Volume 8, case file pages 141-153

On each page — a stamp: “For reference. Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Investigative Department”
At the end of each document — a stamp: “True copy. Investigator Romanovsky V.R.” and a signature

RESOLUTION

on the appointment of an explosive-technical expert examination

Volgodonsk, September 25, 1999

Senior Investigator for Especially Important Cases of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate of Russia for the Rostov Region, Major of Justice A. V. Kruglov, having reviewed the materials of criminal case No. 173,

HAS ESTABLISHED:

• On September 16, 1999, at 5:57 AM, in the city of Volgodonsk, Rostov Region, in the courtyard of house No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Shosse, T. A. Batchayev, Yu. I. Krymshamkhalov, and others carried out an explosion, as a result of which 17 people died, over 300 people received bodily injuries of varying degrees of severity, and significant material damage was caused.
• During the inspection of the scene, deformed fragments of vehicles with traces of explosive impact were discovered and seized, soil samples and washings were obtained, and the scene of the incident was recorded.
• Taking into account that for a correct decision on the criminal case, an explosive-technical expert examination is necessary, guided by Articles 78, 184, and 187 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR,

HAS RESOLVED:

1. To appoint an explosive-technical expert examination in this case, the production of which [is assigned] to the experts of military unit 34435.
2. To submit the following questions for the experts' resolution:
   • Were the destruction and damage to the objects formed as a result of an explosion?
   • What is the mass and TNT equivalent of the detonated charge?
   • What specific explosive substance was used in the explosive device?
   • What is the field of application of this explosive substance?
   • Where exactly was the charge located, what was the design and method of detonating the explosive device?
3. To provide the experts with the scene inspection report dated September 16, 1999, with appendices, video material filmed at the explosion site, soil samples, metal fragments and washings, the object inspection report dated September 20, 1999, with appendices, a copy of the interrogation report of suspect A. I. Iskanderov, and a copy of the interrogation report of witness V. V. Iskanderova.

Senior Investigator for Especially Important Cases of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate of Russia for the Rostov Region
Major of Justice
A.V. Kruglov

FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIA

Directorate for the Rostov Region [to] Moscow
11.10.99, No. 8/6-705
Rostov-on-Don, 31 Bolshaya Sadovaya St.

To the Commander of military unit 34435, Colonel A.V. Fesenko
Moscow

In connection with the investigation of criminal case No. 173 regarding the explosion in Volgodonsk on September 16, 1999, we are sending you materials for the production of an explosive-technical expert examination by your employees, having explained to them the rights and duties provided for by Article 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR, and also to warn them of the responsibility for providing a knowingly false conclusion under Article 307 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, having obtained the appropriate receipt from them.
Soil samples, washings, as well as the most informative fragments discovered during the inspection of the scene, were sent to your address earlier.
If necessary, building inspection reports and a report on damage to houses in the explosion area will be sent additionally upon receipt of the specified documents from the administration of Volgodonsk.

1

Attachment List

• resolution on the appointment of an explosives expert examination dated September 25, 1999, on 2 sheets
• crime scene inspection report dated September 16, 1999, with attachments; 27 sheets in total
• copy of the scale plan of districts "V-U" and "V-16" of Volgodonsk (scale 1:500)
• copies of inspection reports of 16 buildings in Volgodonsk, 32 sheets in total
• copy of the item inspection report dated September 20, 1999, on 21 sheets
• copy of the interrogation protocol of witness Iskanderov A.I. dated September 16, 1999, on 2 sheets
• copy of the interrogation protocol of suspect Iskanderov A.I. dated September 1999, on 4 sheets
• copy of the interrogation protocol of witness Iskanderova V.V. dated September 16, 1999, on 2 sheets
• 2 video cassettes with material filmed at the scene on September 16, 1999

Head of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate for the Rostov Region
Colonel of Justice E.I. Protsenko

Certified: Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate of the RF [illegible] A.V. Kruglov

Correspondence

Case file p. 144;
MILITARY UNIT 34435
December 12, 1999, No. 16/3/4/1955, Moscow

To the Head of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate for the Rostov Region
Colonel of Justice Protsenko E.I.
Rostov-on-Don, Bolshaya Sadovaya St., 31

Ref. No. 8/6-705 dated 11.10.99

We are sending expert report No. 4/197. We request that the objects of study be collected by courier or that you provide us with permission for their destruction.

Attachment: reg. No. 16/3/4/1954, copy No. 1, on 9 sheets, crime scene inspection report dated 16.09.99, 27 sheets in total, 2 cassettes.

