Trepashkin Appeal to Yushenkov

Scanned document 15 pages EN
English translation  ·  Page 1

APPEAL

To: The Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Security of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, S.N. Yushenkov

From: Mikhail Ivanovich Trepashkin, attorney of the Inter-territorial Bar Association "Mezhregion" of the Guild of Russian Lawyers, residing at: Moscow, Zatonnaya St., house 17, apt. 15, tel. 114-51-84.

City of Moscow
May 13, 2002

Dear Sergei Nikolayevich!

I am addressing you with questions that are of great importance for ensuring the security of the state and the citizens of Russia.

I worked for a long time as an investigator in the state security agencies of Russia. My total experience in investigative work is over 20 years.

In December 2001, speaking on REN-TV, I, as an investigator, expressed the opinion that:
* The investigation of the criminal case regarding the facts of the apartment bombings in the city of Moscow is being conducted unprofessionally.
* A number of circumstances are being hidden from the population, which raises questions about a lack of interest in solving these crimes.
* I noted the poor organization of operational-investigative work by the leadership of the FSB of the RF, primarily N.P. Patrushev.

In response to this, on January 22, 2002, a search was conducted at my place of residence by employees of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office and the USB [Internal Security Directorate] of the FSB of the RF. Cartridges (18 pcs.) were planted, and a criminal case was initiated immediately on four counts of crime:

  • Illegal acquisition and storage of ammunition (Part 1, Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the RF);
  • Illegal acquisition and carrying of gas weapons (Part 4, Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the RF);
  • Disclosure of information constituting a state secret (Part 1, Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the RF).
English translation  ·  Page 2

Allegations of Persecution and Abuse of Power

Criminal Charges and Procedural Violations

  • Abuse of Official Powers: Alleged under Part 1, Article 285 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
  • Criminal Case Initiation:
    • Grounds were fabricated for initiating a criminal case under Part 1, Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
    • For the last three counts of the crime, criminal cases were initiated without any grounds whatsoever, described as being "out of thin air," in violation of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR.

Context of Persecution

The initiation of the criminal case against the author, currently under investigation number 240 by the Investigative Service of the UFSB of the RF for the city of Moscow and the Moscow Region, is believed to be a continuation of persecution by the leadership of the FSB of the RF.

The primary target of this alleged persecution is the Director of the FSB of the RF, N.P. Patrushev, due to:
1. The author's principled position in the fight against Chechen extremism during 1995-1996.
2. A court case won in 1998.

Specific Incidents (December 1995)

In December 1995, under the author's leadership, a major operation was conducted in Moscow to apprehend a group of Chechen-Dudaevites led by Visrudi Novikov during an extortion attempt involving a large sum of money.

Key details of the operation:
* The group included three individuals against whom there was witness testimony regarding their involvement in the murders and torture of Russian soldiers in Chechnya.
* 13 people were detained at the scene of the extortion.
* The case could not be fully resolved due to a deliberate obstruction of work initiated by certain leaders of the FSB of Russia, specifically: M.I. Barsukov, N.D. Kovalev, and N.P. Patrushev.
* It was revealed that high-ranking officials from the GRU GS MO RF (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) and the FSB of the RF were involved behind the Chechen criminals (some of whom were subsequently tried).

Obstruction and Internal Investigation

  • The author was prevented from working despite a personal request from the former head of the GUOP (Main Directorate for Organized Crime), V.B. Rushailo, to the former Director of the FSK (Federal Counterintelligence Service) of Russia, M.I. Barsukov.

  • An internal investigation was initiated against the author.

    • Stated Purpose: Not to objectively understand the situation (which was already clear).
    • Actual Purpose: To use the forces of 4 departments of the FSB of Russia to find compromising material and force the author's resignation from the security agencies.
    • Departments Involved:
      • USB (Internal Security Department)
      • UFSB of the RF for the city of Moscow and the Moscow Region
      • UK (Personnel Department)
      • OIU (Operational Inspection Department)
    • Procedural Violation: The investigation lasted two years instead of the 10 days required by law.
    • Outcome: No findings were made, yet a punishment was issued, alleging that the author was abusing their official position by detaining Chechen militant-criminals.

