It's very difficult to find out how this decision was made in the secret corridors of the Kremlin: everyone who could give such advice is still in office and position.

But after the first Chechen war, I gathered some people at my dacha in Peredelkino who were present at Yeltsin's decision then, at the end of '94: "Forward, to Grozny!"

At that time, I was the author and host of a television program on the first channel (later banned, as I was told, personally by Berezovsky), and I have a transcript of that meeting. I can quote a few things:

"Ramadan Abdulatipov testifies:

'On December fourteenth, I wrote a note to the president stating that we were going the wrong way and were effectively turning the entire Chechen people against us, that we should abandon those who had already discredited themselves with absurd political decisions, and that negotiations should be held with every leader, with everyone who considered themselves a leader, and thus dilute Dudayev among other leaders.'"

"And this note reached Yeltsin?"

"Yes... Moreover, the day before, leaders of religious movements, elders... had visited me. They asked for a three-day truce to establish contact with Dudayev. They even told me: 'If Dudayev doesn't agree to negotiations, we will enter into a direct dialogue with the people, bypassing him.' And I also wrote about this in the note to Yeltsin. And Yeltsin declared a two-day truce, starting from December fifteenth."

"Was the order for the pre-New Year attack unexpected for you?"

"The thing is, at the end of December, I contacted the chairman of the Chechen Republic parliament, Idigov (although people criticize me to this day for calling him that, but for me, the main thing was not how to call him, but how capable he was of negotiations). A day later, Idigov called me: yes, we are ready to negotiate. I received de facto permission for negotiations from Shumeiko, and through him—certain support from the president. We prepared negotiation programs, coordinated them with Kovalev, Ponomarev, Zyuganov, Lysenko, and many other State Duma deputies. And we were supposed to fly to Makhachkala on December twenty-seventh to begin the negotiation process. But unexpectedly, we were told: we need to delay the departure."

"Who said that?"

"Egorov (at that time, Chairman of the Security Council or Head of the Presidential Administration, I've forgotten already. - Yu. Shch.) officially met with us and announced that the Security Council had instructed him and Stepashin to conduct negotiations, and the negotiations could only be about one thing - capitulation. I replied to him: 'You cannot go to the Caucasus with an offer of capitulation. One can predict in advance how that will end.' Then I realized that the party of war already had its own plan... The most terrible thing was that the President became a hostage to those people who promised him a quick victory over Chechnya within a week."

Sergey Yushenkov, Chairman (in '94) of the State Duma Defense Committee, testifies:

"You remember Boris Yeltsin's famous address demanding that the Chechens lay down their arms within forty-eight hours and promising to introduce a state of emergency? I perfectly understood what it meant to threaten an entire people with a state of emergency, and I tried to find out: were there such words in the address? I was assured that there were. But Ivan Petrovich Rybkin told me that in the final version of the address, there were no such words. I call Lobov. He assures me that there are such words. 'Look at the address itself, signed by the president,' I ask him. He looks: 'Yes, indeed, there are not. But that doesn't matter. Don't you understand that we need a small victorious war to boost the president's rating?'"

"Did he really say that?"

"Exactly that, and I am ready to confirm it anywhere... This cynicism simply shocked me..."

Yes, most likely, that's how that political decision was made in December '94, for which Russia paid so dearly, for which we all pay and pay, and how much more we will pay.

I understand, different times, different presidents, different backroom conversations, and probably different secrets.

But the price is one: human lives.

After this—the September bombings in Moscow, the bombing in Volgodonsk, the famous "Wipe them out in the outhouse" and universal jubilation.