Unit Commander Colonel A.V. Fesenko

Incoming No. 8/922, 22.12.99

Expert Report No. 4/197

MILITARY UNIT 34435
FORENSIC LABORATORY

Composed on December "08", 1999, Moscow

We, employees of the forensic laboratory of military unit 34435, Tatyana Viktorovna Vinogradova and Konstantin Nikolaevich Stovbur, in connection with the assignment to perform an expert examination for criminal case No. 173, have been warned by the head of the expert institution under Art. 307 of the Criminal Code of the RF regarding liability for providing a knowingly false report.
In accordance with Art. 187 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, the rights and duties of an expert, as provided for by Art. 82 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, have been explained to us.

Experts: T.V. Vinogradova, K.N. Stovbur (signatures)
October 28, 1999

Experts of the forensic laboratory of military unit 34435 Tatyana Viktorovna Vinogradova (higher technical education, specialty mechanical engineer, 4 years of expert work experience, position — expert), Konstantin Nikolaevich Stovbur (higher education, specialty chemical process engineer, 2 years of expert work experience, position — expert), on the basis of the resolution dated September 25, 1999, by the Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate for the Rostov Region, Major of Justice A.V. Kruglov, performed an explosives expert examination on the materials of criminal case No. 173 during the period from 28.10.99 to 07.12.99.

Submitted Materials and Questions

Submitted Materials

The following were submitted for the experts' disposal:
* The protocol of the scene inspection dated September 16, 1999, with appendices.
* Video material filmed at the scene.
* Soil samples.
* Metal fragments and swabs.
* The protocol of the inspection of objects dated September 20, 1999, with appendices.
* The interrogation protocol of suspect Iskanderov [...].
* The interrogation protocol of witness Iskanderova V.V.

Questions for Expert Resolution

The following questions were posed for the experts' resolution:
1. Were the destruction and damage to the objects caused by the action of an explosion?
2. What is the mass and TNT equivalent of the detonated charge?
3. Exactly what explosive substance was used in the explosive device?
4. What is the field of application for this explosive substance?
5. Exactly where was the charge located, what was the construction and method of detonating the explosive device?

STUDIES

1. External Inspection

(conducted by the full commission of experts)

The external inspection was conducted under natural and artificial lighting.
The objects arrived in 5 cardboard boxes, each of which has a number and is sealed with a stamp bearing the inscription:
“KGB USSR Directorate for the Rostov Region — Volgodonsk City Department — For packets No. 1”. The integrity of the boxes and the stamps on them was not compromised.

Upon opening box No. 1, the following was found inside:
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Near Bldgs 50 and 52 Gagarina”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.

Upon opening box No. 2, the following was found inside:
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Near bldg. 54 Gagarina”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Behind the houses on Oktyabrskoye Shosse 30, 31 - Mira 6/27”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Gagarina 70 roof”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Around the roof of house No. 60 Gagarina”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “OVD Attic”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Roof of house No. 37 on Oktyabrskoye Shosse”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.

Upon opening box No. 3, the following was found inside:
* A polymer bag without an inscription, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.

Upon opening box No. 4, the following was found inside:
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Two pipes from the crater at a depth of 2.5 m”, inside of which are two metal sheets.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Bakery premises”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag without an inscription, inside of which is a piece of concrete.
* A polymer bag without an inscription, inside of which are 5 metal fragments.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Fragments from trees at a dist. of 20 to 30 m from the crater”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Box 4”, inside of which are numerous cotton swabs with washings.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Box 4”, inside of which are numerous cotton swabs with washings.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Fragment found on a flattened pipe in the crater at a depth of 2.5 m”, inside of which is a metal fragment.

Upon opening box No. 5, the following was found inside:
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Fragments collected near the radio plant”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Radio plant roof”, inside of which are numerous metal fragments, some of which bear traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “OVD Yard”, inside of which is soil.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Edge of the crater”, inside of which is soil.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “20 — 30 m from the crater”, inside of which is soil.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “Soil sample at a great distance from the explosion (> 1 km)”, inside of which is soil.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “OVD Yard from the entrance side”, inside of which is soil.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: “60 — 70 m from the crater”, inside of which is soil.

2. Physical-chemical studies

(conducted by expert Stovbur K.N.)

Analysis of Samples

To answer questions 3 and 4 of the decree, the expert selected the most informative samples from among those presented, namely:
* Fragments (items 1, 2, 5, 8, here and hereafter items from the "External Examination")
* Swabs (item 14)
* Soil samples from the scene (items 19 — 24)

The studies were conducted using optical microscopy, high-performance thin-layer chromatography (HPTLC), ion chromatography (IC), chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS), and X-ray spectral microanalysis (RSMA) in the following sequence.