  • In 1995-1996, all forces of the FSB of the RF, at the suggestion of the head of the USB, were involved.

English translation  ·  Page 3

Allegations Against FSB Officials and Political Pressure

The actions of Patrushev N.P., FSB Director Barsukov M.I., and Deputy FSB Director Kovalev N.D. were aimed at compromising the author and preventing them from working on the Chechen OPG (Organized Crime Group) line in Moscow and other regions of Russia.

Allegations Regarding Patrushev N.P.

  • Patrushev N.P. is accused of having protected Dudayev's militants in every way, with the input of his friend Lebed A.I., during the time when he later displayed "heroism" in Chechnya on television screens.
  • Due to these actions, bloody militants who killed the author's soldiers in Chechnya—Abdul, Isa, and Turpal—managed to escape responsibility, despite being reported by the author and RUOP (Regional Directorate for Combating Organized Crime) officers.
  • Patrushev N.P. sent out an order for the author's punishment across Russia in February 1996 to bring it to the attention of FSB RF personnel, serving as an "instructive example" of what would happen to those who touched Chechen militants.
  • Because the author did not agree to leave these Chechens alone, Patrushev N.P. continues to keep the author under surveillance by the forces of the USB FSB RF to this day, leading to various provocations.

Legal and Professional Consequences

  • Zotov, Deputy Head of the USB (Internal Security Directorate) of the FSB RF, spent half an hour in military court lecturing that the author, by detaining Chechen extortionists, was inciting national hatred (proposing a criminal case under this article).
  • The author was forced to resign from the FSB RF due to constant pressure, as the work would not have proceeded in the necessary direction of effectiveness, especially since Patrushev slandered the author across Russia.

Case of Novikov Visrudi

  • Novikov Visrudi is described as a "small fry" who was brought to trial through the author's efforts, supported by some RUOP officers.
  • Salman Raduev personally exchanged Novikov Visrudi in December 1996 for three Penza OMON officers, while other individuals were exchanged one-for-one (relevant documents exist in the criminal case).
  • This exchange highlights Raduev's importance in securing Novikov Visrudi, who held the nickname "Hero" for combat operations, into his ranks.

Legal Appeals

  • Regarding the illegal punishment, the author appealed to the military court of the Moscow garrison.
  • The court, by its decision of April 1, 1998, recognized the author was correct and deemed the order for punishment unfounded (a decision the leaders of the FSB RF still refuse to cancel).
  • After resignation, the author appealed to:
    • The General Prosecutor's Office of the RF
    • The State Duma of the RF
    • The media, including:
      • "Komsomolskaya Pravda"
      • "Kommersant"
      • "Literaturnaya Ga-" (Gazeta)
  • The relevant department of the General Prosecutor's Office overseeing the FSB RF refused to investigate, reportedly to avoid conflict with the leadership of the FSB RF.
English translation  ·  Page 4

Document Excerpt Summary

Media and Legal Context

  • Various media outlets, including "Gazeta", "Radio Rossii", ORT, and TV-6, raised concerns regarding the actions of some FSB of the RF leaders, specifically mentioning the blocking of work related to Chechen extremism.
  • The Prosecutor General's Office was also noted for its passive stance.
  • No publication or program was challenged by the FSB of the RF or the Prosecutor's Office.
  • The court ultimately recognized the author's position as correct.

Threats and Investigations (1996-1997)

  • In August 1996 and 1997, the author was the target of assassination attempts by employees of the GRU and FSB.
  • Investigations into these attempts were conducted by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, but the cases were groundlessly terminated.
  • The last known episode regarding a planned assassination attempt was investigated alongside the case concerning the assassination attempt on B.A. Berezovsky.
  • This case was closed despite testimony from several individuals, including:
    • A. Gusak
    • V. Shebalin
    • A. Litvinenko
    • A. Ponkin
    • G. Shcheglov
    • K. Latyshonok
    • These witnesses claimed they had been ordered to "smash my head," among other things.

