Interviewer: Okay, just a second. We are very grateful to you for agreeing to meet with us. Well, to start, I would like you to tell us how you... well, a little bit about where you are from and how you studied, how you became a lawyer, and how you generally approached that moment in life when you began to participate in this commission?

Lev: I am not a lawyer, I am a human rights activist. And I have been doing human rights work since 1991. I was acquainted with an outstanding Soviet dissident, Father Gleb Yakunin, the priest Gleb Yakunin. He was a defender of the rights of believers back in Soviet times, he served time in camps as a political prisoner. I was closely acquainted with him, and he invited me to work in the Supreme Soviet, which existed until '93, then the Duma appeared. And from '91, I worked continuously in parliament until 2004. First it was called the Supreme Soviet of Russia, then, when this Supreme Soviet was shelled, the State Duma—I worked constantly in three Dumas, and in the fourth on a voluntary basis. At the same time, I wrote a lot on human rights topics. There was such a Public Chamber under the President of Russia, back under Yeltsin, on human rights. I was its executive secretary. I worked with all the human rights organizations that exist in Russia: the Moscow Helsinki Group, Memorial, the "For Human Rights" movement, and specialized ones. I dealt specifically with freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, the topic of drugs and human rights, and the topic of alternative civilian service. I was, in fact, the main worker on the law regarding this service. And it still exists today; the law is solid and has stood even during the current war. And after the events of '99 occurred, those explosions of two houses in Moscow, in Volgodonsk, and then the strange story in Ryazan, either an attempted terrorist act or exercises... Well, we'll talk about that. At that time, starting from 2000, I worked with Sergei Adamovich Kovalyov. He was also, in general, a great man. He was a deputy of the State Duma from the Union of Right Forces faction. Before that, I worked with Yabloko, and from 2000 with him and the Union of Right Forces, meaning with Nemtsov. I was also, in general, on professional terms with Nemtsov. He was the chairman of the faction in the Duma, also murdered.

Interviewer: I wanted to ask... well, we know, of course, that you worked with the commission that Kovalyov created. Generally, how common were such commissions at that time? Was it... well, was it a normal thing that such a commission was created?

Lev: No. This commission is unique in its own way. There were attempts at public commissions regarding the events of '93, that is, when Yeltsin carried out a forced constitutional reform, when the Supreme Soviet was shelled. Mostly the communists, first of all, they created a Duma commission in the second State Duma, where the communists had almost a majority. And they were, in general, investigating something there. That was the only case known to me. No, well, regarding some local events somewhere on the ground, something might have happened, some kind of stirring. But, in general, this was... our commission was unique in its own way.

Interviewer: And how... how did it happen that such a commission was created? What were the steps before that?

Lev: The thing is that it was exactly in 2000 that the third State Duma was convened. And there was an initiative first by Sergei Nikolayevich Yushenkov, a deputy from the same Union of Right Forces faction, though he later left it and created the Liberal Russia party. He raised the question of creating a parliamentary commission to investigate the events of 1999, the bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk.

Interviewer: So, specifically only about this event, about these events?