Initial Visual Examination

Initially, to detect microparticles of explosive components (HE), pyrotechnic compositions (fine powders of magnesium, aluminum, ammonium nitrate, etc.) and gunpowder particles, all selected objects were examined visually using a Leica MZ12 microscope (Germany) at various magnifications and lighting.

As a result of the study, no microparticles or particles resembling HE, gunpowder, pyrotechnic compositions, or their individual components were found.

Swab Preparation and Analysis

Then, methanol and acetone swabs were taken from the objects. The swabs were filtered through ashless "white ribbon" filters and, after evaporation in a helium stream to a volume of 1 ml, were divided in half.
* One part, intended for study by HPTLC and GC-MS methods, was evaporated to a volume of 0.2—0.3 ml.
* The other, intended for analysis by the IC method, was dried until the solvent was completely removed and filled with 1 ml of bidistilled water for each swab.

The remaining filters were dried and saved for further research.

To detect trace amounts of high explosives and organic components of smokeless powders (diphenylamine and centralites), acetone and methanol swabs were studied using HPTLC and GC-MS methods.

HPTLC Study

The HPTLC study was conducted using a complex of chromatographic equipment from Camag (Switzerland) under the following conditions:
* HPTLC Silica gel 60 F 254 plate from Merck (Germany)
* Sample application volume — 40 μl
* Eluent — benzene
* Eluent rise height from the start line — 50 mm
* Control samples — an acetone solution of the most well-known high explosives (TNT, hexogen, octogen, PETN, nitroglycerin, tetryl, and picric acid), chloromethylene extracts of various brands of smokeless powders.

The presence of HE and smokeless powder components was established by the correspondence of the relative mobility values of the substance spots on the chromatograms of the studied and control solutions, as well as by the reaction to the effect of developing reagents:
* A solution of diphenylamine in an alcohol-acetone mixture followed by irradiation with UV light at a wavelength of 336 nm.
* A solution of ethylenediamine in acetone.
* A 5% solution of potassium dichromate in a mixture of sulfuric and acetic acids.

GC-MS Study

The GC-MS study was conducted on a GCQ spectrometer from Finnigan MAT (USA).
* Separation of substances was carried out in a helium stream at a speed of 60 cm/s on a DB-1 column from J&W Scientific (USA) with a diameter of 0.25 mm, a phase layer thickness of 0.25 μm, and a length of 1.5 m.
* The injected sample volume was 1 μl.
* Injector temperature — 200 °C.
* Splitless injector mode.
* Column temperature: isothermal at 70 °C for 1 min, then programmed heating at a rate of 25 °C/min.
* Ion source temperature — 150 °C, interface — 250 °C.

Mass spectra of the separated substances were recorded in the chemical ionization mode with methane reagent gas in the negative ion mass range of 35 — 300 amu. Identification of HE was carried out by comparing the retention times and mass spectra of the substances in the studied samples and reference samples.

As a result, it was established that trace amounts of 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) — a high explosive — are present in all swabs, and trace amounts of hexogen — a high explosive — are present in swabs from fragments from box No. 3 (item 8) and swabs (items 14, 15).

Thus, the composition of the detonated IED charge included TNT and hexogen — high explosives.

TNT and hexogen can be used as explosives both individually and in the form of mixtures with other components (for example, with ammonium nitrate, aluminum).

IC Method for Ammonium Nitrate Detection

To detect trace amounts of ammonium nitrate, studies were conducted using the IC method on a Varian Star liquid chromatograph (USA). Eluent delivery was carried out using a Varian model 9002 isocratic pump (USA).

To separate anions in the studied mixture, the following were used:
* An Elsian-6-Kank column from Elsiko (Russia) filled with anion-exchange resin.
* A 2x20 mm pre-column filled with grafted C18 phase with a particle size of 40 μm.
* A BTS AG suppression column from Biotronic (Germany).

Chromatography of the sample was carried out in isocratic mode with a carbonate buffer containing 0.002 M Na2CO3 and 0.002 M NaHCO3. Eluent flow rate 2 ml/min.

To separate cations in the studied mixture, the following were used:
* A BT IV KA column from Biotronic (Germany).
* A 2x20 mm pre-column filled with grafted C18 phase with a particle size of 40 μm.
* A BTS AG suppression column from Biotronic (Germany).