Framing Attempts

Murder of GRU Lieutenant Colonel I. Postovityuk
  • The author was repeatedly targeted by attempts to frame them for various crimes.
  • On December 20, 1996, GRU Lieutenant Colonel I. Postovityuk was killed in front of witnesses.
  • Information from the GRU and FSB alleged the author's involvement, but it was later determined that the author was not involved.
Taganka Police Murder Allegations
  • The author was also linked to the murder of two policemen on Taganka during the same period.
  • A Kalashnikov assault rifle without a stock was planted in the author's car trunk.
  • During the police detention and inspection (which the author believed was based on a tip-off/instruction), the rifle was not found (or possibly planted by them).
  • After the inspection, the author discovered the rifle, disassembled it, and scattered the parts across garbage dumps in Moscow, as they could not turn it in without explaining its origin.

Prosecutorial Review (1997-1998)

  • From 1997-1998, a prosecutorial check (No. Zuk-37/98) was conducted against the author.
  • This action was reportedly carried out under instructions from the leadership of the FSB of the RF and the GVP [Main Military Prosecutor's Office].
  • The basis for the check was the alleged disclosure of information constituting a state secret.
  • The reason cited was a falsified "Conclusion on the degree of secrecy of information contained in materials submitted by former FSB of Russia employee M.I. Trepashkin to the media, the State Duma, and the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation."
  • Subsequently, in 1997, materials from the FSB of the RF were sent to the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, under stern instructions from the Director of the FSB of the RF, N.D. Kovalev.
  • The text ends with the word "support-".
English translation  ·  Page 5

Legal Defense Summary

The text details a defense against a criminal case initiated against the author for the alleged disclosure of state secrets.

Allegations and Proceedings

  • Initiation of Case: A criminal case was initiated by Chief Military Prosecutor Demin to charge the author with disclosing information allegedly constituting a state secret and to apply a preventive measure of detention.
  • Basis of Charge: The charge stemmed from the author's disclosure to the Prosecutor General's Office, the State Duma, and "Komsomolskaya Pravda" regarding the blocking of work on the line of Chechen extremism.
  • Investigation Findings: A pre-investigation check revealed that the author had not disclosed any secret information.
  • Conclusion on Case: The attempt to fabricate a criminal case based on falsified documents failed because the materials were obtained by a professional.

Allegations of Misdirection

The author suggests that N.D. Kovalev may have been misled regarding the author by N.P. Patrushev, who was then the head of the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of the RF. The author posits that Patrushev was seeking grounds to remove N.D. Kovalev from his post as Director of the FSB of the RF to take his place.

Procedural Violations

The author asserts that several procedural violations occurred:

  • The search conducted at the author's residence violated Art. 168 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • The criminal cases were initiated in violation of Art. 108 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure.

Details of the Search Warrant

  • The decree authorizing the search was issued by GVP [Chief Military Prosecutor's Office] investigator S.V. Barsukov.
  • The search was related to criminal case No. 29/00/0011-00 concerning A.B. Litvinenko, in which the author is not even listed as a witness.

Defense Against Evidence Linking to A.B. Litvinenko

The author argues that they could not have possessed any items related to A.B. Litvinenko's alleged crimes for the following reasons:

  1. Litvinenko's Charges: A.B. Litvinenko is reportedly charged with abuse of office during his service in the FSB of the RF in 1996-1997, a period when the author did not know him and could not have been involved in his offenses.
  2. Possession of Items: The author could not have been in possession of:
    • Instruments of a crime committed by A.B. Litvinenko.
    • Objects and valuables obtained by him through criminal means.
    • Other relevant objects or documents pertaining to A.B. Litvinenko (referencing Part 1 of Art. 168 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure).
  3. Location of Litvinenko: While Part 2 of Art. 168 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure allows searches to discover wanted persons, it is common knowledge that A.B. Litvinenko is in Great Britain and therefore could not have been in the author's apartment.

Disputed Purpose of the Search

The author was informed that the search's purpose was to discover data on A.B. Litvinenko's whereabouts. The author disputes this, stating:

  • There is no such ground in Art. 168 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Everyone knows the whereabouts of A.B. Litvinenko.
  • The head [of...] Barsukov... (The text cuts off here).

Note: The number 5 at the beginning of the raw text was disregarded as it appeared to be a page or section marker.