Lev: Yes. About these... these are related events, clearly, there was a certain... there was a certain set, let's say, you can't separate anything. Ryazan—it's all connected, naturally. Only about these events. Well, and what is connected with them, what led to them, ultimately, and some things a bit broader from the point of view of the problem itself of such state terror or state indifference, at the very least, and most likely, the use of non-state terror in the interests of state... well, not state, but the interests of individuals who sought to seize power and seized it, in the end, as we see. And Yushenkov raised the question in the Duma about creating such a commission, a parliamentary commission. Because a parliamentary investigation is, in general, the right of the parliament to conduct investigations into significant public events, its representative function. And 172 deputies voted for it, with 226 required. That is, the pro-government factions—at that time United Russia didn't exist yet, it was Putin's first term, back then he didn't even seem so scary, and there were some positive moments related to human rights in the beginning. For instance, the prison population began to decrease, we were very happy about that, because under Yeltsin we had a colossal number of prisoners, more than a million. During Putin's first term, this decreased by half. So there were certain illusions. And in the Duma it was possible... the democratic and left opposition didn't have a majority, even combined. But still there was a sufficient number... the government factions didn't have a constitutional majority, that is, they couldn't decide issues requiring two-thirds of the votes. But for this commission, fewer voted than... it didn't pass, fewer than required. Then after some time, the same question was raised from the other side by Sergei Nikolayevich Yushenkov, he was like a democrat, a liberal. And from the left side, from the side of the statists, so to speak, even patriots, there was a deputy named Viktor Alksnis, of Latvian origin, Alksnis. He also raised the same question about creating a commission. This was already when ours was created, well, literally right away. Maybe he wanted the Duma to act as a counterweight to ours, because ours was still... there were no communists or such patriots in the commission, there was a certain political spectrum of participants. Well, because we invited those we were used to working with. And there were also the same 172 votes cast for the commission. That is, again it didn't pass. The same 172, those who were capable of voting for this in the third Duma. This was late 2001, early 2002. And then Sergei Yushenkov and Sergei Kovalyov, they decided together to create such a public commission, which included four deputies. Because without having deputy powers and opportunities, it would have been completely useless. You could only search for something on the internet. No one would talk to you. There were such attempts, but they were all useful, probably, in their own way, so to speak, from below. But those were such private initiatives, private. And here we had four deputies: the chairman of the commission Kovalyov, his deputy Yushenkov, and two more deputies—Yuri Shchekochikhin from Yabloko and Valery Pakhmelkin from the Union of Right Forces as well, but he also left, he was a co-chairman of Liberal Russia along with Yushenkov. He is still alive today, but he has moved away from the opposition and deals with such harmless things. I don't think he would agree to talk on this topic now. Well, an attempt can be made. He was, in general, one of those four deputies who worked with us. Then there were human rights activists: Lev Ponomarev, currently alive, you can talk to him on this topic, he lives in Paris now. Valery Borshchev, also alive, a former deputy from Yabloko, I worked with him for four years straight. And me as a human rights activist. Well, and there were well-known public figures, journalists, several such major, well-known ones who were involved in investigations: Otto Latsis, there was such a journalist, who became famous back in Soviet times, and Gennadiy Zhavoronkov. And several other people, including one... I still managed to find one, a resident of the bombed house. I won't mention his last name, because I think now he wouldn't... He was a fairly calm, cautious person, but he still took the risk and voted together on the commission, so to speak, made decisions with us. He is the only one who in 2002 agreed to join this commission. And even so, I don't venture to name him now given the current political situation in Russia. He most likely lives in Russia, but I just don't know, I don't have contact with him now.

Interviewer: Did Politkovskaya have anything to do with it?

Lev: No, Politkovskaya didn't, but... no, well, she certainly addressed the topic itself, but she didn't work with the commission. It just didn't happen. Но у нас вот была группа экспертов, в том числе Каринна Москаленко прежде всего, потом адвокат и бывший сотрудник ФСБ, замечательный человек Михаил Трепашкин. He lives in Russia now, I think. He suffered for this case and even served time. Well... well, he didn't serve for this, he served for some bullets planted on him. He's a former officer, what bullets? An FSB officer. For some weapon that wasn't registered, hanging on the wall. Well, some nonsense. They planted something else on him there. He served four years. He helped us a lot. Valentin Gefter, such a human rights activist, we traveled with him. Well, and that's basically everyone. And we worked, we were involved in this case as long as we had deputy cover. Because we could send inquiries, we could ensure some publicity. But the most important thing was, of course, still the law on the status of a deputy, which gave us the opportunity to receive at least formal, even if evasive, answers.

Interviewer: So the commission had the right to summon...