Chromatography of the sample was carried out in isocratic mode with a buffer containing 0.002 M HNO3. Eluent flow rate 2 ml/min.

Inorganic Component Detection

Detection of inorganic components was carried out by absorption in the UV region at a wavelength of 192 nm using a Varian Star model 9050 photometric detector (USA) and an Alltech model 550 conductometric detector (USA).

• Injection into the chromatograph was performed with a microsyringe and an injector with a 100 μl loop.
• Before injecting the studied samples, a blank experiment was conducted to check the purity of solvents and glassware.
• For calibration, standard freshly prepared solutions of anions in water in the concentration range of 0.1-10 μg/ml were used.

As a result, it was established that ammonium ions and nitrate ions are present in the aqueous extracts of swabs from all studied objects. Their background level was determined based on the results of the analysis of soil sample extracts.

Chemical Analysis of Swabs

• In the swabs from the fragments (item 1) and from the swabs indicated in item 15, the amounts of nitrate ion and ammonium ion (about [illegible] g) slightly exceed the natural background level.
• Nitrate ions and ammonium ions are usually present in the traces of an explosion of mixed explosives containing ammonium nitrate as a component.
• On the other hand, substances of organic and inorganic nature are widely used in everyday life and in the national economy, which either directly contain the above-mentioned ions (for example, ammonium nitrate fertilizers) or form them in the process of their decomposition (for example, aniline dyes, nitro-lacquers, etc.).
• It is not possible to unambiguously determine the origin of the detected ions based on the results of physicochemical studies.

Detection of Combustion Products

• In order to detect condensed combustion products of inorganic components of explosives and pyrotechnic compositions (for example, aluminum, magnesium) or their unburned particles, studies were conducted on deposits of inorganic substances on paper filters remaining after filtration of the swabs.
• The studies were carried out by the EPMA method on a JSM-840 scanning electron microscope from "Jeol" (Japan) with an ISIS microprobe analyzer from "Oxford Instruments" (UK) according to standard methods.
• Accelerating voltage — 20 kV.
• Determined elements — from beryllium to uranium.

Sample Preparation

• Preparation of samples for the study of deposits on filters was carried out as follows.
• Each of the filters was placed in a test tube with alcohol and subjected to ultrasound to separate particles from the filter surface and from each other.
• After that, the alcoholic suspension containing microparticles was applied to the surface of the stage of the electron microscope.
• After the suspension dried, the microparticles were present on the surface of the stage in the form of a monolayer.

Results of Particle Analysis

• As a result of the study, particles with sizes from 2 μm to 15 μm, each having a shape close to spherical, were found on the surfaces of the filters with swabs from the fragments (items 1 and 2) and swabs (item 15).
• The chemical basis of the particles is aluminum oxide with impurities of magnesium, silicon, calcium, and iron.
• The formation of aluminum oxide particles of spherical or near-spherical shape occurs during the combustion or explosion of aluminum-containing explosives or pyrotechnic compositions.
• The presence of these particles on the filters allows for the conclusion that aluminum was most likely part of the explosive charge.

Conclusions from Physicochemical Studies

Based on the physicochemical studies conducted, the following conclusions can be drawn.

• As the explosive charge, either a mixed explosive was used, which included TNT, hexogen, and, most likely, aluminum, and in addition, ammonium nitrate or a combination of the above-listed substances and explosives based on them could have been included.
• It is not possible to establish the specific brand of the exploded explosive from trace amounts. For this reason, it is not possible to determine the area of application of the above-mentioned mixed explosive or the explosives that were part of the combined charge.

Explosive Technical Studies

(conducted by expert T. V. Vinogradova)

To answer questions 1, 2, and 5 of the decree, the expert studied the materials of the previous sections, the protocol of the inspection of the scene of the incident dated September 16, 1999, with appendices, video material filmed at the site of the explosion, the protocol of the inspection of objects dated September 20, 1999, with appendices, the interrogation protocol of suspect A.I. Iskanderov, and the interrogation protocol of witness V.V. Iskanderova.

Scene Analysis

• As follows from the video recordings and the protocol of the inspection of the scene, in front of the 4th entrance of house No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Highway, there is a crater in the ground with a depth of 3.5–4 m and a diameter of 13.5–15 m.
• Also, within a radius of several hundred meters from the crater, the glazing, window frames, and door frames in residential buildings and other structures were partially or completely destroyed.
• These destructions are the result of the action of an air shock wave formed during the explosion of a concentrated explosive charge.
• At the same time, the location of the crater corresponds to the location of the charge.