English translation  ·  Page 6

Legal Allegations and Procedural Violations

Search Warrant and Investigation

  • Colonel Ivanov S.V. reported on television (TVC) that the GVP allegedly possesses information regarding the exact address of Litvinenko in Great Britain.
  • The author states they do not possess this information at the present time.
  • The need for the search is alleged to stem from:
    • Old matters concerning N. P. Patrushev.
    • Revenge for supporting A. V. Litvinenko, including participation in the November 1998 press conference.
  • The author claims a criminal case was initiated against them by:
    • Planting cartridges.
    • Illegally initiating a criminal case based on as many as four elements of crimes.

Violations of Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR

Grounds for Search (Article 163)
  • A review of Art. 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR ("Grounds for conducting a search") shows that GVP investigator S. V. Barsukov lacked any of the specified grounds.
  • The requirements of the Law (Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR) were allegedly ignored in anticipation of impunity, mirroring the situation in the A. V. Litvinenko matter.
  • It is noted as surprising that the illegal decree to conduct the search was sanctioned by the Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor.
Initiation of Criminal Case (Article 108)

The Criminal Procedure Law mandates that the initiation of a criminal case requires two elements:

  1. A pretext (subparagraphs 1-6 of part 1 of Art. 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR).
  2. A ground (part 2 of Art. 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR).

Part 2 of Art. 108 states: "A case may be initiated only in those instances when there is sufficient data indicating the signs of a crime."

  • S. V. Barsukov, Senior investigator for particularly important cases of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, allegedly initiated a criminal case under:
    • Part 1 of Art. 283
    • Part 1 of Art. 285
    • Part 4 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation
  • This action was allegedly taken without any grounds whatsoever, demonstrating a "complete profanation of criminal legislation."

Evidence Regarding Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation

Evidence supporting this conclusion relates to part 1 of Art. 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

The fundamental signs for deciding the issue of initiating a criminal case under Art. 283 must include:

  • An established fact of disclosure of information, meaning the unlawful making public of information constituting a state secret, which subsequently became the property of... (text incomplete).
English translation  ·  Page 7

Arguments Against Criminal Charges

Lack of Evidence and Investigation Status

  • At the time the criminal case was initiated and currently, no such facts exist, nor could they exist, despite four months of preliminary investigation.
  • The Main Military Prosecutor's Office cannot answer any questions regarding the complaints, specifically: "To whom did I disclose any information that is allegedly secret?"
  • Disclosed information must contain a state secret. For this to be true, there must be at least some expert conclusion at the time the criminal case is initiated. This conclusion does not exist after four months.

Dissemination of Information

  • Even if some documents kept by the author might be recognized as containing a state secret, the author was not the one who disseminated them.
  • The documents were disseminated by the members of the investigative team who conducted the search at the author's residence, by familiarizing witnesses and T.P. Sementina with these documents, who did not previously possess this information.
  • This information will continue to be disseminated during inspections, expert examinations, court proceedings, etc.
  • The mere fact of possessing documents, even those of special importance, not to mention documents of one's own making marked "secret," does not constitute any crime.

Regarding Part 1 of Art. 285 of the Criminal Code of the RF

  • Only a person acting on orders—that is, lawlessly and illegally, or with signs of the condition "kretino daunito"—could have made the decision to initiate a criminal case under Part 1 of Art. 285 of the Criminal Code of the RF.
Specific Defenses
  1. Lack of Official Capacity: For six years, the author has not held positions related to state secrets, nor any positions in the FSB of the RF. This is known to the GVP staff conducting the criminal case against A.V. Litvinenko, as well as the investigators of the FSB Directorate for the city of Moscow and the Moscow Region.
  2. Nature of Actions: What actions were committed contrary to the interests of the service? The author collected information on the activities of criminal groups in Moscow and reported it to FSB RF leaders who (unlike the author) held official positions. In doing so, the author did not use official powers.
  3. Statute of Limitations: Under this charge, even if there were signs of a crime, the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution has expired in accordance with parts 1 and 2 of Art. 78 of the Criminal Code of the RF.
English translation  ·  Page 8

Legal Analysis: Abuse of Official Position

Definition of Official Abuse

Resolution No. 4 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR ("On judicial practice" in cases of abuse of power or official position, exceeding authority or official powers, negligence, and official forgery), dated March 30, 1990, states:

"...in accordance with the law, official abuse can be recognized as such actions of an official that stemmed from his official duties and were related to the exercise of rights and duties with which this person is endowed by virtue of the position held" (para. 10).