Lev: To summon—no, but at least to write. Yes, at least to write, to receive an answer, a deputy inquiry, to try to make a parliamentary inquiry. Но депутатский запрос — это все-таки что-то. When Sergei Nikolayevich Yushenkov was murdered in April 2003—it's a dark story, I won't go into details now, but the fact that his very great activity in this direction... he was, you could say, the motor of the commission. Sergei Adamovich was, after all, already an elderly man and not very healthy by that time. Now he is deceased. We certainly lacked that energy that Yushenkov had when he was gone. But we still... I believe that even now, in general, while we are involved, while we are talking with you on this topic—this is all a continuation of the commission's activities. It is in such a dormant, semi-dormant mode.

Interviewer: When... well, so you were telling us who... who the members of the commission were. What was the reaction in general? In short, we... you created it, in the end, well, it was the third time, you tried...

Lev: We created it, yes, a public initiative already, not...

Interviewer: Yes, and... and you created the commission. What was the reaction in general from others, from... from the Duma, from the government? What was the reaction?

Lev: Negative. Absolutely unambiguous. Well, the journalists, of course, back then... now they wouldn't even write about it. If such a thing happened, but it wouldn't happen, because in the Duma I can't name a single person, not a single one in the Duma, who would agree to even, if not create, then join this commission.

Interviewer: And was the public interested?

Lev: In 2002, the public was already a little bit frightened. Not like now, when everyone goes like sheep, gets mobilized, and everything is cemented, asphalted, and nothing can break through... well, of course, it will break through sooner or later. But already in 2002, there was a situation aimed at today, a vector. It was already felt. The reaction of people not connected with this, we didn't really feel it at all. Well, journalists could write. They wrote about us constantly, and we had, in general, great information support from print publications, from the radio, starting with Liberty, Echo of Moscow, we worked with them constantly, talked. Internet publications had already... many had appeared by then.

Interviewer: You just said that these... these events that were around the creation of the commission and so on, it was... well, you feel a direct chain from there to the present...

Lev: Yes.

Interviewer: Tell us a little bit about why, how you think?