Vehicle Fragments

• According to the protocol of the inspection of the scene dated 16.09.99 and the protocol of the inspection of objects dated 20.09.99, fragments of parts of GAZ-53 and PAZ-3205 vehicles were found at distances of up to 430 m from the crater.
• As can be seen from the photographs provided (appendix to the protocol of the inspection of objects), the fragments found have deformations characteristic of explosive impact.
• It follows from this that the explosive charge was located either in the immediate vicinity of the indicated vehicles or inside them.

Charge Mass Estimation

• The estimation of the mass of the exploded charge was carried out based on the partial destruction of glazing recorded in the protocol of the inspection of the scene at the house most distant from the site of the explosion (about 700 m), house No. 56 on Koshevoy St.
• For the calculation, Sadovsky's formula for a surface explosion was used (Pokrovsky G.I. Explosion. M. "Nedra" Publishing House, 1973):

$$\Delta P = 1.06 \cdot (\sqrt[3]{G} / R) + 4.3 \cdot (\sqrt[3]{G^2} / R^2) + 14 \cdot (G / R^3)$$

Where:
* $\Delta P$ — pressure jump at the shock wave front, atm;
* $G$ — mass of the explosive charge in TNT equivalent, kg;
* $R$ — distance from the site of the explosion to the object of interest.

Assessment Findings

Considering that for partial destruction of glazing the value of $\Delta P$ must be no less than 0.015 atm and no more than 0.02 atm, and solving equation (1) for G, we obtain an explosive charge mass in TNT equivalent of no less than 800 kg and no more than 1850 kg. It is not possible to provide a more accurate assessment due to the expert's lack of information regarding the dimensions of the glass, the methods of their mounting in the frames, and the strength of the frames themselves.

The nature of the destruction and damage to the houses, as well as other surrounding objects, indicates that an explosion of a high explosive occurred in the form of detonation. To initiate detonation in a high-explosive charge, an industrially or craft-manufactured means of initiation (MI) is required—an electric detonator or a blasting cap; therefore, the design of the explosive device included industrially or craft-manufactured electric detonator(s) or blasting cap(s).

Analysis of expert practice, as well as the results of field experiments specially conducted at the All-Russian Federal Nuclear Center (Sarov) with various masses of high-explosive charges, show that with charge masses exceeding 5 kg, it is not possible to find any informative remains of the actuating mechanism of the explosive device (means of initiation in the form of shell fragments and end wire fragments, electric current sources, connecting wires, time delays, and electronic boards), its packaging (container), or camouflage suitable for diagnostic studies. During the explosion of an explosive charge, the listed items fragment into minute particles, which are projected at high speed and further shattered upon impact with obstacles. This is explained by the extremely high explosion parameters (pressure, temperature, speed of explosion products) of large masses of explosives. Based on the foregoing, it is not possible to determine the specific design and method of activating the explosive device.

CONCLUSIONS

Regarding Question 1

The destruction and damage to the objects were formed as a result of the action of an explosion.
Expert T.V. Vinogradova

Regarding Question 2

The mass of the detonated charge was 800–1850 kg in TNT equivalent.
Expert T.V. Vinogradova

Regarding Question 3

A mixed explosive was used as the explosive charge, which included TNT, hexogen, and, most likely, aluminum; in addition, ammonium nitrate could have been included, or a combination of the substances listed above and explosives based on them.
Expert K.N. Stovbur

Regarding Question 4

It is not possible to establish the specific brand of the detonated explosive from trace amounts. For this reason, it is not possible to determine the field of application of the mixed explosive mentioned above or the explosives that were part of the combined charge.
Expert K.N. Stovbur

Regarding Question 5

The explosive charge was located either in the immediate vicinity of the GAZ-53 and PAZ-3205 vehicles or inside them, in front of the 4th entrance of building No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Shosse.
The design of the explosive device, in addition to the explosive charge, included industrially or craft-manufactured electric detonator(s) or blasting cap(s). It is not possible to determine the specific design of the device and the method of its activation.
Expert T.V. Vinogradova

reg. No. 16/3/4/1954

CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXPLOSION

The state refused to pay compensation to victims of terrorist attacks in Volgodonsk and Moscow

In early 2004, the Moscow City Court delivered a verdict in the case of the terrorist attacks in Volgodonsk and Moscow: on Guryanov Street and Kashirskoye Highway. Judge Marina Komarova managed to consider the multi-volume and extremely complex case in a month and a half. Needless to say, the trial was closed... But we are not talking now about whether the truth was established: who the masterminds, perpetrators, and accomplices were — although there are enough questions on that score. We are talking about something else — about the victims. About how the state, which unleashed the war in the Caucasus, decided to treat its victims.