This definition is also reflected in all commentaries to Art. 285 of the Criminal Code of the RF.

Elements Required to Initiate a Criminal Case (Art. 285 of the Criminal Code of the RF)

To initiate a criminal case under Art. 285 of the Criminal Code of the RF, the following signs must be clearly established in their entirety:

  • a) That at the time of the commission of each specific act, the individual was an official.
  • b) That the acts committed stemmed from the individual's specific official duties by position, as specified in the relevant orders.
  • c) That these acts were committed contrary to the interests of the service.
  • d) That these acts were committed out of mercenary or other personal interest.
  • e) That these acts are socially dangerous.
  • f) That these acts caused specific harm and to whom exactly.

Note: Only in the presence of these signs in their entirety can one speak of responsibility for abuse of official position (Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR dated October 30, 1991, in case K. - see Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the RF. 1992. No. 4, p. 8).

"If socially dangerous acts are not related to the use of official powers, then responsibility for the crime provided for by Art. 285 of the Criminal Code of the RF is excluded" (see Commentary to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation taking into account judicial practice. Book two, Moscow, "Novaya Volna", 1998, p. 399).

Status of Specific Roles

The Commentary of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation to the Criminal Code of the RF (Moscow, 2000, p. 913) explains:

"Referents, consultants, secretaries... do not belong to officials."

This commentary was referenced in the context of the author's service in the USB FSB RF (Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of the RF), where the author held the position of consultant, and subsequently senior consultant of the 3rd (5th) department, before being placed at the disposal of the department (vydedeniya za shtat).

Conclusion

Taking into account the above, it is perfectly obvious that the listed signs of abuse of official powers in my-

English translation  ·  Page 9

Legal Arguments and Defense Points

General Considerations

  • The actions in question are not observed in relation to the criminal case.
  • Amnesty acts adopted since the dismissal from the FSB of the RF must be taken into account.
  • The individual possesses over 24 years of service and is a veteran of military service.
  • The individual has received government honors, including the "Medal for Bravery" for operational-combat activities during the first Chechen campaign (prior to N.P. Patrushev's arrival at the FSB of the RF).
  • These credentials alone were sufficient to meet the legal requirements and result in a resolution refusing to initiate a criminal case during the pre-investigation check for the specified elements of the crime.

Specific Charge: Part 4 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the RF

Regarding the Gas Pistol
  • The individual did not acquire a gas pistol and never carried it.
  • During the search, the individual informed the officers of the GVP (Chief Military Prosecutor's Office) and the USB (Internal Security Department) of the FSB of the RF that the pistol was brought and left in the apartment by a resident of Moscow, Vladimir Leshok, several years ago.
  • The pistol was voluntarily surrendered.
  • The individual named a specific person, Vladimir Leshok (tel. 911-44-03), who found the pistol and gave it to the individual years ago to determine if it was a gas or starter pistol and why the cartridge was jammed.
  • Vladimir Leshok was interrogated and confirmed the individual's testimony.
  • No evidence exists to show that the individual ever carried the pistol on their person.
  • The transfer and storage of gas weapons do not constitute the elements of a crime.
  • This is clear to anyone knowledgeable, but the GVP officers, who were aware of the entire situation before the criminal case was initiated, ignored the CCP (Criminal Procedure Code) of the RF and initiated a criminal case under Part 4 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the RF.
Conclusion on the Pistol Case
  • The gas pistol was voluntarily surrendered to the officers of the GVP and the USB of the FSB of the RF, which can be confirmed by attesting witnesses.
  • This is reflected in the search protocol dated January 22, 2002.
  • Therefore, initiating a criminal case under Part 4 of Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the RF was unwarranted.
  • Even if the fact of illegal acquisition and carrying of the gas pistol were established, according to the note to Art. 222 of the Criminal Code of the RF and numerous rulings of the highest judicial instances, the criminal case in such an instance is subject to termination.

