FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIA

Directorate for the Rostov Region

Rostov-on-Don, 31 Bolshaya Sadovaya St.
20.09.99 No. 8/45. 173

To the Acting General Director of LLC "TV Company VTV"
Gorbunov A.V.
Volgodonsk, 2 "B" Volgodonskaya St.

Dear Anatoly Vasilyevich!

The operational-investigative group, stationed at the department of the Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation for the Rostov Region in Volgodonsk, is investigating criminal case No. 173, initiated regarding the explosion that occurred on September 16, 1999, near house No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Highway. To clarify the full picture of the tragedy that occurred, we need your help.

We ask you to instruct the employees of your TV company to prepare and hand over to us the materials filmed by the cameramen of your TV company at the site of the explosion. Your cooperation will contribute to a speedy and high-quality investigation of the criminal case. We would be very grateful if the video materials are handed over to us on VHS video cassettes.

Investigator of the investigative department of the Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation for the Rostov Region
Senior Lieutenant of Justice
(Signature) R.V. Marchenko

TRUE COPY
Investigator (Signature) Romanovsky V.V.

Stamp: ... Security ... Directorate ... For information 3 ... Rostov ...

DECISION

on the appointment of an explosive technical examination

Volgodonsk, September 25, 1999

Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate of Russia for the Rostov Region, Major of Justice Kruglov A.V., having reviewed the materials of criminal case No. 173,

HAS ESTABLISHED:

On September 16, 1999, at 5:57 AM, in the city of Volgodonsk, Rostov Region, in the courtyard of house No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Shosse, Batchayev T.A., Yusuf Krymshamkhalov, and others carried out an explosion, as a result of which 17 people died, over 300 people received bodily injuries of varying degrees of severity, and significant material damage was caused.

During the inspection of the scene, deformed fragments of cars with traces of explosive impact were found and seized, soil samples and swabs were obtained, and the situation at the scene was recorded.

Taking into account that for the correct resolution of the criminal case, an examination is necessary, guided by Articles 78, 184, and 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR,

HAS DECIDED:

1. To appoint an explosive technical examination in this case, the production of which is assigned to experts of military unit 34435.

2. To put the following questions for the experts' resolution:
   * Were the destruction and damage to the objects formed as a result of the explosion?
   * What is the mass and TNT equivalent of the detonated charge?
   * What specific explosive substance was used in the explosive device?
   * What is the field of application of this explosive substance?
   * Where exactly was the charge located? What is the design and method of activation of the explosive device?

3. To provide the experts with the protocol of the inspection of the scene dated September 16, 1999, with...

FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIA

Directorate for the Rostov Region
11.10.99 No. 8/6-705
Rostov-on-Don, Bolshaya Sadovaya St., 31.

To the Commander of military unit 34435
Colonel Fesenko A.V.
Moscow

In connection with the investigation of criminal case No. 173 regarding the explosion in the city of Volgodonsk on September 16, 1999, we are sending you materials for the production of an explosives expertise. I ask you to entrust the production of this expertise to your employees, explaining to them the rights and obligations provided for by Article 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR, as well as warning them of the responsibility for giving a knowingly false conclusion under Article 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, having taken a corresponding receipt from them.
Soil samples, washings, as well as the most informative fragments found during the inspection of the scene, were sent to your address earlier.
If necessary, reports on the inspection of buildings and a report on damage to houses in the area of the explosion will be sent to you additionally upon receipt of the specified documents from the administration of Volgodonsk.

Attachment:

• decree on the appointment of explosives expertise dated September 25, 1999, on 2 sheets;
• protocol of the inspection of the scene dated September 16, 1999, with attachments, 27 sheets in total;
• copy of the large-scale plan of districts "V-U" and "V-16" of Volgodonsk (scale 1:500);
• copies of inspection reports of 16 buildings in Volgodonsk, 32 sheets in total;
• copy of the protocol of inspection of objects dated September 20, 1999, on 21 sheets;
• copy of the interrogation protocol of witness Iskanderov A.I. dated September 16, 1999, on 2 sheets;
• copy of the interrogation protocol of suspect Iskanderov A.I. dated September on 4 sheets;
• copy of the interrogation protocol of witness Iskanderova V.V. dated September 16, 1999, on 2 sheets;
• 2 video cassettes with material filmed at the scene on September 16, 1999.

Head of the Investigative Department
of the FSB Directorate of Russia
for the Rostov Region
Colonel of Justice /signature/ E.I. Protsenko

Certified:
Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases
of the FSB Directorate of the Russian Federation
/signature/ A.V. Kruglov

MILITARY UNIT 34435

FORENSIC LABORATORY

Expert Opinion No. 4/197

Compiled on 08 December 1999, Moscow

We, employees of the forensic laboratory of military unit 34435, Tatyana Viktorovna Vinogradova and Konstantin Nikolaevich Stovbur, in connection with the assignment to conduct an expert examination in criminal case No. 173, have been warned by the head of the expert institution under Art. 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation about liability for providing a knowingly false conclusion.