It handled it very simply: it refused to pay compensation to the victims. According to the court, this should be done by the convicts Adam Dekkushev and Yusuf Krymshamkhalov. They are to shell out more than a million rubles as compensation for material damage to fourteen victims who filed lawsuits, and 2,800,000 rubles for moral damages (200,000 rubles to each plaintiff). To everyone except the judges, prosecutors, and officials, it is obvious: Dekkushev and Krymshamkhalov are not in a position to pay such sums. Rather, the judges, prosecutors, and officials know very well that the people who survived the nightmare of 1999 will never receive the money that would allow them to rebuild their lives and improve their health.

The victims filed appeals. On July 8, the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the January verdict regarding these very compensations. Moreover, it refused to pay the legal costs of those who came to the court from Volgodonsk, stating: "no one was waiting for you here" — and explaining that the provision of the Criminal Procedure Code on reimbursing participants in the proceedings for travel and housing expenses "is applicable only to courts of first instance."

How it was done in Volgodonsk

"Every citizen has the right to receive information about the state of their health in a form accessible to them, including information about the results of examinations, the presence of a disease... A citizen has the right to directly familiarize themselves with medical documentation reflecting the state of their health..."
...by phone about what was and is being done in Volgodonsk for the benefit of the victims:
* Everything provided for by the plan has been fulfilled. Patients who have chronic diseases are on the dispensary register. Patients who received traumatic brain injuries continue to be monitored in medical institutions. There were patients who needed treatment in federal centers, cosmetic surgeries, hand prosthetics — they all received treatment.
Then suddenly says:
* You know, there are no special programs for the rehabilitation of victims of the terrorist attack. To treat them, governor's decrees are not issued...

Let's compare the experience of our country (which, as the government boasts, has a giant gold and foreign exchange reserve and a constantly replenished stabilization fund of billions of dollars) with what is happening in the West.

First, in many countries that have experienced terrorist acts, special insurance funds with state participation operate. Such a fund in France, for example, appeared in the 80s of the last century. And in 1990, the French parliament passed a law equating victims of terrorist attacks with victims of war. Such funds also exist in Spain and Great Britain. [In the event of such an] event, a life pension is assigned.

In the United States, after the well-known tragic events, the "September 11th Act" was passed. Compensations (averaging one and a half million dollars) are paid to those victims who refused to file lawsuits against the US government. But the very possibility of suing the state, naturally, remained. Moreover, lawsuits can also be addressed to commercial structures. For example, the husband of the deceased Bonnie Smituk demanded compensation in the amount of 50 million dollars from American Airlines and the security service of the Boston airport.

As for the adequacy of the amounts, it is enough to recall foreign practice and throw up one's hands: they say, this is not Paris or Washington. But 100,000 rubles is a mockery even from the point of view of Russian laws: this is only one-time assistance that the state is obliged to pay to victims in any case. [Regarding the] necessity of moral damage." In his opinion, "the Russian government has fully compensated for the financial costs that compensated for moral and material damage," that is, 100,000 rubles to each victim.

[fragment at bottom right]
...pioneer camp and abandoned. We didn't even have a doctor. A nurse provided help: she could only give a pill or call an ambulance, which took an hour to reach us. They sent us a psychologist, but it's hard to get out of town — and the psychologist stopped coming. If we came to the city and asked for medical help, we were often told that there was a more urgent case, and they refused to admit us.
Vouchers to san- [?]
small compensation,
ty", but did not recognize "his

The state did not insure us against terrorist attacks, but it insured itself against claims from their victims

Smoke of the Fatherland

What do we have? Not long ago, a young lawyer, Venera Kamalova, won a lawsuit against the Moscow government for compensation for material damage to the family of Timur Khaziev, a musician who died in the "Nord-Ost" siege. The widow and daughter of the deceased will be paid about $50,000 over 11 years. This is an exceptional case for Russian justice.

According to the law "On Combating Terrorism," moral and material damage caused by a terrorist attack must be compensated by the Ministry of Finance, and immediately, and then the money should be recovered from the perpetrators through subrogation. Nevertheless, the Moscow City Court, considering the case of the apartment bombings, refused to involve the Ministry of Finance as a defendant.

In the "Nord-Ost" trial, however, the Ministry of Finance did not escape this fate. The ministry representative then recognized the "fairness of the claims in the material part," but did not recognize "its obligation to compensate," although the obligation to pay for moral and material damage is provided for by the Civil Code. It says there in black and white: damage caused to a citizen as a result of criminal actions (inaction) of state bodies is subject to compensation.

