
* The person at the FSB, informing the journalist (Informant) about the recorded call, did not know about the call to Anatoly or, for some reason, did not supplement his story with this detail.
* After the publication in "MK," Alvi was not interested in it and did not ask Anatoly anything.

None of these assumptions seem completely improbable, but their coincidence seems improbable. Therefore, it can be considered practically certain that there was no second call to "Deutsche Welle."

The Two Messages from the FSB

So, "MK" received essentially two messages in one from the FSB:

1. About a call from the Caucasus to "Deutsche Welle" (other "German radio stations broadcasting in Russian," as far as we know, do not exist) and that radio journalists reported this call to the FSB.
2. That three houses would be blown up.

Who combined these messages into one—the Informant or the Chekists?

"MK" called its information unique. This means it was not reported at a press conference or briefing. This implies the Informant has closer contacts with the FSB than other journalists. It is difficult to assume that such an "especially trusted" journalist, on the way from the FSB to "MK," independently supplemented the Lubyanka message with a forecast about "three houses." In this case, after the real explosions, the FSB would have begun to disavow authorship of the forecast, just as State Duma Chairman Seleznyov disavowed the prediction of the explosion in Volgodonsk.

It is even harder to imagine a person who receives "unique" information simultaneously from both the FSB and real terrorists.

Volunteer Mylnikov

This is the most accurate of the predictors.

If we believe the journalists of "Komsomolskaya Pravda" (10.09.1999), he came to them on the evening of September 8 and warned that the next explosion (after the gaming hall on Manezhnaya) "was promised in seven days. The deadline expires tonight." At midnight, there was an explosion in Pechatniki.

Vladimir—this is how Anatoly Mylnikov introduced himself to the "Komsomolka" journalists—told them a touching story of his love. In January 1999, a certain Alexander Z. was sentenced to 15 years on murder charges. "Alexander's wife was left with two children. Since January, I began living with her." Alexander's cronies are beating his share of the murder fee out of his accomplice, who remained at large. The police accuse Alexander's wife, Natalya Z., of this extortion, and in June she goes to prison. According to "Vladimir's" version, certain Caucasians are now putting pressure on him, demanding that he secure Natalya's release. They call him and write to his pager: until Natalya is free, "there will be fireworks," "explosions will be repeated every day... no, every week."

The next day, September 9, the journalists met with Mylnikov again (he still hadn't told them his real name), and at that moment another message came to his pager: "We made a second firework. There will be a third if necessary."

If we don't believe the journalists, then it turns out that they made the prediction of the third explosion (the second house explosion) themselves: the newspaper came out on September 10, the second house explosion—on Kashirka—was on the 13th, having invented the story of the previous prediction that came exactly true for persuasiveness.

But the journalists did not invent the predictor himself. In addition to visiting them, the 53-year-old head of the economic security service of the "Zolotye Stranitsy" publishing house, Anatoly Viktorovich Mylnikov, sent warnings (but in a different form) to the Prosecutor General's Office and to "Novaya Gazeta."

Document Transcription

...were killed by the Lazovites themselves. When Nataev's brother, Said, came to Moscow to find out Atlan's fate, Lazovsky's people shot him as well.

Immediately after his arrest, Vorobyov named another Chechen: he stated that Khozh-Ahmed Nukhaev had instructed him to blow up the bus. But when Vorobyov was interrogated in accordance with procedural norms, in the presence of a lawyer, he recanted this testimony.

Khozh-Ahmed Nukhaev

Khozh-Ahmed (Khoja-Ahmed) Nukhaev was the head of Chechen foreign intelligence under President Dudayev and Deputy Prime Minister under President Yandarbiev.

• In 1997, he registered the Caucasian-American Chamber of Commerce in Washington (according to flb.ru).
• In the summer of 2001, he spent two days in Moscow, participating in a conference organized by the "Eurasia" movement.