Final Assessment

  • Given the lack of complexity in investigating this crime, the legislator indicates that regarding the elements of the crime, pre-... (text incomplete)
English translation  ·  Page 10

Legal Arguments Regarding Criminal Proceedings

Procedural Issues

  • Inquiry vs. Preliminary Investigation:
    • An inquiry is prescribed by Part 4 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (and Part 1 of Article 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR).
    • A preliminary investigation is conducted for this type of crime only if the prosecutor deems it necessary.
    • The criminal case file lacks substantiated instructions from the prosecutor justifying a preliminary investigation over an inquiry under Parts 1 and 4 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
    • Consequently, the preliminary investigation for these types of crimes is being conducted illegally.

Allegations of Planting Evidence

Regarding Part 1 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the following points are raised:

  • Motive for Planting: There is no doubt that the ammunition was planted in the apartment to initiate a criminal case against the author, either to create grounds under Part 1 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation or by any other means.

  • Disputability of the Crime: Even the charge itself is disputable based on the following points:

    1. Intentionality Requirement:

      • The specified crime requires intent. If the individual was unaware of the ammunition's presence, there can be no criminal liability.
      • The ammunition was specifically planted on the eve of or on the day of the search to initiate a criminal case out of revenge for the press conference held in November 1998, of which the author was a participant.
      • The planting is reasonably demonstrated by the fact that criminal cases were initiated without grounds under Part 1 of Article 285, Part 1 of Article 283, and Part 4 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

    2. Legal Opportunity for Mitigation:

      • If the ammunition had been kept, the author, as a lawyer, would have utilized the provision in Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, as voluntary surrender of weapons and ammunition exempts a citizen from criminal liability.
      • The failure to take advantage of the opportunity during the search is deemed an absurdity.

    3. Discovery Location:

      • The location where the ammunition was found (in a box for office supplies above the desk, where the child constantly climbs) raises significant questions and indicates the ammunition was planted, and done so in haste.
      • The location is problematic because:
        • It could have been discovered immediately.
        • It was closer to the workspace, whereas the author kept holsters and accessories for combat weapons in another room, high off the floor, on the top shelf.
English translation  ·  Page 11

Testimony Excerpts

Personal Circumstances and Allegations

  • Living Situation: The individual resides in a rented apartment where visitors are frequent, and in some instances, the person was left alone in the room.
  • Discovery of Cartridges: On several occasions during long trips (e.g., a family trip to Bryansk and Livadia), upon return, the individual noticed that someone had visited the apartment in their absence.
  • Possibilities for Cartridge Presence: The individual posits several possibilities regarding the presence of the cartridges:
    • They were planted by ill-wishers who subsequently informed the USB FSB RF (Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of the RF) about the cartridges.
    • They were planted by FSB RF agents who entered the home.
    • They resulted from an operational measure involving secret entry into the dwelling.
    • They were present during the search conducted on January 22, 2002, by a member of the operational-investigative group.
  • Evidence of Planting: The individual suggests that fingerprints of the persons involved could have been preserved on the cartridges.
  • Knowledge of Possessions: The selection of the planted cartridges suggests the perpetrators knew the individual previously owned a Makarov system pistol and a "Colt".
  • Hunting Rifle Matter: During service in the USB FSB RF, many were aware the individual was applying for a permit to purchase and carry a hunting rifle, but the matter was not finalized due to lack of time. Despite this, even a hunting rifle cartridge in a cardboard shell was planted.