All other arguments are legal casuistry and the state's elementary unwillingness to pay.

But when the victims at the Theater Center on Dubrovka filed lawsuits in court, the speaker of the Moscow City Duma, Vladimir Platonov, stated: "In the event of compensation payments, an increase in the cost of living in Moscow and the final impoverishment of pensioners and public sector workers is inevitable." Truly a statesmanlike mind: he cannot think of any other source of income besides the pockets of pensioners and teachers.

And how should one evaluate in this regard the words of former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, which he spoke while handing over housing certificates to Volgodonsk residents who lost their apartments: "This is a small compensation, moral and psychological..."

The number of victims of the Volgodonsk explosion is growing: three suicides and beatings for seeking the truth

...Ministry of Health No. 222. But it is a long way from the Moscow bosses to Volgodonsk.

Doctors who conducted the examination of the victims of the residential building explosion managed to do without specialists—military medics. What's more—they did without the victims themselves! Somehow, three forensic experts "examined" about 800 people in one day, which is simply impossible.

Who benefits from such a deception? Such a check (and investigators refused to conduct it for many victims altogether) deprived many people of the opportunity to prove that they suffered specifically from the terrorist attack. That is, the state's expenditures on compensation, already meager, were sharply reduced. Savings, you see...

Victim Irina Polinskaya told "Novaya": "The examination was done without us, based on our documents. For everyone, they wrote that sick leave was no more than 21 days. For me, who spent months in the hospital, they also wrote 21 days and a medium severity injury. We were not allowed to see these conclusions. We only discovered the results of the examination at the Prosecutor General's Office when we started the lawsuit. Therefore, we could not appeal them earlier or conduct a second examination. And we don't have money for an independent examination. All the doctors in Volgodonsk are afraid they will be fired, so you won't get the truth."

Another victim, Lyudmila Dubinskaya, under whose house the powerful explosion occurred, was diagnosed with a "cut on the left heel." "Besides our house, 56 houses around were damaged, but we, who were in the destroyed house, are considered completely healthy!" she says. "When the explosion happened, some of us victims, about 200 people, were taken out of town to an old [illegible]... they were given to anyone but the victims. One of the residents of the bombed house, upon learning about this, wanted to douse herself with gasoline and set herself on fire: she had been waiting for a voucher for two years, and she was told she would get nothing. Another victim, Lyudmila Galkova, tried to prove she had the right to rehabilitation. City health officials did not believe her and called the police. She had to go to court—the voucher was found immediately."

Among the victims, there is an epidemic of suicides. After the terrorist attack, people were supposed to be provided with psychological help, but according to Volgodonsk residents, there was none. However, the city's psychologists and psychiatrists claim the opposite. The chief physician of the Volgodonsk dispensary, Galkin, said in 2001: "More than two thousand people turned to us regarding mental disorders. And even now, two years after the tragedy, more than 600 victims continue to be treated at the Volgodonsk psychiatric dispensary."

Victim from Volgodonsk Viktor Sitnitsky said that "after the terrorist attack, the husband of Lyudmila Kremneva committed suicide, and when she was given an apartment to replace the destroyed one, they deducted his 18 square meters... In addition, they did not include her daughter in the certificate calculation, who is studying in Novosibirsk and does not have her own living space. The same situation occurred in the Fedorov family (the father threw himself out of a window). In the city's housing department, the widow was told: 'Say thank you to your neighbors who made the fact of the suicide public (publication in "Argumenty i Fakty" — Ed.), now they know about it in Rostov, and we are obliged to take these meters away from you.'"

A city health official, who wished to remain anonymous, told us for a long time that... in the region, funds are not allocated for prosthetics...

To all claims, the victims are told: you have already received everything due by law—according to government decree No. 1503-r, they were paid 50,000 rubles for lost property. And that's it. That's why the Volgodonsk residents went to court. They tried to have this very government decree declared illegal—they wrote to the Supreme Court.

On February 7, 2003, the court replied that the government decree cannot be illegal because it is "incorrectly interpreted and executed by officials on the ground," and in the event of its cancellation, "the rights of the victims... to receive compensation payments, provision of housing, and implementation of medical and social rehabilitation measures will be violated, since these issues are not regulated by any other legal acts."

Did you understand anything? Translation: there are many violations—if we cancel what exists, there will be even more violations of the law, and as for where your money is—figure it out yourselves.