Many journalists were surprised then that Nukhaev, as it turned out, was not on the wanted list. Felshtinsky and Dzhemal consider him an FSB agent. Currently, Nukhaev is creating his own movement based on rigid nationalism and the division of Chechnya into two parts, with one of them seceding to Russia.

Connections to Lazovsky and FSB

Information about the connection between Lazovsky's gang and Nukhaev, as well as with FSB General Khokholkov and SVR Colonel Suslov, is mentioned in the only document known to us: "Report on the Situation in Novorossiysk." The origin of this report remains unclear. It was published by the website kompromat.ru (closely linked to the magazine "Kompromat" and the website flb.ru). We assume that this may be one of the documents used by the State Duma commission investigating events related to the Novorossiysk port. Unfortunately, all we know for certain about this commission so far is that it existed.

Litvinenko and Felshtinsky also write about the connection of the Lazovites with Khokholkov and Suslov in their book. However, they do not mention Nukhaev. This is likely due to the fact that Nukhaev worked for some time with Berezovsky, who sponsored the book. Apparently, Berezovsky and the book's authors do not believe in Nukhaev's involvement in any bombings. We also found no evidence of such involvement. Nor did we find any regarding Khokholkov and Suslov.

Aside from Nataev, not a single Chechen name appeared in the verdict against four former "Lanako" employees—among the 150 witnesses and victims who went through the hearings in the Moscow City Court over six months.

"Lanako" and the Apartment Bombings

Until now, very little pointed to a possible connection between "Lanako" and the apartment bombings: the presence of a professional explosives expert in the group. Besides Vorobyov, a hereditary defense industry worker, there were several other people from Tula in the group. In the 2002 Moscow City Court verdict, Vorobyov is not mentioned at all: he did not participate in any of the known bloody commercial actions. He was listed as a prosecution witness, but, according to the judge, he could not be found.

A chronological point is of interest: Vorobyov was arrested in August 1996, immediately after the trolleybus bombings (in which he was a suspect, but was convicted only for the bus bombing), and was released in August 1999—just a few days before the events we are considering.

Unlike other "Lanako" paramilitary operations, including those involving explosives, the bombings on transport appear completely random and aimless. The only possible motive one can assume is the attractiveness of the target: an unguarded bridge, clearly visible from a busy highway and surrounded on all sides by woods. The driver Akimov constantly drove past this place to work; presumably, Vorobyov and Kharisov—Lazovsky's closest associate—also frequently drove past here toward the city center. Right here, opposite the bridge, is also the stop for bus No. 33.

Indications of FSB Connection

There are somewhat more indications of a possible connection between "Lanako" and the FSB.

On November 11, 1996, "Novaya Gazeta" published the text of a deputy inquiry that Yuri Shchekochikhin, a member of the Duma Security Committee, sent to the heads of the FSB, MVD, Prosecutor General's Office, and the Presidential Administration (this inquiry can be read in full online in Litvinenko and Felshtinsky's book "FSB Blows Up Russia"). Shchekochikhin asks to confirm information he received from "one of the high-ranking officers of the MVD of the RF" regarding the participation of active FSB officers Karpichev, Mekhkov, Yumashkin, Abovyan, Dmitriev, and Dokukin in the activities of Lazovsky's gang and other groups. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Kolesnikov responded to the inquiry: "Indeed... during the operations carried out in Moscow to capture armed criminals, in addition to Lazovsky, among those brought to the internal affairs agencies were individuals who presented identification documents on behalf of law enforcement and other state services." FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev also responded: "As the investigation showed, in their (UFSB officers' – Authors of the book) actions there were certain deviations from the requirements of departmental regulatory acts, which, combined with a lack of practical experience and professionalism, could have been the cause of the incident that attracted your attention..."

According to various testimonies, other members of the gang also had special services identification cards.