Legal Proceedings and Search Irregularities

  • Investigation Type: Due to the perceived lack of complexity, the legislator indicates that an inquiry is being conducted under Part 1 of Art. 222 of the UK RF (Criminal Code of the RF), rather than a preliminary investigation (under Part 1 of Art. 126 of the UPK RSFSR - Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR).
  • Procedural Concern: The individual asserts that there is no reasoned instruction from the prosecutor mandating a preliminary investigation instead of an inquiry under Part 1 of Art. 222 of the UK RF, leading to the conclusion that the preliminary investigation is being conducted illegally.
  • Details of the Search:
    • Quantity and Type: 18 various cartridges, including blanks, were planted during or before the search.
    • Presentation: The cartridges were kept in a single cellophane bag but were "scattered" across several items in the search protocol to simulate a larger quantity.
    • Statement During Search: The individual was told in plain language, in the presence of witnesses and T.P. Semektina, that this was a "standard set for searching the apartments of former officers" to prevent complaints.
    • Seizure Timing: The bag containing the cartridges was seized from among office supplies almost immediately upon the entry of the investigative-operational group, suggesting prior knowledge of the cartridges' location or a deliberate trick by the group members.
English translation  ·  Page 12

Argument Summary

To all my arguments, based on laws, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office did not provide a reasoned response. Nothing else was expected from them, since the search at my place of residence was authorized by the Deputy Main Military Prosecutor. He cannot then admit that he broke the law or overlooked the lack of grounds. One violation leads to another, and as a result, a tangle is formed that is difficult to untangle.

A sense of revenge prevailed over common sense, over the law, pushing the law into the background.

Here one should recall the wisdom: "He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer shall be abomination" (Solomon). A single disregard for the law causes other violations; the concept of "honor of the uniform" comes into play, and in this meat grinder, few remain objective. "Plate sin with gold, / And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks..." (W. Shakespeare).

"He acts wisely who is obedient to the dictates of the law" (Latin legal maxim).

All of the above indicates that Barsukov S.V., who illegally initiated the criminal case, committed a crime that is now being covered up by employees of the military prosecutor's office.

Violations of Normative Acts

I also want to draw attention to the fact that my complaints through the chain of command are met with formal brush-offs (unmotivated responses), which violates the following normative acts:

  • Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR
  • Federal Law "On the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation"
  • Order of the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF dated January 30, 2001, No. 5 "On measures to strengthen prosecutorial supervision over the legality of seizure and search operations"
  • Order of the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF dated June 18, 2001, No. 31 "On the organization of prosecutorial supervision over preliminary investigation and inquiry"
  • Order of the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF dated August 4, 2000, No. 115 "On the procedure for checking the legality of a resolution to initiate or refuse to initiate criminal cases"
  • Order of the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF dated May 22, 1996, No. 30 "On the organization of prosecutorial supervision over the execution of laws and the observance of human and civil rights and freedoms"
  • Order of the Main Military Prosecutor of the RF dated October 3, 1994, No. 128 "On the state of legality in criminal proceedings and ensuring the constitutional rights of participants in the process"
English translation  ·  Page 13

Legal Documentation and Procedural Concerns

Regulatory Documents Cited

  • Order of the Chief Military Prosecutor No. 100-1993: "On operational information in the bodies of the military prosecutor's office."
  • Instructions of the General Prosecutor's Office of the RF:
    • Dated August 19, 1997, No. 52/20: "On facts of gross violation of criminal procedural legislation."
    • Dated December 24, 1996, No. 1y-1150: "On further improvement of supervisory activities in the bodies of the military prosecutor's office," etc.

Allegations of Procedural Irregularities

The criminal case initiated against the author is alleged to be illegal, rendering the preliminary investigation itself illegal.

Lack of Clarity and Due Process
  • For four months, the author has not been specifically informed of the suspected offense.
  • A petition to ensure the right provided by Part 2 of Article 52 of the CCP of the RSFSR (since the author has been declared a suspect) and to receive an explanation of the suspicion was denied.
  • The author is being interrogated as a suspect without justification.
  • The author cannot identify the regulating normative act (article of the CCP of the RSFSR) governing their status as a suspect, as the criteria listed in Part 1 of Article 52 of the CCP of the RSFSR (detention at the scene of the crime or the application of a measure of restraint before charges are brought) are not present.
Violations of Constitutional Rights
  • In violation of Part 2 of Article 24 and Article 46 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the author has not been provided with a photocopy of the decision to initiate the criminal case (currently numbered No. 240).
  • The author has not been given the opportunity to review the said decision and make necessary extracts from it.
  • To date, neither the investigator nor the prosecutor's office employees have disclosed any information constituting a state secret. This lack of disclosure applies to other elements of the alleged crimes as well.