Lev: Here's what's important. I'll say it right away, and then we'll return to the conversation about what formally... what the scope of the commission's activities was, what it was doing. And here I would say right away, without delay, that there are like two such main versions. There are many intermediate ones, we won't talk about them now. The official version is that these were indeed... the house bombings were organized by Chechen terrorists, and, basically, that's it. They had to be caught, they had to be destroyed, and therefore the second Chechen war began after these bombings. Well, they don't officially state this connection, but the official version is: Chechens blew them up, Chechen terrorists blew up the houses. And that's it. And that's the whole story. The opposite version, which was voiced by Litvinenko, Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer, an FSB employee who emigrated to London, and together with the historian and journalist living in America, Yuri Felshtinsky, wrote the book "FSB Blows Up Russia." Well, accordingly, it was proven there, as it were, that it was the work of the secret services, that the houses were blown up by Chekists, KGB men or FSB men, as they are called now. I can... as an opinion not only mine, but also Kovalyov's, which he can no longer voice now, but he did voice it. Our opinion is that, unfortunately, maybe, or I don't know, fortunately... no, rather unfortunately. Unfortunately, in Litvinenko and Felshtinsky's book, there are no proofs of the kind that can be considered proofs, that could be considered proofs in court... Imagine a court, and what is stated in the book, can it serve as proof that the FSB blew up the houses? We believe—here I am speaking for myself and for Kovalyov, well, and, in general, for almost the entire commission with whom I spoke—that no. But the official version doesn't stand up to any criticism either. And here, it seems to me, the main result of our work, it is, in general, no less... no less serious and no less, in general, harsh towards the authorities. Because our commission's work showed that the Russian authorities or the ruling regime, one can already say so, did everything possible so that there would be no public... no attention, no public proceedings, no truth about this at all. It would seem, well, it's just a tradition, whether Soviet or in general, that our people are silent. And any attempts to say something, to show initiative of political independence somewhere... well, in the 90s it was like that, but then the 2000s came, and all this must be stopped. But that's like that, but in fact it's more. Looking from today, everything already looks a bit different. Because back then we proceeded from the fact that... well, when we discussed among ourselves: well yes, it was profitable for them, for the authorities, it was profitable for Putin in order to start the war, to come to power. He came to power on this, on these bombings. "Waste them in the outhouse"—that was, you know, launched. And still... well, maybe, everything can be, there some indirect... some representatives of the FSB, former ones, maybe, who are connected with the criminal world, including the Chechen one, somehow influenced someone there, and Putin took advantage of it. Such were the ideas. Well, how can an order still be given to blow up residential buildings with people in order to achieve some political goals? Well, to ourselves we thought that anything can be expected from this government. Still, such a thing as... well, there was the Stalinist terror, that's clear, yes, there were many in Russia of suppressions there of violent various popular dissenting movements and initiatives. Someone was executed there, the Decembrists were executed, then Stalin destroyed millions of people, yes, that all happened. But still, even Stalin didn't blow up houses in Moscow with all the people living there: children, old people. Still, it's somehow even more outrageous—to blow up houses, to blow them into the air at night. But now, when the third year is already... three years the war in Chechnya has been going on practically... and they blow up houses, in general... well, it doesn't matter, one country, two countries, they blow up houses with people, and with their own people at that. Well, basically, all people have the same rights. And even if it happened in Syria, it would be... But when it's here, in Kyiv... and in Kyiv there are a huge... millions of Muscovites, Russians there in Kyiv have brothers, sisters, just relatives. The same kind of people as in Moscow, who are not only all of us humans, but also like relatives in the literal sense. Brother is set against brother like that. And so if there is enough not only... well, such bandit courage to go for this, but also the attempt to justify it, to say that it is necessary, it is... we will do it and we don't intend to end it, and we will generally destroy Ukraine and all that, everything that is happening now, there when cities are wiped out, captured ones, from the face of the earth, like Mariupol, for example, Bucha... And the same kind of houses, like those that were blown up in Moscow, two houses, the same kind are being blown up now all over Ukraine by the Russian armed forces. Then it, in general, you begin to understand that if a thousand houses can be blown up in Ukraine, then blowing up two houses for the sake of one's political... and for the same goals at that. Back then, two houses, well, three houses including Volgodonsk, actually blown up... how many more attempts there were, we don't know. Back then that was enough to come to power, to hold power. To hold power at this stage, three houses were no longer enough. It's already necessary to wage wars... war on... in all directions. For now Ukraine, God grant, with this... at least it won't expand, but anything can be. They are already declaring, they are already, that we want both to the left and to the right, everything for you, you know, to set everything on fire everywhere. Therefore, today there is no more evidence, and our commission cannot say that we proved that the FSB... and not only we didn't prove it, but Litvinenko and Felshtinsky didn't prove it either.

Interviewer: If possible, let's go back a bit to that time when the commission was created. So, well, already on the third attempt you managed to create this commission. Were there deputies who voted against the creation of the commission?

Lev: There weren't. 13 people, mostly Zhirinovsky's LDPR. 13 people. I remember one vote, I don't remember the second. 13 people. The government factions didn't vote.

Interviewer: And all the rest, how did they vote—for?

Lev: All the rest were for. To break through back then there was the Unity party separately, the Fatherland party separately, then from them United Russia was formed. It was... United Russia was already by the end of 2003 as the ruling party, so to speak.