10

Explosions and Allegations

• Explosions occurred in the premises rented by Gochiyayev; he finally realized he had been set up.
• "I immediately called the police, the 'ambulance', even the 911 emergency service and reported the warehouses on Borisovskie Prudy and in Kapotnya, where explosions were subsequently prevented. <...> Now I am almost certain that this person I worked with (I will provide all data on him later) is an FSB agent."

Details of the Alleged Agent

• Whether the agent asked to rent the premises using someone else's passport is not mentioned in the letter.
• In Gochiyayev's second testimony—in the transcript of a video interview—this person was identified by the initial K.
• Based on the first testimony (the letter), where Gochiyayev named his firm—"Kapstroy-2000", we assumed that by K. he meant the co-founder of this firm, Karmishin.
• Later, a former FSB investigator and now lawyer Mikhail Trepashkin shared information with us, which he also presented to the Kovalev and Felshtinsky groups: another firm—"Brand-2"—was established two months before the events, on July 13, 1999.
• Laipanov was written about as its employee who rented premises at various addresses.
• Its head is listed as Alexey Andreevich Kolobanov.
• Now we are inclined to believe that it is him Gochiyayev means—regardless of whether he is telling and writing the truth or not.
• The legal address of the firm is Lyusinovskaya St., 41. We did not find it at this address (it will later become clear that this is a common occurrence).
• The manager's phone number, indicated in the registration data, belongs to an institution located in a completely different place—the Moscow Department of the Ministry of Taxes and Levies.

Letter from Krymshamkhalov and Batchaev

• A letter from Krymshamkhalov and Batchaev is dated July 28, 2002 (almost immediately after Gochiyayev's letter was made public in Paris and then in London and Moscow).
• It was handed over to Felshtinsky and Litvinenko and published by them in December.
• The authors admit to being involuntary accomplices in the preparation of the apartment bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk, declare the FSB as the customer of these bombings, and suggest that one of the executors who led them in Moscow was the "well-known employee of the Russian special services" Max Lazovsky.
• The authors promise to dedicate the rest of their lives to the struggle for the independence of the Chechen people.

[Photo: Adam Dekkushev]
[Photo: Yusuf Krymshamkhalov and Timur Batchaev]

Analysis of the Evidence

What should be believed from what was reported in the two letters and the interview?

• Gochiyayev was "used blindly": he rented basements but did not know what would be placed there.
• Krymshamkhalov and Batchaev were also "used blindly": they knew they brought explosives, but did not know they would be used for bombings.
• It is hard to assume that the fellow countrymen in Moscow did not meet and talk in those days.
• And if they talked, then all three must have known: it was specifically explosives that were not only stored in dozens of bags in two places, but also placed in residential buildings in portions calculated for one explosion in two other places.
• Therefore, the ignorance of all three about the goals of their work is very unlikely.
• The claim that the accused did not know the time of the explosions seems very much like the truth.
• In the second cache—on Borisovskie Prudy—38 bags were found, according to the head of the FSB Public Relations Center Zdanovich, and 43 according to earlier reports.
• For the explosion of one house, according to numerous estimates, no more than ten bags are required.
• So the second cache was indeed a warehouse, the terrorists did not intend to limit themselves to the explosion of two houses, and the assurances of the authors of the penitent letters that the explosions occurred earlier than the planned time sound very credible.
• Of course, the same people who delivered the mixture and set the timers could have changed plans and canceled further explosions: some weighty reason could have forced them to retreat urgently.

Document Excerpt

• ...workshop type, and a parking lot, and a fire station under construction, and a huge area enclosed by a fence, stretching for half a kilometer into the fields and accommodating many small firms with their sheds and hangars. This can explain the almost 24-hour delay in discovering the warehouse on Krasnodarskaya compared to the discovery of the cache on Borisovskie Prudy, even if reports about them were received simultaneously.
• Thus, the probability of Gochiyaev's call about Kapotnya can be assessed as increased, and the call about Borisovskie Prudy as high.