In accordance with Art. 187 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, the rights and duties of an expert, as provided for in Art. 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, have been explained to us.

Experts:
* October 28, 1999 [signature] T.V. Vinogradova
* October 28, 1999 [signature] K.N. Stovbur

Experts of the forensic laboratory of military unit 34435 Tatyana Viktorovna Vinogradova (higher technical education, specialty: mechanical engineer, 4 years of expert work experience, position: expert), and Konstantin Nikolaevich Stovbur (higher education, specialty: chemical process engineer, 2 years of expert work experience, position: expert), based on the resolution dated September 25, 1999, by the senior investigator for particularly important cases of the investigative department of the FSB Directorate of Russia for the Rostov Region, Major of Justice A.V. Kruglov, conducted an explosives expert examination from 28.10.99 to 07.12.99 based on the materials of criminal case No. 173.

The following were placed at the disposal of the experts:
* The protocol of the inspection of the scene of the incident dated September 16, 1999, with appendices
* Video material filmed at the site of the explosion
* Soil samples, metal fragments, and swabs
* The protocol of the inspection of objects dated September 20, 1999, with appendices
* The interrogation protocol of suspect A.I. Iskanderov
* The interrogation protocol of witness V.V. Iskanderova.

The following questions were posed for the experts' resolution:
1. Were the destruction and damage to the objects caused by the action of an explosion?
2. What was the mass and TNT equivalent of the detonated charge?
3. What specific explosive substance was used in the explosive device?
4. What is the scope of application of this explosive substance?
5. Where exactly was the charge located, what was the design, and what was the method of activating the explosive device?

3

1. Polymer bag without an inscription, inside of which there are 5 metal fragments.
2. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Fragments from trees at a distance of 20 to 30 m from the crater", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which have traces of high-explosive impact.
3. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Kor 4", inside of which there are many cotton swabs with washings.
4. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Kor 4", inside of which there are many cotton swabs with washings.
5. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Fragment found on a flattened pipe in the crater at a depth of 2.5 m", inside of which there is a metal fragment.

Upon opening box No. 5, the following was found in it:
17. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Fragments collected near the radio plant", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which have traces of high-explosive impact.
18. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Roof of the radio plant", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which have traces of high-explosive impact.
19. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Department of Internal Affairs (OVD) yard", inside of which there is soil.
20. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Edge of the crater", inside of which there is soil.
21. Polymer bag with the inscription: "20 - 30 m from the crater", inside of which there is soil.
22. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Soil sample at a large distance from the explosion (> 1 km)", inside of which there is soil.
23. Polymer bag with the inscription: "Department of Internal Affairs (OVD) yard from the entrance side", inside of which there is soil.
24. Polymer bag with the inscription: "60 - 70 m from the crater", inside of which there is soil.

2. Physico-chemical studies

(conducted by expert Stovbur K.N.)

To answer questions 3 and 4 of the resolution, the expert selected the most informative samples from among those presented, namely: fragments (items 1, 2, 5, 8, here and hereafter items of the "External examination"), washings (items 14 and 15), as well as soil samples from the scene of the incident (items 19 - 24).

The studies were carried out using the methods of optical microscopy, high-performance thin-layer chromatography (HPTLC), ion chromatography (IC), gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) and X-ray spectral microanalysis (RSMA) in the following sequence.

Initially, for the detection of microparticles of components of mixed explosives (HE), pyrotechnic compositions (fine-dispersed

Page 5

...ions 35 - 300 amu. Identification of explosives was carried out by comparing the retention times and mass spectra of the substances in the studied samples and reference samples.

As a result, it was established that trace amounts of 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) - a high explosive - are present in all swabs, and trace amounts of RDX (hexogen) - a high explosive - are present in swabs from fragments from box No. 3 (item 8) and tampons (items 14, 15).

Thus, the composition of the detonated charge of the explosive device included TNT and RDX - high explosives.

TNT and RDX can be used as explosives both in individual form and in the form of mixtures with other components (for example, with ammonium nitrate, aluminum).

To detect trace amounts of ammonium nitrate, a study was conducted using the IC (Ion Chromatography) method on a "Star" liquid chromatograph from "Varian" (USA). The eluent was supplied using an isocratic pump model 9002 from "Varian" (USA).

To separate anions in the studied mixture, an Elsian-6-Kank column from "Elsiko" (Russia) filled with anion-exchange resin was used, a 2x20 mm guard column filled with grafted C18 phase with a particle size of 40 μm, and a BTS AG suppression column from "Biotronic" (Germany). Chromatography of the sample was carried out in isocratic mode with a carbonate buffer containing 0.002 M Na2CO3 and 0.002 M NaHCO3. Eluent flow rate 2 ml/min.