Interviewer: And after the creation of the commission, did you feel... well, in general, there was major support for the commission then, it turns out, in parliament. And did you feel support also from those people, from someone, who, in principle, should have shown that they were against... well, they didn't interfere with us at least. Those official leaders didn't get involved in this, the democratic leaders. But they didn't interfere and, in general, they supported us, of course. They supported... well, how... the topic was generally considered forbidden, in its own way. A bit dangerous. Even then it was considered a topic that was better not to touch. It's like in Russian history Boris Godunov, the Tsar, killed or didn't kill—historians argue about it, well, according to the traditional version, he killed Tsarevich Dmitry in order to come to power, to ascend the Moscow throne. There was such an attitude among many, that well, maybe something was indeed very, very bad there, but Putin—we will find a common language with him, he... yes, he might be, if he is badly influenced, if he is well influenced, then it will be, maybe, even better. At least he doesn't drink. Such were the ideas in the quasi-liberal, semi-liberal environment back then. Back then he organized all sorts of attractive events that disposed people towards him: there was such a Civil Forum gathered, where everyone was invited. The late Lyudmila Mikhailovna Alexeyeva, chairwoman of the Moscow Helsinki Group, our greatest human rights activist, sat on the presidium next to Putin. Everyone gathered there, those involved in human rights, and in general NGO people, NGO people in the sense of non-governmental organizations, almost in the Kremlin, that is, in the Kremlin, right in the Kremlin, yes. And Putin was there, so good, smooth, and fluffy. But even then much was, of course, clear, and Kovalyov didn't harbor any illusions about him for a minute.

Interviewer: Well, so it turns out that Putin, as it were, well, showed that he gave the go-ahead for this, as if he was helping.

Lev: Well yes, yes. That is, as it were... well, we all understood that he, well, FSB, he's from the FSB, of course, he has this professional, not very good background, well, or maybe good in the KGB of the USSR. But he was a small fry there, then he worked with Sobchak, and Sobchak was a prominent democrat, he was his deputy, devotedly then looked after his family. Well, I think the mother of Ksenia Sobchak, Narusova, is still sitting in the Federation Council, I think she's sitting there, a senator. No one touches her, she even has the unique right here to say something a little bit, to object to something. But she doesn't go far. And already from 2001, the adoption of that whole body of laws began, which Putin as a legalist—he is a lawyer after all, and he built the system specifically as a legislative, well, and institutional system that would ensure the omnipotence of the secret services. He turned Russia—they say totalitarian, they say authoritarian state—I believe it is primarily a police state. Specifically a police state, where the police, the siloviki, all the power structures are in power. Primarily, of course, the FSB, headed by the FSB.

Interviewer: Of those who participated in the commission, the members of the commission, was there initially disagreement between them or unanimity? They all doubted... well, how... I formulated the question poorly. Well, the commission was created in order to consider these events in Moscow. The members of the commission, did they all suspect that the state itself was set...

Lev: Well, many thought... no, there were no disagreements. There were only disagreements, and even those were overcome, the majority agreed with us. Well, we proceeded primarily from the considerations that the public investigation itself is a certain value, that this is exactly how civil society is educated, that in our Constitution to this day it is written that citizens exercise their power directly and through their representatives. Direct execution... realization of power by the people, by citizens—these are exactly such forms: public organizations, various forms of public activity, referendums, for example. Well, and all sorts of public investigations, if the need for them arises and people want to do it. And it is exactly against this, in general, that Putin has been fighting for 25 years. He destroys primarily freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of discussion, freedom of dissemination of information. Well, and all other freedoms follow, so to speak. And it would seem, can writers, journalists, even journalists, theater figures, film directors remove him from the presidency? But a struggle is waged against them in the most heated way, as traitors, the fifth column. Because, in general, the main lesson—I'll say it right away—the main lesson of our commission is that we revealed in all... in all its diversity this state policy of suppressing public freedoms. There are many examples of this. One can, of course, immediately move on to the conversation about Ryazan. But I would probably first say a little bit about what the commission was doing in general.

Interviewer: I wanted... yes, I wanted to finish for you. Yes, so I would also like to understand, so how did the commission approach this issue, what was the strategy? Yes, well, did you agree among yourselves somehow how you would proceed...

