FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIA

Directorate for the Rostov Region

21.09.99 No. 8/16-173
Rostov-on-Don, 31 Bolshaya Sadovaya St.

To the Head of the City Health Department
A.I. Kurilov
Volgodonsk.

Dear Anatoly Ivanovich!

The operational-investigative group stationed at the department of the UFSB of the RF for the Rostov Region in the city of Volgodonsk is investigating criminal case No. 173, initiated regarding the explosion that occurred on September 16, 1999, near house No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Highway. To clarify the full picture of the tragedy, we need your assistance.

Pursuant to Art. 70 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, we ask you to instruct the employees of your department to prepare and provide to us a complete list of persons who sought medical assistance in connection with the explosion near house No. 35 on Oktyabrskoye Highway, according to the following formula: Full Name, year of birth, place of residence, which medical institution they applied to for help, diagnosis. Your cooperation will contribute to a prompt and high-quality investigation of the criminal case.

Head of the Investigative Department
of the UFSB of the RF for the Rostov Region
Colonel of Justice [signature] E.I. Protsenko

Copy No. 2
[Stamp: UFSB of the RF for the Rostov Region...]
TRUE COPY
Investigator [signature] S.V. Romanovsky

Sheet 8

...the device included industrially or home-made electric detonator(s) or blasting cap(s).

Analysis of expert practice, as well as the results of field experiments specially conducted at the All-Russian Federal Nuclear Center (Sarov) with various masses of high-explosive (HE) charges, show that with charge masses exceeding 5 kg, it is impossible to find any informative remains of the explosive device's firing mechanism (initiation means in the form of shell fragments and end-wire fragments, electric current sources, connecting wires, time delays, and electronic circuit boards), its packaging (containers), or camouflage suitable for diagnostic research. During the explosion of an HE charge, the listed items undergo fragmentation into minute particles, high-speed projection, and additional crushing upon impact with obstacles. This is explained by the extremely high explosion parameters (pressure, temperature, velocity of explosion products) of large masses of HE. Based on the above, it is not possible to determine the specific design and method of activating the explosive device.

CONCLUSIONS

Regarding Question 1

The destruction and damage to the objects were formed as a result of the action of an explosion.

Expert [signature] T.V. Vinogradova

Regarding Question 2

The mass of the detonated charge was 800 - 1850 kg in TNT equivalent.

Expert [signature] T.V. Vinogradova

Regarding Question 3

A composite explosive was used as the explosive charge, which included TNT, hexogen, and, most likely, aluminum; additionally, ammonium nitrate could have been included, or a combination of the substances listed above and explosives based on them.

Expert [signature] K.N. Stovbur

[Stamp: Investigative Department of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. For information 3]

Nitrate and Ammonium Ion Detection

Nitrate ions and ammonium ions are usually present in traces of an explosion of composite explosives containing ammonium nitrate as a component.

On the other hand, substances of organic and inorganic nature are widely used in everyday life and the national economy, which either directly contain the above-mentioned ions (for example, ammonium nitrate fertilizers) or form them in the process of their decomposition (for example, aniline dyes, nitro-lacquers, etc.).

It is not possible to unambiguously determine the origin of the detected ions based on the results of physicochemical studies.

Detection of Inorganic Combustion Products

To detect condensed combustion products of inorganic components of explosives and pyrotechnic compositions (for example, aluminum, magnesium) or their unburned particles, studies were conducted on deposits of inorganic substances on paper filters remaining after filtration of washings. The studies were conducted by the EPMA method on a JSM-840 scanning electron microscope from Jeol (Japan) with an ISIS microprobe analyzer from Oxford Instruments (UK) according to standard methods. Accelerating voltage - 20 kV. Elements determined - from beryllium to uranium.

Sample Preparation

Preparation of samples for studies of deposits on filters was carried out as follows. Each of the filters was placed in a test tube with alcohol and subjected to ultrasound to separate particles from the filter surface and from each other. After this, the alcohol suspension containing microparticles was applied to the surface of the stage of the electron microscope. After the suspension dried, microparticles were present on the surface of the stage in the form of a monolayer.

Study Results

As a result of the study, particles with sizes from 2 $\mu$m to 15 $\mu$m, each having a shape close to spherical, were found on the surfaces of the filters with washings from fragments (items 1 and 2) and swabs (item 15). The chemical basis of the particles is aluminum oxide with impurities of magnesium, silicon, calcium, and iron. The formation of spherical or near-spherical aluminum oxide particles occurs during the combustion or explosion of aluminum-containing explosives or pyrotechnic compositions. The presence of these particles on the filters allows for the conclusion that aluminum was most likely part of the explosive charge.

Conclusions from Physicochemical Studies

Based on the physicochemical studies conducted, the following conclusions can be drawn.

• As an explosive charge, either a composite explosive was used, which included TNT, hexogen, and, most likely, aluminum, or, in addition, ammonium nitrate or a combination of the above substances and explosives based on them could have been included.

It is not possible to establish the specific brand of the exploded explosive by trace amounts. For this reason, it is not possible to determine the area of application of the above-mentioned composite explosive or the explosives that were part of the combined charge.

Analysis of Sample Components

Visual Examination

• Selected objects were examined visually using an MZ12 microscope from Leica (Germany) at various magnifications and lighting.
• As a result of the examination of microparticles and particles, no substances resembling explosives, gunpowder, pyrotechnic compositions, or their individual components were found by appearance.