Issues Regarding Investigation Term Extension

  • The term of the preliminary investigation is being extended without justification.
  • Part 3 of Article 133 of the CCP of the RSFSR permits extension "In cases where the investigation presents particular complexity."
  • The elements of the alleged crimes (Part 1 and Art. 222, Part 1 of Art. 283, and Part 1 of Art. 285 of the Criminal Code of the RF) do not present particular complexity for their investigation; these are not considered grave elements of crimes.
English translation  ·  Page 14

Legal Concerns Regarding Criminal Investigation

As a lawyer, I find it unclear why it has taken four months to document an obvious fact related to the discovery of a gas pistol handed over to me by witness Leshok V.

Procedural Issues

  • For the elements of crimes provided for by parts 1 and 4 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the standard procedure is an inquiry (part 1 of Article 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR).
  • A preliminary investigation is only conducted in these cases if the prosecutor deems it necessary.
  • To my knowledge, there is no justified instruction from the prosecutor in the criminal case mandating a preliminary investigation instead of an inquiry under parts 1 and 4 of Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
  • Consequently, the preliminary investigation for these elements of crimes is being conducted illegally.

Investigation Scope and Conduct

  • The "special complexity of the investigation" of criminal case No. 240 consists only of attempting to find signs of crime elements "out of thin air," meaning without sufficient data.
  • Currently, the investigation is engaged in verification work that operational units are obligated to perform.

Criticisms of Security Organ Work

The illiterate and unprofessional approach to work by some leaders of the security organs has caused numerous problems. Examples include:

  • The appearance of the traitor to the Motherland, Belenko, who hijacked a state-of-the-art aircraft to Japan, due to unfair actions.
  • The creation of the political refugee Litvinenko, resulting from unprofessional work and illegal criminal prosecution by employees of the FSB of the Russian Federation and the Main Military Prosecutor's Office.

Dozens of other examples could be cited.

Damages Caused by Illegal Actions

The illegal initiation of the criminal case and the conduct of the search have caused me significant damage:

  • A computer was seized during the search, which has not been returned to date for unknown reasons.
  • This computer contained dossiers on all my clients.
  • My petitions to copy this information have not been satisfied to date.
  • Consequences of this seizure include:
    • Postponing court proceedings.
    • Restoring a huge amount of materials.
    • Refusing to defend a number of persons.
    • My legal practice was practically suspended.

It should be noted that even before the system unit was sealed, employees of the USB FSB RF and prosecutor-criminalist Silchenko used it, attempting to read and print the existing Lexicon [files].

English translation  ·  Page 15

Statement and Requests

Allegations of Data Corruption and Persecution

  • Certain files were converted using other programs, particularly Windows, and utilized their own floppy disk, a fact confirmed by all participants of the search. Such actions could lead to file corruption.
  • The author has also suffered significant moral damage.
  • The author asserts they are not the only individual dismissed from the FSB of Russia for maintaining a principled stance in the fight against organized crime.
  • The author states they are not the only person subjected to unfounded persecution, including criminal prosecution, for speaking truthfully about the questionable actions of their former leaders.
  • A number of individuals have died under unexplained circumstances.
  • For several years, no one has been able to halt the legal lawlessness of the FSB RF leaders. Impunity and lack of control are leading to an increase in crimes.

Formal Requests

Taking into account the above points, the author requests the following actions:

  1. To inquire with the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, and the FSB RF regarding the legality and validity of initiating a criminal case against the author and conducting a preliminary investigation, considering the circumstances detailed above.
  2. To ask the specified bodies to verify and state in their responses whether criminal case No. 240 against the author contains elements of the following crimes under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation:
    • Part 4 of Article 222 (illegal acquisition and carrying of a gas weapon).
    • Part 1 of Article 283 (disclosure of information constituting a state secret).
    • Part [1?] of Article 285 (abuse of official powers).
  3. To ask the heads of the named bodies to take control over the legality and validity of the investigation of criminal case 240.

[Signature]
M. I. Trepashkin

Note: The author mentions that in response to their complaint, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office provided only a formal, non-specific dismissal, failing even to name to whom the alleged secret information was disclosed.