Lev: We did, yes, we met periodically, discussed what had been worked on, gathered journalists. The work proceeded, in general, like this. First of all, realizing that we had two years of deputy powers, we sent inquiries on all issues arising in connection with this... with these houses, to all official instances. We wrote deputy inquiries in large numbers. I am now talking not about the content, but about the form of work, in what forms it was conducted. Then yes, we met. The most well-known meeting, which received a great... a great resonance, was when there was an open meeting for journalists, for the public, let's even say, the interested public, an open meeting of the commission in the form of a simultaneous telelink between Moscow and London, where those involved in the same thing were: Litvinenko, Felshtinsky, Berezovsky. And here I probably should have said this earlier, when I was talking about the creation of the commission. The main reaction of the authorities—the most noticeable and clearly articulated reaction of the authorities to our commission was this: it's a PR stunt for Berezovsky. We will have nothing to do with this commission, because these are puppets controlled by Boris Abramovich Berezovsky. Well, I won't tell the pre-history of Berezovsky now...

Interviewer: But that would be interesting to us.

Lev: Well... no, telling about Berezovsky in the sense of his whole pre-history, all his activities—he was, of course, a very unique politician, a person, a businessman, who indeed became an oligarch, he turned everything in Russia, essentially, one can probably say, by his hands Putin was made, United Russia was made. Then he, you know, beat his chest, repented. And in 2001, in 2000 he became a deputy, in 2001 he threw away his deputy card and badge and left the Duma after the law on political parties and the Federation Council was passed, his elections to the Federation Council were terminated. In fact, Berezovsky, of course, yes, he strongly approved of the commission's activities. But, first of all, we didn't receive a penny from him. Therefore, we didn't receive any instructions from him. And no one worked for his PR. On the contrary, we went to London—the only thing was that where there were funds, with his funds we went to London to interview him, to talk with him, with Litvinenko, with Felshtinsky, everyone who was of interest to us around this topic there. Including some other people, I will name them when the occasion arises when we talk about this in detail. But primarily with them. And our general impression was—three of us went: Kovalyov, I, and Valentin Gefter, a human rights activist, director of the Institute for Human Rights. The conversation with Berezovsky, it, in general, convinced us that he was not telling the truth. He immediately started with the fact that he didn't know about Ryazan at all, that he didn't pay attention to it, and it would seem... he was feeling unwell, was busy with the elections to the Duma somewhere in the Komi-Permyak or Khanty-Mansiysk district, something like that, somewhere in the wilderness he was being elected, where there are few voters, easier to pass. He passed. He poured huge money in there. And this alone, the fact that he, like, Felshtinsky opened my eyes to what happened in Ryazan. It was an obvious lie. Because well, it's too much if millions of people knew, but Berezovsky, who was turning the whole Kremlin at that time, manipulating there, he, forsooth, was not in the loop. Well, and he was also convinced by some... Well, and then all the questions asked of him, they like lost their meaning. He took such a position that, like, I'm not in the loop at all and only started dealing with this in 2001, having left Russia. And what happened there—for me it's a dark forest. But now, now I understand, back then I didn't understand. A person in his position couldn't not understand. If he didn't understand, then he wasn't a politician. And he was a politician, so he understood. And our relations with him were, of course, kind of good outwardly, but we received signals that he was dissatisfied with the work of the commission.

Interviewer: In what year?

Lev: In 2002. The main part was 2002, the commission worked very actively all year. This trip to London was also a lot of work. Then this telelink on July 25, 2002. I'll give you later, I have newspaper copies of newspaper publications, there are photos here like I'll show you now. I won't just show them to you, I'll give them to you with pleasure, they might come in handy. This is the telelink. This is in London, three people are sitting there. And here is our commission, part of it. This is one article, just not copied that way. There stands Kovalyov in a bit of a funny pose. Next to him is Sergei Yushenkov. And then Borshchev, Valery. And me further on. I think we need to read this, and then...