Addresses and Titles

• Guryanova Street, 19
  • Bird of the seas and ship of the desert
  • This chapter cannot be published yet.
• Kashirskoye Highway, 6, bldg. 3
  • 'Ours' are those who pay

Investigation Details

• The head of the Moscow GUVD, Nikolai Kulikov, shortly after the explosions (September 21), reported on the air of 'Ekho Moskvy': Achimez Gochiyaev, using the documents of Mukhit Laipanov, starting from August 10, inspected about 38 warehouses that he found through the newspaper 'Iz Ruk v Ruki' [From Hand to Hand]. Operatives checked all these addresses. The premises on Kashirskoye Highway were not on this list.
• 'We still cannot figure out which of the REU [Repair and Maintenance Unit] workers covered for the person who secretly rented "sublet" the premises in the basement of building No. 6. No one will admit it,' officials at the district administration told an 'MK' correspondent (quoted here from the book by Y. Felshtinsky and A. Litvinenko).
• The officials of the 'Nagatino-Sadovniki' district administration did not tell the members of the Kovalev Commission this: they simply refused to talk. 'Igor Viktorovich is at a meeting,' 'Igor Viktorovich has gone to the enterprises,' the secretary of the head of the administration replied to all calls from the Commission member. Even a letter signed by Kovalev on State Duma deputy letterhead did not help.
• But the surviving residents know perfectly well who rented out the basement. The terrorist did not lead anyone astray 'somewhere in the depths of citizen Epifan's restaurant,' as a similar story was described in a Vysotsky song. He simply walked into the 2nd REU section across from the doomed house. 'She should be imprisoned!' a woman who buried her family later shouted. This referred to the current head of the section, Nina Borisovna Epifanova. It was she, according to the residents, who rented the basement to the terrorist. And on the evening of September 12, when residents asked the district police officer Dmitry Kuzovov to check this basement, Kuzovov called Epifanova, and she reassured him: 'Dima, they are all ours.' (Conversation with the victims. Tape recording)

Visual Reference

[Photograph of the destroyed building]
This is what building 6, building 3 on Kashirskoye Highway looked like, only with one entrance. N.B. Epifanova at a memorial prayer.

Interview Attempts

• When we approached Nina Borisovna with a request to speak with the members of the Commission (she seems to us a very important witness, and we did not dare to question her ourselves; it was necessary to at least conduct an identification of the terrorist from photographs in the presence of sufficiently authoritative people), she initially did not object, but asked to obtain permission for this conversation from the head of the district administration. For two weeks, it was not possible to obtain such permission. We called Nina Borisovna again, but her tone was already completely different: 'I will not talk to anyone. It is hard for me to remember. A friend of mine died there. That's all, I have a reception.' Short beeps.
• Let's not think the worst. Let's assume that the case with Gochiyaev is the only case when Ms. Epifanova rented out premises that did not belong to her for cash. If this were repeated many [times...]

Trepashkin's Identification

Trepashkin names the person who, in his opinion, is very similar to this first composite sketch with a square face and glasses: Vladimir Romanovich. Trepashkin crossed paths with this man, an FSB agent once embedded in one of the gangs, during his investigative work while serving in the FSB.

Therefore, further in this text, "Gochiyayev" will mean "Gochiyayev or the person posing as Gochiyayev" (and for some time as Laipanov).

Location Details

Borisovskie Prudy, 16, bldg. 2

Thank you, doctor!

Storage and Explosives

The bags had to be moved very quickly to other premises, rented under a different name (or names). Such transport was indeed underway.

Very nearby, at Borisovskie Prudy, house 16, building 2, they set up a more reliable storage facility—on the first floor of a new building: not in the basement, as was written in most publications, but in one of the rooms specifically intended for small shops.

