Union State Project Alternative

Preparing for War

On 5 March, a group of armed Chechens wearing masks brazenly seized
General Gennadii Shpigun, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian
MVD in Chechnya, as he was about to board a plane at Severnyi airport in
Groznyi. Shpigun’s kidnapping served as a pivotal justification for the
beginning of planning for a second war in Chechnya. (Roughly a year later,
the murdered Shpigun’s remains were discovered in Chechnya.
58) At the
beginning of the year 2000, “Former Interior Minister and Premier Sergei
Stepashin told Interfax on 27 January that preparations for a new military
operation in Chechnya began in March 1999, shortly after the abduction in
Groznyi of [Shpigun]...’”
We shall examine the question of what groups
were responsible for Shpigun’s kidnapping later on in this essay.
At the end of March 1999, a meeting was held of the Russian power
ministers—MVD chairman Stepashin, Defense Minister Igor’ Sergeev, head of

57 Aleksandr Khinshtein, “Okhota na ved’m,” MK.ru, 10 April 1999. On the removal of
these two officials, see too: Yurii Kochergin, Leonid Krutakov, “Operatsiya vzorovannyi
mir,” MK.ru, 24 September 1999. On the abolishing of UKROSO, see: “Ocherednaya
reorganizatsiya proizvedena v strukture Federal’noi Sluzhby RF,” RIA Novosti, 2 April
1999.
“Sudmedeksperty opoznali Shpiguna,” Gazeta.ru, 13 June 2000.
RFE-RL Newsline, 28 January 2000.
the General Staff of the Armed Forces Anatolii Kvashnin, and FSB director
Vladimir Putin—which adopted a plan of intervention in Chechnya that would
result in the creation of a sanitary cordon around the republic; the creation of
a zone of occupation that would extend to the Terek River in northern
Chechnya; and also the taking under control of Chechnya’s border with
Georgia. “In April, this plan received the approval of the Security Council,
which Putin had just taken command of.”
Yeltsin had named Putin secretary
of the Security Council on 29 March.
While Yeltsin had to have officially approved this plan—the Security Council
was an advisory body to him—it is known that Prime Minister Evgenii
Primakov had strong objections to it. Primakov, citing budgetary exigencies
“which prevented the diverting of a single kopeck [to a new military
operation],” also underlined the fact that the Georgian authorities were not
giving permission to Russian forces to cross Georgian territory in order to
take control of the border with Chechnya.
Primakov’s fierce objections seem to
have prevented an implementation of this plan until after his removal in
mid-May.

The Sacking of Primakov

It was the ousting of Primakov, following in the wake of the removal of
General Bordyuzha two months previously, which cleared the way for the
unfettered rule of the radical group referred to in the Russian media as the
Family. On 2 June, the newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta reported that on the
previous day “a group of people close to the president—Tat’yana D’yachenko,
Aleksandr Voloshin, Vladimir Putin, Dzhakhan Pollyeva and Gleb Pavlovskii—
discussed their strategy for the future in connection with the new situation
which had been created following the formation of the government of Sergei
Stepashin.”
This meeting was reportedly devoted to exploring ways in
which maximum pressure could be put on two television channels perceived
as insufficiently loyal to Yeltsin and his entourage.
In an investigative article entitled “The Six Days’ War,” the newspaper
Kommersant-Vlast’ sought to elucidate the reasons for Primakov’s removal
and for the appointment of Stepashin as his successor. “[T]he condition of
Yeltsin’s health unexpectedly worsened,” the weekly reported, “There
appeared to be a danger that in the heat of conflict with the Duma Yeltsin for
objective reasons might once again have to cease being involved in affairs.
This danger required the Yeltsin team to force matters. As the sources of

60 Lorrain, La Mystérieuse ascension, p. 418, footnote 2. Lorrain writes that “personal
sources” provided him with this information.
Ibid., p. 418. In footnote three on this page, Lorrain cites a “conversation with
Primakov” as his source for this information. In his previous capacity as head of the SVR,
Primakov had argued against the first invasion of Chechnya at a 29 November 1994
meeting of the Security Council. On this, see John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya:
Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.
208.
Nikolai Ul’yanov, “To li sensatsiya, to li provokatsiya,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 June
1999.
Kommersant-Vlast’ maintain, in adopting the decision there took part—
directly or indirectly—the following persons: Tat’yana D’yachenko, Valentin
Yumashev (by telephone from abroad), Boris Berezovsky (by telephone, and
through his allies in Yeltsin’s entourage), Roman Abramovich, Aleksandr
Voloshin, Anatolii Chubais, and Vladimir Gusinskii. The names of others, if
they exist, are not being cited.”
By 8 May, the account continued, the contest for the premiership had
narrowed down to two candidates, MVD minister Stepashin and Nikolai
Aksenenko, minister of transportation. Oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and
Roman Abramovich were said to be strongly backing Aksenenko, but Anatolii
Chubais was reported to be vigorously opposed. “He believes that naming
Aksenenko would overly strengthen the position of Boris Berezovsky,” the
account noted. The two front-runners remained neck and neck for several
days: “Two draft decrees were prepared: one concerning the naming of
acting premier Nikolai Aksenenko, and the second, concerning the naming of
acting premier Sergei Stepashin.” On the evening of 11 May, however, “a
meeting was held in the Kremlin which took a decision to name Stepashin
acting premier.” It is known that Chubais played the key role in gaining
Stepashin’s appointment.
On 12 May, Kommersant-Vlast’ wrote, Primakov arrived at the Kremlin for a
prearranged meeting with the president. “Yeltsin informs the premier of his
removal—the decree, he says, has already been signed. Primakov expresses
his disagreement with the decision. The president embraces the premier.
Thirty minutes after that the president receives Sergei Stepashin and informs
him of his decision to name him acting prime minister... After that, in
telephone conversations with Gennadii Seleznev [speaker of the Duma] and
Egor Stroev [speaker of the Council of the Federation], Boris Yeltsin
pronounces another name of a candidate for premier—Nikolai Aksenenko. In
the Kremlin this mistake is explained by the fact that Yeltsin’s memory
betrayed him.” (In his memoirs, Yeltsin confides that he was playing a crude
joke on the two houses of parliament.
64)
Two days later, the State Duma held its long-awaited vote on the
impeachment of President Yeltsin. As the authors of the volume The Putin
Epoch observed: “The removal of Primakov confused all the cards of the
Duma members.” On all points of the impeachment indictment, the deputies
failed to gain the necessary 300 votes. (The closest they came was on the
point of indictment titled “On unleashing the [first] war in Chechnya,” where
there were 283 votes for, 43 against, and four spoiled ballots. Those favoring
impeachment of Yeltsin had fallen a mere seventeen votes short.) “The result
of the vote,” the authors of The Putin Epoch observe, “was a decisive victory
for the Presidential Administration... The nomination of Sergei Stepashin for
the post of chairman of the government was conditioned by the fact that he
turned out to be ‘in the right place at the right time.’... As far as one can

