O.Ch.: And what kind of result can be expected under such conditions?

S.K.: To be honest, I have not the slightest hope that we will complete our report with the words: the masterminds are such-and-such, the perpetrators are such-and-such, everything was organized in such-and-such a way. For such conclusions, we do not have the capabilities.

Our business is to most carefully collect and analyze all the information available to us, without stopping in advance at any of the versions. I emphasize: our commission cannot, at least for now, answer the question—who is to blame? These explosions were a powerful factor in President Putin's election campaign. This is a fact. They were used by the team that brought Putin to the presidency 100 percent. This was one of the strongest psychological factors in Putin's election campaign.

This fact, of course, can be interpreted according to the principle: look for who benefits. But on such a basis, conclusions cannot be made: facts are needed here, not speculation.

All we can do is carefully collect facts, generalize them, and analyze them. Among these facts, official information occupies a very important place. I hope that with our activity, our attention to everything that is said officially about the explosions, we will in some sense help the investigation. Our pestering of the official authorities is a way to add energy to them and a way to get an answer from them. But, I repeat, so far our efforts in this sense are in vain.