Chemical Extraction and Preparation

• Methanol and acetone washes were taken from the objects.
• The washes were filtered through ashless "white ribbon" filters and, after evaporation in a helium stream to a volume of 1 ml, were divided in half.
  • One part, intended for examination by HPTLC and GC-MS methods, was evaporated to a volume of 0.2 - 0.3 ml.
  • The other, intended for analysis by the IC [Ion Chromatography] method, was dried until the solvent was completely removed and filled with bidistilled water in a volume of 1 ml for each wash.
• The remaining filters were dried and preserved for further research.

Detection of Trace Components

• To detect trace amounts of high explosives and organic components of smokeless powders (diphenylamine and centralites), acetone and methanol washes were examined using HPTLC and GC-MS methods.

HPTLC Study

The HPTLC study was conducted using a complex of chromatographic equipment from Camag (Switzerland) under the following conditions:
* "HPTLC Silica gel 60 F 254" plate from Merck (Germany);
* Applied sample volume - 40 μl;
* Eluent - benzene;
* Eluent rise height from the start line - 50 mm;
* Control samples - acetone solution of the most well-known high explosives (TNT, hexogen [RDX], octogen [HMX], PETN, nitroglycerin, tetryl, and picric acid), chloromethylene extracts of smokeless powders of various brands.

The presence of explosives and smokeless powder components was determined by:
* The correspondence of the relative mobility values of the substance spots on the chromatograms of the studied and control solutions.
* Reaction to the effects of developing reagents:
* A solution of diphenylamine in an alcohol-acetone mixture followed by UV irradiation at a wavelength of 366 nm.
* A solution of ethylenediamine in acetone.
* A 5% solution of potassium bichromate in a mixture of sulfuric and acetic acids.

GC-MS Study

The GC-MS study was conducted on a GCQ spectrometer from Finnigan MAT (USA).
* Separation of substances was carried out in a helium stream at a speed of 60 cm/s on a DB-1 column from J&W Scientific (USA) with a diameter of 0.25 mm, a phase layer thickness of 0.25 μm, and a length of 15 m.
* The volume of the injected sample was 1 μl.
* Injector temperature - 200 °C.
* Splitless injector mode.
* Column temperature: isothermal at 70 °C for 1 min, then programmed heating at a rate of 25 °C/min to [?].
* Ion source temperature - 150 °C, interface - 250 °C.

Mass spectra of the separated substances were recorded in the chemical ionization mode with methane reagent gas in the range of negative masses...

RESEARCH / INVESTIGATIONS

1. External inspection

(conducted by the full commission of experts)

The external inspection was conducted under natural and artificial lighting.

The objects arrived in 5 cardboard boxes, each of which has a number and is sealed with a stamp bearing the inscription: "Directorate of the KGB of the USSR for the Rostov Region * Volgodonsk City Department * For packets No. 1". The integrity of the boxes and the seals on them was not compromised.

Upon opening box No. 1, the following was discovered.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Near House 50 and 52 Gagarina", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.

Upon opening box No. 2, the following was discovered.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Near house 54 Gagarina", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Behind the houses on Oktyabrskoye Highway 30, 31 - Mira 6/27", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Gagarina 70 roof", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Around the roof of house No. 60 Gagarina", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "OVD attic", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Roof of house No. 37 on Oktyabrskoye Highway", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.

Upon opening box No. 3, the following was discovered.
* A polymer bag without an inscription, inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.

Upon opening box No. 4, the following was discovered.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Two pipes from the crater at a depth of 2.5 m", inside of which there are two metal sheets.
* A polymer bag with the inscription: "Bakery premises", inside of which there are many metal fragments, some of which show traces of brisant effect.
* A polymer bag without an inscription, inside of which there is a piece of concrete.

MILITARY UNIT

— 34435 —

"12" December 1999

No. 16/3/4/1955
Moscow

To the Head of the Investigative Department
of the FSB Directorate of Russia
for the Rostov Region
Colonel of Justice
E.I. Protsenko
Rostov-on-Don, 31 Bolshaya Sadovaya St.

Ref. No. 8/6 - 705 dated 11.10.99

We are sending expert opinion No. 4/197. We request that you collect the research objects by courier or provide us with permission for their destruction.

Enclosure:
* reg. No. 16/3/4/1954, copy No. 1, on 9 sheets, protocol of the inspection of the scene of the incident dated 16.09.99, total 27 sheets, 2 cassettes.

Unit Commander
Colonel [signature] A.V. Fesenko

Incoming No. 8/922
22.12.99

[Stamp: Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Investigative Directorate. For inquiries 3]

TRUE COPY
Investigator [signature] Romanovsky V.V.

No. 8

142 attachments, video material filmed at the explosion site, soil samples, metal fragments and washings, the protocol of inspection of objects dated September 20, 1999 with attachments, a copy of the interrogation protocol of suspect Iskanderov A.I., a copy of the interrogation protocol of witness Iskanderova V.V.

Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases
of the Investigative Department of the FSB Directorate of Russia
for the Rostov Region
Major of Justice [signature] A.V. Kruglov

[Seal: Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation * Investigative Department * For inquiries 3]

TRUE COPY
Investigator [signature] Krivosheevsky V.A.

CERTIFICATE

dated 23.09.99

In connection with the terrorist act of 16.09.99 at the address quarter VU, Oktyabrskoye Shosse 35, a PAZ 32050 bus, state license plate E 381 VN 61/ RUS, manufactured in 1998, engine 1014749, body No. 0003532, white-green color, belonging to ZAO "Energostroytservis", tech. passport 52EB No. 748165, was destroyed by the explosion.

The units and metal parts of the bus remaining from the explosion (namely, the rear axle, front axle, engine, and others) are currently undergoing technical expertise at the MREO GIBDD of the city of Volgodonsk.

Head of MREO GIBDD
of the city of Volgodonsk
K.M. Krasikov

FSB Representative

TRUE COPY
Investigator
Romanovsky V.V.