63 Igor’ Klochkov, “Shestidnevnaya voina,” Kommersant-Vlast’, 18 May 1999. It is
doubtful that Gusinskii, who was already at this time perceived as an opponent of the
Kremlin, would have been involved in this decision.
Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, p. 287.
judge, Yeltsin had had been more impressed with Nikolai Aksenenko.
However, Aksenenko’s candidacy elicited revulsion on the part of other
groups of the pro-presidential coalition (first of all, Anatolii Chubais). It also
became obvious that a conflict-free acceptance of Aksenenko by the Duma
would not occur: he was immediately perceived by the deputies not as a ‘big
businessman’ close to them in spirit but as a creature of the ‘Family.’”65

Preparations for Emergency Rule

But what if the State Duma had passed even a single article of
impeachment? On 5 July 1999, a leading pro-democracy publication, Novaya
gazeta published the text of a draft presidential decree which had come into
the possession of one of its editors, Duma deputy Yurii Shchekochikhin. “In
connection with the aggravation of the political and criminal situation,” the
draft decree read, and also given the existence of “mass disturbances
accompanied by violence threatening the life and security of citizens and the
normal activity of state institutions,” Emergency Rule was to be instituted
throughout Russia from 13 May until an unspecified date in July.66 Sergei
Stepashin was to be named head of the Temporary Administration to
administer the country during this period, while retired general Aleksandr
Lebed’ (a protégé of Berezovsky), the governor of Krasnoyarsk krai, was to
become Stepashin’s deputy. During the period that Emergency Rule was in
effect, “The conducting of gatherings, meetings, street processions and
demonstrations and other mass measures” would be prohibited, while “a
special regime of entry and exit and also a special order for the movement of
citizens” would be instituted. All firearms and ammunition would be seized
from citizens while all “illegal armed formations” would be disbanded.
That the Yeltsin Family were prepared to proceed with the imposition of
Emergency Rule throughout Russia, Yurii Shchekochikhin noted, was
demonstrated, inter alia, by the fact that, “According to our sources, A.I.
Lebed’ was summoned to Moscow on the 11
th [of May] in the evening and left
Moscow on the 13th.”67 The threat of authoritarian rule had been narrowly
averted, but its shadow would remain suspended over Russia in the months
to come.
The most likely explanation of this whole episode is that Yeltsin and his
entourage feared that Primakov might in some way resist his dismissal and
try to mobilize political forces to support him. However, once Primakov had
meekly accepted his dismissal, Lebed’ could safely be sent back to
Krasnoyarsk, because now the Kremlin was confident that impeachment
would fail the next day.

Valerii Fedorov and Avtandil Tsuladze, Epokha Putina: Tainy i zagadki “kremlevskogo
dvora” (Moscow: Algoritim, 2003), pp. 77-79.
“Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii o vvedenii chrezvychainogo polozheniya na
territorii...” Novaya gazeta, 5 July 1999.
Yurii Shchekochikhin, “Nado perenosit’ prezidenta, a ne vybory,” Novaya gazeta, 5 July
1999. Shchekochikhin died on 2 July 2003, perhaps as the result of intentional poisoning.
On this see ten articles appearing in the 1 July 2004 issue of Novaya gazeta.

Union State Project

Another plan which the Yeltsin Family had been considering before and during
this period was the so-called “Union State Project” or “Milosevic variant.” A
pro-Yeltsin Duma deputy, Nikolai Gonchar, proposed that a popular
referendum be conducted on the subject of introducing the post of a
popularly elected president of a new Union State which would include both the
Russian Federation and Belarus’. According to Gonchar’s plan, it was
proposed to conduct two referendums—a consultative one (“Do you support
the reunification of Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus’ into a
single state, in which the head of state and the organs of legislative power
are popularly elected?”) and one ratifying the new union treaty.
Under
Gonchar’s plan, it was proposed that presidential elections in Russia should be
postponed until the resolution of the fate of the Union State.
The central problem with this scheme was that the then State Duma “did not
intend to adopt decisions leaving the president a hope of becoming the head
of this Union. Therefore the problem of forming a Duma fully loyal to the
president and his family emerged as the top priority.”
In addition, the
Russian political establishment feared that “as a result of realizing the
integration idea A. Lukashenka [the president of Belarus’] would sooner or
later emerge on the Russian political scene.”
Finally, Yeltsin’s rapidly
declining health served to render this “Milosevic-style” alternative less
feasible as a long-term solution to the Family’s problems.