The explosives were found "through the wall from us," the deputy head of the pharmacy told us confidently. Now that room houses a hardware store. And in September 1999, residents of the house say, it was most likely a film rental point (one witness also named the firm "Mr. Dent"—probably meaning the well-known dental network "Master Dent"; journalists, citing "special services," wrote that the premises were owned by the firm "Lars-Market," but in fact, this firm was located next to the bombed house on Kashirskoye Highway). The doors face the bridge over the Moscow River, so there are no "neighbors opposite." Part of the bags and the most critical elements—detonators and clocks—were moved here. According to investigators' revelations to journalists, Casio brand watches were programmed for five more explosions:

• September 13 at 16:28
• September 14 at 4:48 and 18:00
• September 16 at 17:16
• September 21 at 4:05

[Photos of the building and signs: BORISOVSKIE PRUDY STREET 16 bldg 2; AUTO PARTS GOODS FOR THE HOME]

Analysis of Timing

None of the popularizers bothered to explain: what was the point of setting the alarm time on clocks lying in a warehouse, and why, unlike previous explosions, were new ones planned not for round times, but for such strange moments? It is more likely that no one set these clocks to any time—they were simply lying in the state in which they were purchased.

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INSPECTION OF CRIME SCENES

We will outline the events, based primarily on our own information, secondarily on police reports made in the immediate aftermath, and only for lack of anything more reliable, on publications citing named and unnamed employees of the Prosecutor's Office and the FSB.

70 Krasnodarskaya Street

Terrorist's mistake?

The very first warehouse for explosives in early September 1999 was rented on Krasnodarskaya Street, on the very outskirts, in the lower reaches of the Moskva River; beyond that are only dried-up aeration fields and an oil refinery. In various publications, this warehouse also appears under the addresses "Krasnodarskaya, 7," "Projected Driveway," and "Kapotnya." The firm "Transservice," the owner of the warehouse, was registered at 70 Krasnodarskaya Street, but the most accurate indication of the warehouse address is Projected Driveway 3, garage box 14. Now this driveway has become Tsimlyanskaya Street (to which, by the way, many victims from Guryanova Street were relocated, and the former warehouse is visible from their windows).

[Photograph of a multi-story residential building]

The warehouse in the Krasnodarskaya area was rented by the main suspect — Gochiyayev — for his firm "Kapstroy-2000," which had existed since 1996. This is precisely the case about which the Chekists told journalists that "once, a terrorist mistakenly rented a premises in his own name." A photograph of Gochiyayev — a poor photocopy of it — was published on September 15, the same day as the report about the warehouse on Krasnodarskaya. For some reason, his surname was only published on the 16th.

It is hard to imagine that a person would make such a gross mistake. It is much easier to imagine that when he rented this — the very first — warehouse, he did not yet have someone else's passport. Apparently, the passport of a deceased relative was brought to him along with the sacks. And at least one premises had to be ready for the arrival of the cargo. Explosives could not be kept in a trailer for long: in those days, when the explosion in the Manezhnaya amusement arcade had already occurred and the war in Dagestan was underway, the Moscow police had sharply increased not only their vigilance but also their animosity toward Caucasians (a "Chechen trace" was found after every terrorist attack; though, later it would be lost again). Every hour was precious, and he had to use the documents that were available. It was quite reasonable to expect that once the cargo was moved, its trail would be completely lost: the owners would have no reason later to link an ordinary sugar trader with terrorist attacks.

The fact that the fake passport was delivered at the last moment shows that Gochiyayev's preparation for the bombings was short. The operation itself may have begun in May or June, but Gochiyayev only joined it in August.

This conclusion does not align well with information that appeared in the press (citing the FSB) that Gochiyayev had already approached a real estate bureau in July looking for premises to rent. Unfortunately, we have no way to verify this claim.

According to journalist Orkhan Dzhemal, who did an enormous amount of work searching for witnesses, the real Gochiyayev might not have been in Moscow at all in the summer of 1999: "It is known that while Gochiyayev was in SIZO [remand prison] (in February 1999. – M.U.), his relatives sold a jeep. Whether the money played a role,

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