To separate cations in the studied mixture, a BT IV KA column from "Biotronic" (Germany) was used, a 2x20 mm guard column filled with grafted C18 phase with a particle size of 40 μm, and a BTS KG suppression column from "Biotronic" (Germany). Chromatography of the sample was carried out in isocratic mode with a buffer containing 0.002 M HNO3. Eluent flow rate 2 ml/min.

Detection of inorganic components was carried out by absorption in the UV region at a wavelength of 192 nm using a "Star" model 9050 photometric detector from "Varian" (USA) and a model 550 conductometric detector from "Alltech" (USA). Injection into the chromatograph was performed using a microsyringe and an injector with a 100 μl loop. Before injecting the studied samples, a blank experiment was conducted to check the purity of solvents and glassware. For calibration, standard freshly prepared solutions of anions in water in the concentration range of 0.1-10 μg/ml were used.

As a result, it was established that ammonium ions and nitrate ions are present in the aqueous extracts of swabs from all studied objects. Their background level was determined based on the results of the analysis of soil sample extracts. It turned out that in the swabs from fragments (item 1) and from the tampons specified in item 15, the amounts of nitrate ion and ammonium ion (about 10 mg/l) slightly exceed the natural background level.

[Stamp: For inquiries 3]

3. Explosives Engineering Research

(conducted by expert Vinogradova T.V.)

To answer questions 1, 2, and 5 of the resolution, the expert studied materials from previous sections, the crime scene inspection report dated September 16, 1999, with appendices, video material filmed at the explosion site, the item inspection report dated September 20, 1999, with appendices, the interrogation report of suspect Iskanderov A.I., and the interrogation report of witness Iskanderova V.V.

As follows from the video recordings and the crime scene inspection report, in front of the 4th entrance of building No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Shosse, there is a crater in the ground with a depth of 3.5 - 4 m and a diameter of 13.5 - 15 m. Also, within a radius of several hundred meters from the crater, glazing, window frames, and door frames in residential buildings and other structures were partially or completely destroyed. These destructions are the result of the action of an air shock wave formed during the explosion of a concentrated explosive charge. At the same time, the location of the crater corresponds to the location of the charge.

According to the crime scene inspection report dated 16.09.99 and the item inspection report dated 20.09.99, fragments of parts from GAZ-53 and PAZ-3205 vehicles were found at distances of up to 430 m from the crater. As seen from the presented photographs (appendix to the item inspection report), the found fragments have deformations characteristic of explosive impact. It follows from this that the explosive charge was located either in the immediate vicinity of the specified vehicles or inside them.

An assessment of the mass of the exploded charge was carried out based on the partial destruction of glazing recorded in the crime scene inspection report of building No. 56 on Koshevoy St., which was the most distant from the explosion site (about 700 m).

For the calculation, Sadovsky's formula for a surface explosion was used (Pokrovsky G. I. Explosion. M. "Nedra" Publishing House, 1973):

$$\Delta P = 1.06 \cdot \left(\sqrt[3]{G} / R\right) + 4.3 \cdot \left(\sqrt[3]{G^2} / R^2\right) + 14 \cdot (G / R^3), \text{ where (1)}$$

• $\Delta P$ - pressure jump at the shock wave front, atm;
• $G$ - mass of the explosive charge in TNT equivalent, kg;
• $R$ - distance from the explosion site to the object of interest.

Considering that for partial destruction of glazing, the value of $\Delta P$ must be at least 0.015 atm and no more than 0.02 atm, and solving equation (1) for $G$, we obtain an explosive charge mass in TNT equivalent of at least 800 kg and no more than 1850 kg. It is not possible to provide a more accurate assessment due to the expert's lack of information about the dimensions of the glass, the methods of their fastening in the frames, and the strength of the frames themselves.

The nature of the destruction and damage to the houses, as well as other surrounding objects, indicates that an explosion of a high explosive (HE) occurred in the form of detonation. To initiate detonation in a high explosive charge, an industrially or craft-made initiation device (ID) is required - an electric detonator or a blasting cap; therefore, in the design of the explosive

Regarding Question 4

It is not possible to determine the specific brand of the detonated explosive (HE) from trace amounts. For this reason, it is not possible to determine the scope of application of the above-mentioned mixed HE or the HEs that were part of the combined charge.

Expert [signature] K.N. Stovbur

Regarding Question 5

The HE charge was located either in the immediate vicinity of the GAZ-53 and PAZ-3205 vehicles, or inside them, in front of the 4th entrance of building No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Highway.

In addition to the HE charge, the design of the explosive device included industrially or clandestinely manufactured electric detonator(s) or blasting cap(s). It is not possible to determine the specific design of the device and the method of its activation.

Expert [signature] T.V. Vinogradova

reg. No. 16/3/4/1954

[Stamp: Investigative Department... For inquiries 3...]

TRUE COPY
Investigator [signature] Romanovsky V.V.