Lev: Well yes, of course. I copied some basic things for you that can be more detailed there... there are some stories that take a very long time to tell, but which are important in all the details here. I selected such ones. Well, I'll give them to you later at the end or during the conversation. For now...

Interviewer: So tell us a little bit, how did you decide who to... well, who to talk to about these bombings? How did you select the witnesses?

Lev: Well, I'll give such an example. When the failed terrorist attack or exercises in Ryazan occurred, back then NTV television was still independent, as it were, the old NTV, Koch was there... And there was Nikolai Nikolaev's program, a wonderful journalist, a political talk show, I don't remember what it was called. Well, a talk show. People are sitting there, you know, arguing about something very excitedly. And about five or six days, less than a week, I think, passed after September 22, after it happened in Ryazan, Nikolaev gathered the public, invited the FSB. General Zdanovich came, there was such an Alexander Zdanovich then, chairman... head of the Public Relations Center. Well, PR, so to speak, media, FSB PR. Other representatives of the FSB and the Prosecutor General's Office came. And a crowd of residents of that house came. Almost everyone was let in, because about 20 people were shouting there, demanding justice, to punish those who organized it. Some military resident of the house was beating his chest: I'm an officer, I know what exercises are, exercises can't be on living people. And all this went on the air. Well, they cut it a bit, it went on the air. That was '99. Well, in September, a week after those events. No one was afraid of anything. They pushed and shoved that Zdanovich, he didn't know what to say. He looked very pathetic. We went to Ryazan with Kovalyov at the end of 2002, almost right before the New Year, December 28, we were there on the 29th, December 28, 29, 2002. Only one person from that house agreed to talk to us—an old woman. No one opened their doors. We knew they were there. We met one resident whom I had seen on television, I don't know his last name, who was also shouting there. He started shouting at us, that you're only earning money on us for your own interests, we're talking here, but it's only worse for us because of it, no one will talk to you, get out of here altogether. And that's the difference. Only three years had passed.

Interviewer: So in the end you found only one person from the Ryazan house, right?

Lev: One person, and even she spoke timidly, an old woman, who, in general, only spoke about... but she did tell us something regarding her impression. Many people said this in Nikolaev's studio, but she still repeated it uncertainly.

Interviewer: And what did she tell?

Lev: That they spilled it when they were carrying the sacks, right on the ground. We saw it, it's not at all like... by the way, about the sugar. Well, this is exactly the most, in general, terrible consequence.

Interviewer: And did you find witnesses from other houses that, well, not everyone died, in other houses where there were bombings?

Lev: Well, where there were bombings, one person agreed to work with us, to join the commission. Yushenkov handed me several letters that came to him when he was still before the commission, but he spoke in the Duma, journalists wrote about it, that Yushenkov was demanding the creation of a parliamentary commission. Several residents even wrote letters to him. They demanded justice. But when I called this person, a resident of one of the Moscow houses, when the commission was active, he said he wouldn't talk. In fact, regarding Moscow, Volgodonsk, and Ryazan, there is a huge block of questions, rows of questions, to which we wanted to get an answer, and to which they didn't give us an answer. Moreover, they only refused without fail.

Interviewer: And why?

Lev: Well, precisely because there was an instruction from above not to work with the commission. There was such an episode, I'll tell you right away. And then maybe we'll talk more systematically about Ryazan. Of course, we should start with Ryazan, because if we describe everything concerning the houses... well, you know what happened there, I won't repeat it.

Interviewer: Good. I also wanted to say if you want to rest, you just say so too.

Lev: Well yes, yes.

Interviewer: I will ask questions, but as soon as you feel you want to drink something or, you know, take some kind of break, you'll say so.

Lev: Well then, we can take a break now, I'll get everything on Ryazan so it's in front of me. Because I'll still be peeking, that's probably not very good. Pause. Yes. Action. A small pause.