THEIR WAY

To make it clear what is really happening, in Israel, a law on victims of terrorist attacks appeared in 1970. It applies not only to Israelis but also to foreigners. The status of victims is largely equated to the status of military personnel. The law gives a person the opportunity to receive necessary medical care for free, during the entire period of treatment, a pension in the amount of three average salaries. If after the end of the rehabilitation course a person is still unable to work, they have the right to apply to a state medical commission, which will determine the degree of disability. In case of total loss of work capacity-

No. 50 (980) 15.07—18.07.2004

CONSEQUENCES

The state refused to pay compensation to victims of terrorist attacks in Volgodonsk and Moscow

At the beginning of 2004, the Moscow City Court delivered a verdict in the case of the terrorist attacks in Volgodonsk and Moscow: on Guryanova Street and Kashirskoye Highway. Judge Marina Komarova managed to review the multi-volume and extremely complex case in a month and a half. Needless to say, the trial was closed... But we are not talking now about whether the truth was established: who the masterminds, perpetrators, and accomplices were—although there are enough questions on that account as well. We are talking about something else—about the victims. About how the state, which unleashed the war in the Caucasus, decided to treat its victims.

It handled it very simply: it refused to pay compensation to the victims. According to the court, this should be done by the convicts Adam Dekkushev and Yusuf Krymshamkhalov. They are expected to shell out more than a million rubles in compensation for material damage to the fourteen victims who filed lawsuits, and 2,800,000 rubles for moral damage (200,000 rubles to each plaintiff). To everyone except the judges, prosecutors, and officials, it is obvious: Dekkushev and Krymshamkhalov are not in a position to pay such sums. Or rather, the judges, prosecutors, and officials know very well that the people who survived the nightmare of 1999 will never receive the money that would allow them to rebuild their lives and improve their health.

The victims filed appeals. On July 8, the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the January verdict regarding these very compensations. Moreover, it refused to pay the procedural costs of those who came to the trial from Volgodonsk, stating: "no one was waiting for you here"—and explaining that the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure on reimbursing trial participants for travel and housing expenses "is applicable only to courts of first instance."

How it was done in Volgodonsk

"Every citizen has the right to receive information about the state of their health in a form accessible to them, including information about the results of examinations, the presence of a disease... A citizen has the right to directly familiarize themselves with medical documentation reflecting the state of their health—this is a quote from the order..."

...pioneer camp and abandoned. We didn't even have a doctor. A nurse provided help: she could only give a pill or call an ambulance, which took an hour to reach us. They sent us a psychologist, but it's hard to get out of town—and the psychologist stopped coming. If we went to the city and sought medical help, we were often told that there were more serious cases, and they refused to admit us.

Vouchers were also allocated to sa... [likely sanatoriums] by phone about what was done and is being done in Volgodonsk for the benefit of the victims:
* Everything provided for by the plan has been fulfilled. Patients who have chronic diseases are on the dispensary register. Patients who received traumatic brain injuries continue to be monitored in medical institutions. There were patients who needed treatment in federal centers, cosmetic surgeries, hand prosthetics—they all received treatment.

Then suddenly says:
* You know, there are no special rehabilitation programs for victims of terrorist attacks. In order to treat them, governor's decrees are not issued.

[Right Column]

...let's compare the experience of our country (which, as the government boasts, has a giant gold and foreign exchange reserve and a constantly growing stabilization fund in the billions of dollars) with what is happening in the West.

Firstly, in many countries that have experienced terrorist acts, special insurance funds with state participation operate. A similar fund in France, for example, appeared in the 80s of the last century. And in 1990, the French parliament passed a law equating victims of terrorist attacks to victims of war. Such funds also exist in Spain and Great Britain.

...event, a life pension is assigned.

In the United States, after the well-known tragic events, the "September 11th Act" was passed. Compensations (averaging one and a half million dollars) are paid to those victims who refused to file lawsuits against the US government. But the possibility of suing the state itself, naturally, remained. Moreover, lawsuits can also be addressed to commercial structures. For example, the husband of the deceased Bonnie Smithwick demanded compensation in the amount of 50 million dollars from American Airlines and the security service of Boston airport.

...moral damage." In the opinion, "the Russian government has completely replaced the financial costs that compensated for moral and material damage, that is, 100,000 rubles to each victim."

As for the adequacy of the sums, it is enough to recall foreign practice and throw up one's hands: they say, this is not Paris or Washington. But 100,000 rubles is a mockery even from the point of view of Russian laws: this is only one-time assistance that the state is obliged to pay to victims in any case. It is necessary...

Covered by the blast...